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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
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DON HALVERSON,
Plaintiff / Appellant,
and
CHARLOTTE HALVERSON
Plaintiff

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official
capacities and in their individual capacities; DAN
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his
individual capacity,
Defendants / Respondents.

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Latah
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER, DISTRICT JUDGE

..............................................
DON HALVORSON
PRO SE

i1
t

RONALD J. LANDECK
TTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

this

day of

STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK

By

Deputy
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Reporter
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
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DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife)
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1
Plaintiffs,

)
)
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NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTMCT; BOARD OF
)
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)
LATAH COUNTY WIGHTYAY DISTRICT, )
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
1
HANSEN, SHEFMAN CLYDE, in their
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official capacities, and their individual
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in his official
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1

OPINION AND OKDER ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT OF I.C. tj 40-203A AND
PLAINTIFFS' &!IOTIONFOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.C. 5 67-8003(3)

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court, in tm70separate proceedings, on the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 40-203A and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment
Under I.C. fj 67-8003(3). The Court hsard oral argument on the first motioil on May 13: 2008,

OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 1
FOR DECL-1RATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. S; 40-203X
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77-,-n
,- .\
K7,T
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A n n -

and the Court heard oral argument on the second motion on May 27,2008. The Plaintiffs
proceededpro se i n the matters. The Defendants were represented by Ronald Landeck, of the
firm Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham. The Court, having heard argument and being fully
advised in these matters, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs, Dan and Charlotte Halvorson, own property in Latah County, and a portion
of this property is traversed by a road known as Camps Canyon Road. See Complaint, at 2.
Camps Canyon Road is under the jurisdiction of the North Latah County Highway District
(hereafter "Highway District").The Plaintiffs filed the Complaint ill this matter on March 3,

2008. The Complaint alleges, among other things, that the previous owners of the property in
question, the Swaisons, entered into an agreement with the Highway District in the fall of 1996.
The agreement allowed the Highway District to extend tlie roadbed of Camps Canyon Road to
the northeast and to straighten several curves, in order to meet the goal of improving, widening
and straightening Camps Canyon Road. Conzplaint, at 3. The Plaintiffs purchased the property
in question from the Swansons in December, 1996. Complaint, at 2. The Plaintiffs were aware
of the agreement to improve Camps Canyon Road at the time of the purchase. Conzplaint, at 3.
The Plaintiffs argue that there was no intendcd or implied gift of the land northeast of the
road bed of Camps Canyon Road. Complaint, at 4. The Plaintiffs argue that the "1996 alteration
changed (a) the location of the right of waflhighway, CCR, (b) tlie width of the right of
.i.vayJrhighway,
CCR, and (c) the nature or type of the right of wayihighway, CCR." Conzplaint, at
5. The Plaintiffs further argue that any "increase in width or use, or change in location or nature

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs refer to Camps Canyon Road as CCR. Further, the Plaintiffs use the abbreviation,
CFPR. in reference to constitutionally protected property rights.
OPJNION A h D ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 2
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. gIO-203A
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(type) of the public right-of-way/public higllway" where Camps Canyon Road traverses the
Plaintiffs property may be a deprivation of the Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected property
rights. Complaint, at 7. The Plaintiffs are seeking damages as a result of the alleged unlawful
taking of their property due to the alterations made to Camps Canyon Road.
Currently before the Court are two motions for declaratory judgment: the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. fj 40-203A and the Plaintifb7Motion for Declaratory
Judgment Under I.C. § 67-8003(3). In the first, the Plaintiffs are seeking an order which would
require the Highway District to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or public rightof-way, specifically Camps Canyon Road, pursuant to I.C. § 40-203A. In the second, the
Plaintiffs are asking this Court to make a determination regarding the validity of the
governmental action with regard to the modifications of Camps Canyon Road, pursuant to I.C. fj
67-5003(3).

ANALYSTS
As stated above, the Plaintiffs are seeking resolution of certain matters from the pending
civil action by way of declaratory judgment. As to both motions for declaratory judgment, the
Higfiway Department argues that such determination is not appropriate in light of the underlying
civil action which addresses the issues currently before the Court.
I.C. $ 10-1201 authorizes the Court to issue a declaratory judgment, M-hichhas the force
and effect of a final judgment or d e ~ r e e ~. ~ n person
y
with interest under a deed, will, written or

I.C. $ 10-1201 states:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall ha\ e power to declare rights, status, and oxher
legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No zction or proceeding shall be open
to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed fcr. The declaration may be
OPINION A h B ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' IvTOTION 3
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oral contract, or whose rights are affected by statute may seek a declaratory judgment to
detennine questions of construction or validity. I.C.

5 10-1202.'

"The Declaratory Judgment

Act authorizes courts to declare rights, status, and other legal relations." Farmers Ins. Exchange
v. Tucker, 142 Iddio 191, 193-94, 125 P.3d 1069-70; see also I.C.

5 10-1201.

"Where the

proceeding involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined
as in other actions." Id. at 194, 125 P.3d at 1070; see also I.C. 5 10-1209.
At the outset, the Court recognizes the Plaintiffs are not precluded from seeking
declaratory judgnent at the same time they are proceeding in a civil action. According to
I.R.C.P. 57, "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."
The determination whether a trial court should grant or dismiss a petition for declaratory
relief where there is a pending action involving the same issue was first addressed by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Scott v. ~ ~ r i c u l t kProdztcts.
al
Corp, k c . , 102 Idaho 147, 627 P.2d 326
(1981). The Scott Court relied on guidance from the federal courts on this question. Id. at 149,

Several federal courts have held that where another suit is pending it is
proper for a court to refuse to entertain a request for declaratory relief, or
alternatively stay the request until the pending action is adjudicated, if the pending
action involves identically the same issues as those raised by the declaratory

3

4

either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effcct of a
final jud-pent, or decree.
I.C. 5 10-1203 states:
Any person interested under a deed, will, witten contract or other writings constituting a contract or any
oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or fkanchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder.

"However, since Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the procedures for obtaining
declaratory relief, is virtually identical to Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal case law is of
assistance in determining whether the trial court's dismissal here anlountxl to error." Id.
OPINION Ah33 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' ,MOTION 4
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judgment action. . . . The rationale advanced is that because of convenience,
efficiency and expediency, it is necessary to insist that the parties to the
declaratory judgment action assert their claim in the pending action so as to avoid
the evils inherent in a multiplicity of actions. . . . The rule is subject to one
important caveat: the pending action must necessarily settle those issues raised in
the declaratory judgment action.
Id. (internal citations omitted). It is with this background in mind that the Court addresses each
of the Plaintiffs' motions for declaratory relief.

1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 40-230A seeks an advisory
opinion.

The Plaintiffs' first motion for declaratory judowent regarding whether the Highway
District must hold a validation hearing seeks an advisory opinion from the Court regarding the
duties of the Highway District and whether the Highway District must be required to hold public
proceedings in order to validate Camps Canyon Road as a public highway. Idaho's Declaratoly
Judgment Act does not permit the Court to issue an advisory opinion. Guidance on this issue is
provided inNoh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002).
Idalio has adopted the federal justiciability requirement. Harris at 5 16,
68 1 P.2d 988. Federal justiciability is constitutionally based. Congress may not
circumvent it. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Alurton, 405 U.S. 727,732 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. .
1361, 1365 n. 3, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 n. 3 (1971).
Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. I11 federal courts to render
advisory opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 3 1 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed.
246, or to entertain "friendlyt suits, U~zitedStatt?sv. Joh;rzson, 3 19 U.S. 302, 63
S.Ct. 1075, 87 L.Ed. 1413, or to resolve "political questions," Luther v. Burden, 7
How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 58 1, because suits of this character are inconsistent m-iththe
judicial function under Art. 111.

I.C. $ 40-203A sets fo13h the procedures for initiating public proceedings to validate a
highway or public right-of-way. The statute permits any resident or property holder within the
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county or highway district to initiate the proceedings or the commissioners may validate such
proceedings on their own resolution. Specifically:
Any resident or property holder w-ithin a county or highway district system,
including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the federal
government, may petition the board of county of highway district commissioliers
. . . to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or public right-of-way, . . .
provided that the petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as determined by the
commissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings, or the commissioners may
initiate validation proceedings on their OWTI resolution . . . .

The Plaintiffs pose questions which would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion.
For example, "Although there may be better paths (Due Process) to resolution, is I.C. $40-203a
[sic] a manner under which the nature (type), width, location, and use of a right of waylhighway
may be questioned and resolved?" Plaint@ ' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of l: C. f 40-

Further, through motion for declaratory judgment, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to
require the Highway District to hold validation proceedings. The Plaintiffs argue that the fee
requirement of I.C.

8 40-203A(1) is a violation of due process, and argue that the Highway

District should be co~npelledto initiate proceedings on their own resolution. Tlie Court,
however, can find no authority through ~vhichit can mandate the Highway District to act at the
Plaintiffs request, nor is the Court convinced that the fee requirement of the statute is
unreasonable. Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. $'
LEO-203a is denied.
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2. The PIaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 3 67-8003(3) is best

resolved through the underlying civil action.

The Plaintiffs' second motion for declaratory judgment is pursuant to I.C. $ 67-8003(3) of
the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act. This motion realleges claims made in the Plaintiffs'
Complaint; specifically, negligence, trespass, takings, and damages claims. The Defendants
argue that the particular relief sought pursuant to the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act requires a
"regulatory taking," or final decision. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs have presented no
facts which support the argument that a final decision has been made. Plaintiffs, on the other
hand, argue that the Highway District made a final determination when it recommended to them
that they should hire counsel, or in the alternative, that by failing to make a determination, the
Highway District has acted in a manner that allows for review.

It is not necessary for the Court to make a determination whether a final determination
was made by the Highway District because the issues presented by the Plaintiffs; negligence,
trespass, takings, and damages claims, are appropriately addressed in the underlying civil action.
Before making a determination of declaratory judgment, the Court would need to hold an
evidentiary hearing in order to resolve factual issues in question. For purposes of judicial
economy, and for reasons of convenience, sfficiency, and expediency, it is not beneficial to hold
separate evidentiary hearings for purposes of declaratory judgment. See Scott, 102 Idaho at 149,
627 P.2d at 328. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Jud,gnent Under I.C. fj 678003(3) is denied, and determination of the claims presented will be appropriately considered
through the underlying civil matter.
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CONCLUSION
Pending bzfore this Coui-t are the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5
40-203a and Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003(3). The first
motion requires the Court to issue an advisory opinion, which is not an appropriate role of the
judiciary. Further, both n~otionsfor declaratory judgment are appropriately addressed through
the underlying civil action. For reasons of judicial economy, both niotions for declaratory
judgment are denied.

ORDER
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 5 40-203A is hereby DENTED.
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.
DEhTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this q h a y of June 2008.

CARL B..KERRICK - District Judge
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5 67-8003(3) is hereby

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION Ai.W ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF 1.C. 6 40-203A AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
R I.C. 5 67-5003(3) was mailed, postage prepaid, by
the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho,
of June, 2008, on:
Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick ID 8353 7
Ronald Landeck
LANnECK WESTBERG JUDGE & GRAHAM
P 0 Box 9344
Moscow ID 83843
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE.: SECOND SUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)

1

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

CASE NO. CV-08-00180
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCHEDULING CONFEl?J3NCE

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
1
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
)
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT,)
ORLAND -BERG,
RICHARD
)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
official capacities, and their individual
)
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official
capacity and in his individual capacity,
)
Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Friday, the 8~ day of August, 2008, at the hour of
10:00 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Caul-thouse,
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Scheduling Conference in the aboveentitled matter with the COURT initiating the call.
DATED this

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCE-FEDIIZING CONFEREXCE

9%

day of July, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a tlue copy of the
foregoing
ORDER
FOR
TELEPHONIC
SCHEDULING
CONFERE.NCE was mailed, postage
prepaid, by the
signed at
Lewiston, Idaho, this
2008, on:
Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83537
(208)289-5602

Ronald J. Landeck
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, lD 83843
(208)883- 1505

PATTY 0 . WEEKS, Cle

ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCEiE13LILRiTGCOhFEiCENCE

Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife))

1

Plaintiffs

)

VS.

North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) Case No. CV 2008-180
Commissioners for the North Lata h County

) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION AND BRIEF TO

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

) RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

) ORDER ON PL(41NTIFFSr MOTION FOR

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C.

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

) 40-2033 AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

Individual Capacity

) FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Defendants

) UNDER I.C.

5

5 67-8003 ( 3 )

Plaintiffs come before the court under I.R.C.P. Rule 11(a) (2) (B) with
Motion/Petition And Brief To Reconsider Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C.

g 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory

Judgment Under I.C. fj67-8003 (3).
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONI'BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPbTIONAND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION F O 2 DEGtA-ZATORU JUDGh4ENT OF I.C. 10-203aAND
PL14NTIFFS3h?OTION FOR DE-CL-4RTOR.Y "GDGh4ENT bXDER I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
1
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Plaintiffs MotionIBrief To Reconsider is filed to petition Court to decree Plaintiffs
rights to Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law under two circumstances (1)
Plaintiffs request of Commissioners to initiate validation proceedings on their own
resolution under I.C. 5 40-203a and (2) Plaintiffs submittal of Requests For Takings
Analysis under IRTA. These formal requests for hearing and examination of the
evidence have been denied by Commissioners' refusal to initiate validation proceedings
on their own resolution and their refusal to respond to the Requests for Takings
Analysis. These matters, as well as (3) Plaintiffs' request for Court to decree that under
I.C.

67-8003 (3), as applied, Plaintiffs have a colorable claim to the land considered in

this matter and this claim contains a constitutionally protected property right, are the
requests for the determination of Plaintiffsf rights, as matters of law, and are filed under
the civil case CV 2008-180.
These justiciable controversies arise under and are parts of the civil case CV
2008-180, and fulfill guidance as is found in Aloh I/: Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d

1217 (2000). These controversies are ripe and have standing. Plaintiffs seek no advice
in hypothetical matters, as all matters have occurred, have injured Plaintiffs directly and
as individuals and are in controversy and are resolvable by Court decree (see Plaintiffs'
Complaint and see Defendants' Answer), and as such these controversies are real and
concrete matters. I n the matter of judicial economy Plaintiffs request Court to
determine these matters now as matters of law, and now offer the following arguments
and in response to Court's Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment Of I.C.

5 67-8003 (3).

5 40-2031And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

The determination of these controversies Is appropriate to pretrial

motion practice and fulfills Court's goal of judicial economy.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONiBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' IZIOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGR4ENT OF I.C. $40-203a AND
PLX&TTIi;FS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGh-IENTUNDER I.C. 5 67-8003 (3)
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I. Court's Background falls short of the causative and procedural histories

of the Complaint.

11. The Court declares matters not petitioned for and avoids declaring the
matter Ptaintiffs did petition for.
111. The grounds for dismissal of the cited cases in Court's Opinion and
Order do not support the dismissal in the present case.
IV. The Court's determination that Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment Of I.C. !j40-203a is seeking an "advisory opinion" is in error and is not
supported by the guidance provided in the cited case.
V. I n the alternative, Defendants are required to have provided due
process under their quasi-judicial capacity.
VI. Court fails to follow its own citation: Further, in the chance that the
court denies these Motions and Reconsiderations again, Plaintiffs request the denial be
without prejudice. Scott v, Agricu/t~/ra/Products
Cor~,,Inc., 102 Idaho 147, "Where
declaratory judgment action was dismissed because of another action pending, district
court should have specified that dismissal was without prejudice. Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rules 41(b), 57; Fed Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 57, 28 U.S.C.A."
I.Court's Backgrounddoes not adequately describe the events of the

Compia,itf or the procedural history leading to Plaintiffs requesting t h e
Commissioners initiate validation proceedings on their own resollutisn and
filing Requests For Reguiatory Takings Analysis
Plaintiffs did not provide Court with any historical background of the
circumstances underlying the Comp/aintas the Motions for Declaratory Judgment were
made as requests o f the determination of Plaintiffs rights under the law, I.C.
IRTA and I.C.

3 67-8003 (3),

5 40-203a,

and no determination of facts were deemed necessary.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' hlOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGLMENTOF I.C. $40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGlclENT UKEER I.C. $ 67-8003 (3)
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Since the Court intends Background (see Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. fj40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment Under I.C. fj67-8003 (3) at 21, it is incumbent on Plaintiffs to insure such
Backgroundis accurately portrayed.
The Court's Backgroundof the changes to CCR in 1996 as derived by the Court
from Plaintiffs' Complaint is accurate as far as it goes. The background of the events
that Plaintiffs seek remedy of, however, turns on the more recent events than the
Court's Background. The events, on which the Complaint lies and the time at which
Plaintiffs became aware of these events, began on arid the weekend before the
4/12/2006 meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners (see Complaint at 10-25, beginning at
P.). The weekend before the 4/12/06 meeting, Plaintiffs discovered that the Wagners

had constructed a driveway access across Plaintiffs' property.
Don Halvorson attended the NLCHD meeting (4/12/06) to inform Defendants
that the Defendants were operating out of their right of way and had no authority to
issue the permit and widen CCR, as these actions were an improper interference with
Plaintiffs' property rights.
At the 4/12/06 meeting Defendants denied the 1996 events the Court includes in
its Backgroundand Defendants also made other claims of "prescriptive right" and
prescriptive right of way, adversely affecting rights 06 Plaintiffs to own, peacefully enjoy
their land, to restrict others from their land, and to have a clear and marketable title to
their land at SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM.
On 4/12/06 Plaintiffs first became aware of the following claims by Defendants,
as Defendants denied and claimed the following.
(a) Defendants denied the events and alterations to CCR in 1996 (including, but
not limited to straightening of the curves, movement of the roadbed, and widening of
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONiBRTEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 3 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT LiXDER 1.C. 9 67-8003 (3)
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the roadbed). Defendant Arneberg emphatically stated that CCR had not moved in his
tenure in office or under his watch.
(b) Defendants claimed "prescriptive rightrr to issue a driveway access permit to
the Wagners trespassing onto Plaintiffs land, as Defendants Arneberg and Payne
claimed the driveway access was within the 50 foot prescriptive right of way;
(c) Defendants claimed "prescriptive rightrf to widen CCR to the northeast by
approximately 6 inches by about 50 feet.
(d) Defendants claimed "prescriptive rightrf to damage Plaintiffsf fence by pushing
a wind fallen tree into Plaintiffs fence (Defendants claimed Plaintiffs' fence was inside of
"their" right of way, and
(e) Defendants claimed a fifty foot and/or 25 feet from centerline prescriptive
right of way in the vicinity of the 3i-/-acre parcel (in particular 25 feet from centerline
to the northeast).
Plaintiffs argued at the 4/12/2006 (See Complaint starting at 10, P.) meeting
that:
(1) Defendants claims of prescriptive right of way did not justify any of
Defendants claims of "prescriptive right"; that is, the Defendants have no right to take
land from Plaintiffs and/or damage Plaintiffsf property. The proper government
interference with Plaintiffs property rights is through eminent domain and due process,
and no right exists for Defendants to confiscate land for the Wagner driveway access
permit or for widening of CCR. Further, taking of land for the Wagner driveway access
permit is also prohibited, as it is not for a public use. Damage of Plaintiffs property
(fence) is prohibited under any kind of right of way. Plaintiffsrfence is protected by
statute and requires prior notice and hearing in any request for removal, and

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203aAND
PLAINTIFFS' TL+OTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGL/iENTUNDER I.C. 5 67-8003 (3)

(2) no prescriptive right of way exists northeast of CCR in the vicinity of the 3s/acre parcel after the events of the 1996 alterations to CCR, and

(3) without waiver of Plaintiffs' allegation that no prescriptive right of way exists
in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel after the events of the 1996 alterations to CCR, if
a prescriptive right of way exists in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, the right of way
width does not extend to 25 feet from centerline to the northeast encumbering
Plaintiffs' property (the width would be limited to the usage of the road bed and its
supporting structures after the completion of the 1996 alterations).
Plaintiffsr allege that Defendants were biased and treated Plaintiffsr complaints
arbitrarily and with indifference at the 4/12/06 meeting (See Comphintat 14, P. 5)).
Plaintiffs also allege Defendants voided the record of any or all that was said at the
rneetinq by any of Defendants (See Coqdaintat 14, P. 5; see Exhibit # 2 at l), and
failed to qive any valid reasons for their actionslinactions, in particular to the (1)
issuance of a permit for a trespass, (2) not revoking the permit after fair warning was
given and the knowledge that Plaintiffs would call for a survey, and (3) for their claim of
prescription to the northeast side of CCR (See CompIainf starting at I O , P.).
Since 4/12/2006 Plaintiffs have sincerely tried to resolve the matters now before
the Court (See Complaint starting at 17, Q. 8) beginning with a survey and clarification
of the limits and legal establishment of the CCR right of way by the examination of all
the pertinent and/or pertaining evidence (See CumpIahtstarting at 18, Q. 8) f., and
also Exhibit # 2 a t 2). Plaintiffs have colorable claim to the land affected by the
changes in the right of way made by the Defendants since 2005 and Defendantsr claims
(as first noticed as of 4/12/06) of prescription, including "prescriptive rightri as legal
justification of damages to their fence, unlawful issuance of the first Wagner driveway
access permit and failure to revoke it, claims of prescription to the northeast of CCR in
PLAhTTIFFS' MOTIONiBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLA4II\:TIFFSY
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. fj 40-203aAND
PLAINTIFFS' RlOTION FOR DECLARTOR'I' JUDGMEYT t3CEX I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
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the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, and the taking of land for the widening of CCR in
2005 and 2006 (See Comp/aintat 7, E.). Plaintiffs have proceeded with the assumption
that any actionlinaction the Defendants take, under the color of law, whether statutorily
correct or not, which have the effect of interference with Plaintiffs' rights require the
protections of due process (in the present case, as land is protected property under the
5th ~ m e n d m e nof
t the U.S. Constitution, Plaintiffs' property rights are afforded
protection of the 1 4 ~mendment
~ ~
as well (See Comp/aintstarting at 16, Q.). Further
protection is found under the Idaho State Constitution Article I5 13 & 5 14, amongst
other Idaho and Federal statutes. These protections of Due Process (procedural and
substantive) and Equal Treatment Under the Law are demanded by the Constitution
and failure to provide such procedures is as much an unlawful act as the unlawful acts
of trespass, taking of private property, negligence, etc.
I n the summer of 2006, after the survey showed that Defendants were wrong in
issuing the permit and, without notice, Defendants defiantly further widened CCR
another 4 feet by 50 feet in the area of Plaintiffs corral across from the 3+/- acre
parcel, encroaching on and damaging Plaintiffs' fence in deliberate indifference to
PIaintiffs fair warning that Defendants were operating out of their authorized right of
way (given on 4/12/06).
Plaintiffs sought and finally obtained time on Commissioners Agenda. On
3/21/2007 Plaintiffs presented evidence of survey done by Plaintiffs to abate the
trespass of the Wagner first driveway access to CCR. (When the stakes of the survey
were driven Plaintiffs told Wagners that P!aintiffs would cooperate in the deeding to the
NLCHD an easement in order to resolve the trespass if Bob Wagner would present the
proposal to the NLCHD. Bob Wagner stated to Plaintiffs that the NLCHD had turned
down the proposal and voluntarily abated the driveway, obtained a second permit and
PLAINTIFFS' IMOTIOT\~/BRIEF
TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINlON AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARLiTORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203 a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGLMENTmDER I.C. 5 67-8003 (3)
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built a new driveway by excavating the entire hillside.) Evidence was submitted to the
Defendants at the 3/21/07 meeting (see Exhibit # 2, at 2 and Exhibit # 3), including
but not limited to the following:
(1) Rimrock Consultants' Survey which showed change in location of the

intersection of CCR with the east and west property lines of >50 feet to the north
compared to what is recorded in the deed description. This survey shows that the

geosara~hiclocation CCR has chanqed as compared to the ancient records
(Plaintiffs' and Wagners' deed descriptions) and Plaintiffs alleged that this movement

nesates the Zesal establishment of GCR presclri~tiverisht of way without
further records or evidence from the MLGHD;
(2) The confirmed trespass, unlawful issue of, and refusal to revoke the first
Wagner driveway access permit confirmed the Defendants no lonqer could

accurately determine the location s f CGR due to numerous alterations
(Defendants either knew the correct location of the CCR right of way (in such
knowledge, they admit to preparing false testimony to try to force through the first
Wagner driveway access permit) or they didn't know (in such knowledge, they admit
that they do not know the correct focatisn of CCR due to the numerous

alterations of CCR). (See Comp/ainf starting at 22, Q. 8) f. xiii. (c)), and;
(3) Plaintiffs presented evidence and testimony of the events of the 1996
alteration of CCR which included, but is not limited to the conversation Dan Payne hzd
with Ed Swanson, the cutting down of trees, the straightening of curves at the east and
west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel, the lowering of the roadbed at both the east and
west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel, the movement of the roadbed to the northeast, and
the supporting evidence that Eli Harris btjught the 3+/- acre parcel from Per and Anna
Johanson for a driveway access to his farm(see Exhibit # 3) in 1911.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COLTRT'SOPINION AhTDORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 30-203 a AND
PLL41NTIFFS'NiOTION FOR DECLARTORU JUDGMENT LWDER I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
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At the 3 / 2 1 / 0 7 meeting, Plaintiffs requested Commissioners initiate
validation proceedinqs under 1-63,6 40-203a by their own resolution (see
Exhibit # 3, a t 1). These three points of evidence and allegations complete the triad

of permissive prerequisites found in I.C.

3 40-203a (see Exhibit # 3,staifing

at 2).

Defendants took no action, treated Plaintiffs' evidence with deliberate
indifference, arbitrarily stated all matters were within Defendants "prescriptive right"
(without stating the authority by which they claim such "prescriptive right") and gave
Plaintiffs no meaningful response (written and/or final decision), and in so doing
provided no verbatim transcribable record of the meeting. The hearing Plaintiffs sought
was negated by Defendants actions/inactions.
Defendants subsequently offered to honor Plaintiffs application for validation of
CCR if Plaintiffs would apply and submit a $750 fee (see Exhibit # 2, starting at 5).
Plaintiffs told Defendants that the questions Plaintiffs wanted answered
(defining and clarifying the limits of the CCR right of way) and the confusion the
Defendants had about the limits of the CCR right of way could only be answered if the
Commissioners initiated validation proceedings under their own resolution and that
Plaintiffs had no reason to question whether CCR was Public or not (see Exhibit 8 2,
starting a t 5)
Defendants told Plaintiffs there were two choices (1) Pay the $750 fee and apply
for validation or (2) get a lawyer(see Exhibit # 2, at 8). Although the Complaintis more
extensive than this present controversy and that these controversies are a part of the
case (CVZOD8-180), more background and/or history can be later added as needed.

If. Court misstates altegations of Piaintiffs' Gomp/a/itf. PlaintiRs'
rights to due process and obligation to exhaust agency remedies are negated

PLAINTIFFS' biOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLATT.ITIFFSYiMOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-20% AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT LXDER I.C. $ 67-3003(3)
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by Defendants actions and failures to act and create a justiciable controversy
under a civil case.
'This motion realleges claims made in Plaintiffs' Complaint; specifically,
negligence, trespass, takings, and damages claims." (See Opinion And Order On
Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. fj 40-203a And Plaintiffsr Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003 (3) at 7.)
Court leaves out the reason why Plaintiffs are in Court to begin with-the

fact

that none of Plaintiffs complaints have been met with Due Process. Plaintiffs arrive in
Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and only plead negligence, trespass, takings, and damages
claims in the alternative, (see Complaint, beginning at 16, Q.). These matters of
trespass, takings, and damages claims are actionable in and of themselves, yet without
the Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law, these matters are actionable
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due Process and Equal treatment Under the Law are required,
notwithstanding the results of the trespass, takings, and damages claims.
42 U.S.C. 1983 reads, "Every pzrson who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any ridits, privileees, or immunities secured bv the Constitution and
lams, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injuncti-rrerelief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief Tvas unavailable."

Plaintiffs bring forth in their Complaint, allegations that Defendants, under the
color of law, have deprived Plaintiffs of their Constitutional Rights (sthand 1 4 ~ ~
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution), in particular Plaintiffs' rights to own, to
peacefully enjoy their land, to be able to restrict others from their land, and to have a
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONiBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPbTIONAND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 3 30-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JTJDGhIENT LWDER I.C. $67-8003 (3)
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clear and marketable title to their land (see Complaint, at 7, E, and at 9, L., M., N.),
without Due Process, and without Equal Treatment Under the Law.
I n Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C.

5 40-203a and Plaintiffsf

5 67-8003 (3),

Plaintiffs seek declaratory

Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

decree from Court to determine Plaintiffs' rights of Due Process under these two Idaho
Statutes. Without waiver of their right to Predeprivation notice and hearing, Plaintiffs
allege that they sought post deprivation due process under these two Idaho statutes
and were denied these rights, as well as their right and obligation to seek exhaustion of
agency remedies (see Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffsf Complaint).
Plaintiffs request Court to grant decree that Plaintiffs have rights of Due Process
under both or either statute, and to make available declaratory relief and as such as to
require Defendants to show cause why Defendants denied Plaintiffs Due Process under:
( I ) I.C.

5 40-203a (6) "the

commissioners shall proceed to determine just

compensation..."(j ust compensation requires Due Process as a prerequisite); and
(2) I.C.

5 67-8001 '...local

governments to evaluate whether proposed

regulatory or administrative actions may result in a taking of private property
without due process of law."
by Defendants' actions/inactions of:
( I ) not initiating validation proceedings under their own resolution after
Plaintiffs had reasonably shown Defendants or that it was reasonably obvious
that the location of CCR could not be accorrate/y determhed by Defendants due
to the alterations of the road (Defendants had issued and refused to revoke the
first Wagner Driveway access permit- when it was alleged to be trespassing,), the
legal establishment of the right of way was questioned (prescriptive r@htof way

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AKD ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 6 40-203aAND
PLAINTIFFS' 3fOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT UKDER I?. 5 67-3001 ( 3 )
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was no /anger prescr@tive/i7 light of the 1996 alterations), and the location of
CCR did not correspond to the location of the public records; and

(2) not responding to Plaintiffs' Requests For Regulatory Takings Analysis
and why further relief; action under 42 US.C.1983, should not be granted to
Plzintiffs. ((See I.C.

3

10-1208.)

Further by Commissioners' failure to initiate validation proceedings on their own
resolution, Defendants have denied Plaintiffs the right to a Judicial Review.
Plaintiffs petition Court for further declaratory decree and relief under I.C.

5 67-

8003 (3), as applied, and to invalidate Defendants actions and to Decree Defendants'
actions (claims of prescriptive right of way and claims of "prescriptive right") as likely to
improperly interfere with Plaintiffs' private property rights (Plaintiffs have colorable
claim to a constitutionally protected property right, land) and that Due Process is
required and require Defendants to show cause why Due Process was not afforded to
Plaintiffs, and why further relief, action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 should not be granted to
Plaintiffs.
Defendants' implied defense that Defendants were trying to work the problems
out informally is negated by Defendants' refusal to administer these formal procedures
and the abdication of their responsibility of even an informal disposition by failing to
issue a "final decision".
There are no disputed facts in these matters. Court, Defendants, and Plaintiffs
are all in agreement "no final decision" (Due Process) has been afforded Plaintiffs and
that these matters have received no hearing. (see Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs'
Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. €j40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

3 67-8003 (3)

at 7: see Exhibit # 2 at 6, see

Complaint, starting at 16). The Declaratory Relief under I.C.

5 67-8003 (3) does not

PL-41NTIFFS7hlOTIONIBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AKD ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' '3:OTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGLMENTOF I.C. S; 40-203a AYD
ILAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY 3UDGh4EhTTUXDER I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
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require any factual determinations (it is an evaluation process-thereby its declaratory
nature) t o decree that Plaintiffs have colorable claim to a constitutionally protected
property right, land, and that Due Process is required before any action was taken or
for Defendants to show cause why due process was not afforded Plaintiffs. These are
matters of law. Further actionlrelief may be granted by Court to determine injuries
alleged by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (see Mathews v. Eldrai?,424 U.S. 319, 96
S.Ct.893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

111. Court misstates Plaintiffsr petition for declaratory judgment and
Court's grounds for dismissal of motions for declaratory decree and relief are
not supported by Court's cited cases.
"A declaratory judgment must clariw and settle legal relations in issue and afford
relief from the uncertainty and controversy which gave rise to the action." Harris v.

Cass/a County 106 Idaho 513,681 P.2d 988.
Plaintiffs will separate this argument for reconsideration into three parts: A.
matters pertaining to I.C. tj 40-203a only,

B. matters pertaining to I.C. 5 67-8003, and

C. matters pertaining to both.
A. MATTERS PERTAINING TO I.C.

5 40-203A

2. The Court declares matters nol: petitioned for and avoids

declaring the matter Plaintiffs petitioned for.
"The Plaintiffs' first motion for declaratory judgment regarding whether the
Highway District must hold a validation hearing seeks an advisory opinion from the
Court regarding the duties of the Highway District and whether the Highway District
must be required to hold public proceedings in order to validate Camps Canyon Road as
a public highway." (See Opinion And Order On Plaintiffsr Motion For Declaratory

PLAINTIFFS' 'fOTIONIBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPETON AVD ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' hIOTION FOR DECLA4R4TORYJUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' 34OTION FOR DECLXRTORY JC;DGVfENT UNDEX 1.C. $67-8003 (31
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Judgment Of I.C.

5 67-8003 (3)

5 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

at 5).

As abutting landowners to CCR, Plaintiffs have rights, as a member of the
general public, and have rights, associated with their land ownership and the right of
way of CCR traversing their property and the application of general statutes, policies,
and/or customs regarding the determination of the limits of the right of way CCR to
Plaintiffs and their particular situation.
Plaintiffs do not request a declaration of their Public rights ("...whether the
Highway District must be required to hold public proceedings in order to validate Camps
Canyon Road as a public highway."), as they have never asked the NLCHD to validate
the right of way, CCR, as beins Public or not in the public interest by Plaintiffs petition
and/or request of Commissioners to on their own resolution. The Commissioners have
no duty to the public to perform or not perform an action involving the public as a
whole.
Further, the Commissioners are prohibited from seeking new public assets under

I.C. fj 40-203a. (See Plaintiffs' Brief I n Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Ruling Of I.C.

5 40-203a,

at 6, GaIvin K Canyon County High. Dist No. 4, 134 Idaho

579, 6 P.3d 829, "Section 40-203a may onlv be used to validate an existinq hishwav of
public riqht of way about which there is some kind of doubt. It does not allow for the
creation of a new public right." (Emphasis added by Plaintiffs.)
Under Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment under I.C.

5 40-203a,

Plaintiffs

have asked the Court to declare Plaintiffs' riqhts to have their presented evidence (see
Exhibit #3) receive Due Process and Equal Treatment under the Law under I.C.

5 40-

203a. (See Cump/lant, at 18-20, Q. 8) f. i., ii., iii

PLAJX-TIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGlMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203aAND
PL-4IXTIFFS' A4OTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGhlENT m T D E RI.C. 5 67-8003(3)
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2. COURT'S CITED CASES DO NOT SUPPORT COURT'S
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C.
gS 40-203a AS BEING "ADVISORY"

Unfortunately, or by lack of experience, Plaintiffs inserted a question which the
Court views to be advisory. The question is; "Although there may be better paths (Due
Process) to resolution, is I.C. fj40-203a a manner under which the nature (type), width,
location, and use of a right of way/highway may be questioned and resolved?" The
phrase "[allthough there may be better paths (Due Process) to resolution ..." is a
statement of Plaintiffs' inexperience and not the search for advice.
"Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act does not permit the Court to issue an
Advisory opinion. Guidance on this issue is provided in Noh 1! Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho
798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002)." (See Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. 5 40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory
Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) at 5). The guidance of this cited case is a s follows:
(a) Standing "In order to satisfj, the requirement of standing, the petitioners
must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and the substantial likelihood the judicial
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Noh a t 800
Plaintiffs alleqe and demonstrate: The Plaintiffs have rights to due process
and equal treatment under the law to ask Commissioners to initiate this validation on
their own resolution as the actionslinactions and claims and denials of Defendants have
adversely affected Plaintiffs rights of land ownership (See Complahtstarting at 7, E.),
rights to restrict others from their land (See Cornplaintstarting at 9, L., M., N.), rights
to be able to market their land with a clear title, and rights to peacefully enjoy their
land (See Cornp/ajnf starting at 10, P.), and Plaintiffs requested Commissioners initiate
validation proceedings (Plaintiffs' right to due process) on their own resolution to clarify
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPNION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLAMTORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 6 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY LTDGL,fENTL J D E R I C . 5 67-8003(3)
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and declare the limits of the right of way through a process of the examination of
evidence at a hearing-validation(See

Complaintstarting at 18, Q. 8) f. i.). Plaintiffs

right to a response, Due Process, (i.e, a validation proceeding to determine the legal
establishment, proper recording of the right of way, and the informed location of the
right of way of CCR) from the Commissioners, other than the one given (deliberate
indifference) by the Commissioners is the Declaratory Judgment sought by Plaintiffs at
this time (I.C.

3

10-1201, I.C.

3 10-1202, 1.R.C.P Rule 57,

amongst others).

Plaintiffs do not request any determination of in the public interest or not in the
public interest of the right of way of CCR. The injuries alleged by Plaintiffs are private
property right injury and not of a public nature.
The case at hand bears no similarities to the Noh case. I n Noh the advisory
decision was based on the fact that The Indian Gaming Initiative (Proposition One) was
only qualified to appear on the ballot and had not even won approval, as the election
had not taken place. The Declaratory Judgment became hypothetical on whether the
proposition won or not. The Noh petitioners claimed only alleged future injuries of a
general and nonspecific nature. Plaintiffs, in the present case are not asking, "in the
event that ...Plaintiffs may be injured?"
The issuance of the permit, the non revocation of the permit, the trespass of the
driveway access permit, the land taken by widening of the road, the damages to
Plaintiffs' fence, as well as the loss of Plaintiffs' rights to restrict others from their land
(See CumpIaintstarting at 9, L.,

M., N. and at 7 E.), rights to be able to market their

land with a clear title, and rights to peacefully enjoy their land (See Cornpaintstarting
at 10, P.) have all happened and are in controversy (see Complaint and see Answer).
The declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs in the present case seek, will declare Plaintiffs'
rights to Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law and Plaintiffsr obligation and
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONIBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. $40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT UXTDERI.C . $ 67-8003 (3)
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right to accomplish exhaustion of agency remedies which Plaintiffs seek by their
colorable claim of a constitutionally protected property right, land, whether the alleged
injuries are shown to be so or not. The injury Plaintiffs request declaration of is
Defendants admitted denial of Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law.
(b) Ripeness 'The traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff
to prove 1 ) that the case presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and
substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adjudication."
Noh, at 801.

1) Plaintiffs do not pose a hypothetical question a s the Noh petitioners do
on some future event. Plaintiffs have requested that Commissioners initiate
validation and by Defendantsf inaction they have denied such request by their
inaction (See Comp/aintstarting a t 18, Q. 8 ) f. i.). The controversy exists in
reality and is not hypothetical and no advice is sought a s to whether Plaintiffs
should request initiation of validation of CCR by the Commissioners own
resolution or whether Plaintiffs should not request Commissioners initiate
validation of CCR under their own resolution or whether Plaintiffs should seek
some other form of Due Process.
(2) Plaintiffs seek a declaration by the Court of Plaintiffs rights of Due

Process (see Comp/aint) and obligation to exhaust agency remedies (see
Answefj and as requested of Commissioners to initiate validation of CCR on
Commissioners' own resolution. The issuance of the permit, the non revocation
of the permit, the trespass of the driveway access permit, the land taken by
widening of the road, the damages to Plaintiffsr fence, a s well as the loss of
Plaintiffs' rights to restrict others from their land (See Cornp/aintstarting at 9, L.,
M., N. and at 7, E.), rights to be able to market their land with a clear title, and
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIOhT/BRIEFTO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. $40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGhzIENT UNDER I.C. $ 67-8003 (3)
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rights to peacefully enjoy their land (See Comp/aintstarting at 10, P.) have all
happened and are all real and a substantial controversy exists (see Comp/aint
and see Answefl.
(3) The judicial determination sought by Plaintiffs is a matter of law and
requires no findings of fact. Plaintiffs allege Commissioners must afford Plaintiffs
Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law and initiate validation
proceedings on their own resolution, This is a matter of duty for a public official,
as this is an application of general laws to specific individuals and Plaintiffs have
a right to due process, as well as the protection of the

sth and 1

4 ~mendments
~ ~

of the U.S. Constitution.
Further, the fee is reasonable in the matter of the public question, but the fee is
not required by I.C. fj 40-203a when the initiation is by Commissioners' resolution and
the fee would be unreasonable in this case, as it is a matter of public official duty and
due process afforded to Plaintiffs.

B. MATTERS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY

JUDGMENT UNDER I.C.3 67-8003 (3)

I. The question of whether in the view of judicial economy this
judicial determination is better made later wifl be discussed under a fater
heading.

2, Turning now to Defendants' stated objection to Plaintiffs'
Motion (I.C.

5 67-8003) as no 'final

decision" has been made by Defendants.

The Court's opinion that, "Its not necessary for the Court to make a determination
whether a final determination was made by the Highway District because the issues
presented by the Plaintiffs; negligence, trespass, takings, and damage claims, are
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONiBRIEF TO ECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION '4ND ORDER ON
PLANTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. $40-203a AND
PLAIA'TIFFS' 34OTION FOR DECLXRTORY JUDGMENT LxDER I.C. $67-8003 (3)
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appropriately addressed in the underlying civil action. Before making a determination
of declaratory judgment, the Court would need to hold an evidentiary hearing in order
to resolve factual issues in question." (see Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. Ej 40-203a And Plaintiffsr Motion For Declaratory
Judgment Under I.C. fj 67-8003 (3) a t 7) The Court misstates the factual issues. The
fact ua I issue is, was due process afforded to Plaintiffs, not do P/ainf!i"fshave a factual
injuty? There is no dispute that a formal final decision was not given. No evidentiary

hearing of the factual issue is necessary in the case that no due process was afforded.
Plaintiffs reiterate that Defendants' objection is frivolous. Defendants have no
discretion to violate the law, in this case not to provide Due Process-not to issue a
'final decision" or to respond in some meaningful way. Commissioners' denial of
Plaintiffs' right of Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law and Plaintiffsr
required exhaustion of agency remedies by Commissionersf refusal to initiate validation
proceedings under their own resolution, failing to establish a formal disputed case,
hearing or some other manner of due process, and/or abdication of the Commissionersr
duty to provide "final decision" under some form of informal procedure, the
Commissioners have violated the law.
Further, Defendants are required to have provided a predeprivaton hearing or show
cause why this was not feasible and Plaintiffs have not waived any constitutional rights
to a predeprivation hearing by requesting post deprivation hearing. These violations do
not then create a legal excuse for further violations of the law. Plaintiffs also sought
D u e Process under IRTA and Defendants refusal to reply once again violates Plaintiffsr

rights to Due Process and obligation to exhaust agency remedies. The manners in
which the legislature has provided for local agencies to comply with constitutional
requirements are foiled by the Defendants refusal to apply the statutes a s intended. In
PLAINTIFFS' LMOTION/BRIEFTO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPWTION,4ND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' hIOTI0N FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. $40-203a
PLAINTIFFS' LIOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGh4ENT UNDER I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
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Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) The Supreme Court recognized, in a review of the
legislative history under which Section 1983 was passed, that one reason section 1983
was passed was that state laws were not being enforced.
"It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance
or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied
by the state agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 36.5 U S . I67 (1962)

3. Plaintiffs' request for Declaratory Judgment under I.C, 5 67-

8003 (3) does not require an evidentiary hearing, only the determination

that Plaintiffs have a colorable claim to a constitutionally protected property
right.

No evidentiary proceeding is necessary. Due Process and Equal Treatment
Under the Law are matters of law. I.C. 5 67-8003 (1) reads, "...All state agencies and
local governments shall follow the guidelines of the attorney general." Defendants have
no discretion in this matter and may only defend their inaction/action by showing they
have afforded Plaintiffs Due Process in some other manner, prior to this event and they
have already stated they have not-no

hearing has been before the

omm missioners and

no final decision has been made.
4. I.C. 5 67-8001.reads, "The purpose of this chapter is to establish an

orderly, consistent review process that better enables state agencies and local
governments to evaluate whether proposed regulatory or administrative actions may
result in a taking of private propetty without due process of law." This statute states
the two rights Plaintiffsf Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003 (3)
petitions the Court to declare; (1) Administrative actions which may be carried out
PLATXTIFFS' hdOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER Ofi
PflAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 8 40-2O3a AND
PLAINTIFFS' hf.OTION FOR DECLXRTORY JUDGMEXT LWDER I.C. 6 67-8003 (3)
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without due process and (2) Administrative actions which may result in taking of private
property'
"The Defendants argue that the particular relief sought pursuant to the Idaho
Regulatory Takings Act requires a "regulatory taking" or final decision." (see Opinion
And Order On Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C.

5 40-203a And

Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. Ej 67-8003 (3) at 7) The Court
fails to conclude that final decision, "regulatory taking" and/or administrative action are
all the same in effect and in the light of the statute.
Plaintiffs petition the Court to determine (evaluate) that Plaintiffs have a
colorable claim to a constitutionally protected property right, land ownership and its
inherent attributes that goes with land ownership and if the administrative
actionslinactions of Defendants mav result in a taking of private propem without due
process of law. No evidentiary hearing is necessary in this determination of colorable
claim, only the decree that Defendants need to show cause why Due process has not
been afforded Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege they have a colorable claim to a constitutionally protected
property right, land, and have rights to Due Process (see McCuIfoch v. Gfasgow, 620 F.
2d 47

(sthCircuit 1980), (plaintiff was entitled to Due Process before road was built

over land of disputed ownership); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983, 32
L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14'~~ m e n d m e nproperty
t
right even though dispute exists); Carey

v. Pl;ohl/s, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) '...right to procedural
due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon the merits of a claimants
assertion...") under the IRTA to file Requests For Regulatory Takings Analysis.
I.C.

5 67-8003 (1) reads, '...All

state agencies and local governments shall follow

the guidelines of the attorney general."
PLAINTIFFS' hfOTIONiBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDCb3:EhTTbWDER I.C. § 67-8003 (3)
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Court also fails to note that Defendantsf argument as stated by the Court, "The
Defendants argue that the particular relief sought pursuant to the Idaho Regulatory
Takings Act requires a 'regulatory taking' or final decision." (See Opinion And Order On
Plaintiffsf Motion For Declaratory Judgment Of I.C. €j40-203a And Plaintiffs' Motion For
Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

5 67-8003 (3) at 7),

that I.C. fj 67-8002 (4)

"Regulatory takingff means a regulatory or administrative action resulting in deprivation
of private property that is the subject of such action, whether such deprivation is total
or partial, permanent or temporary, in violation of the state or federal constitution."
The point turns on the definition of action and as such is any order or rule which
determines the lesal rights, duties, privileses, immunities, or other lesal interests of one
or more specific persons, or the Defendants performance of or failure to perform anv
d u w placed on them by law. Failure of this duty gives Plaintiffs right of Declaratory
Judgment on the Requests and a voiding of the governmental action. Failure of
Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with due process prior to the actions taken and/or
failures to act violates the 5m Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and this
inaction/action triggers the protection of the 14"' Amendment of the U.S Constitution
(as well as Article Ifj 23 and 514 of the Idaho State Constitution and numerous Idaho
State Statutes and Federal Statutes). (see Lingle v. Chevron USA, 544 US 528 (2000),

(d) "A plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated
taking may proceed by alleging a "physicalff taking...r')

C. MATTERS PERTAINING TO BOTH I.C. fj 40-203a AND I.C.

5 67-8003 (3)

The private property rights, land, of Plaintiffs have been adversely affected by
the actions of the Defendants and Plaintiffs sought due process, exhaustion of agency
remedies (see McVicker v. City of tewiston, 134 Idaho 34, 37, 995 P.2d 804, 807
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION/BRTEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAIXTTIFFS'MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. § 40-203a AND
PLAISTIFFS ' iVOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGAMEhTTLWDER I.C. 5 67-8003 (3)
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(2000) ("Because the doctrine of exhaustion of agency remedies generally requires that
a case run the full gamut of administrative proceedings before an application for judicial
review may be considered..."), and remedy under I.C.

5 40-203a,

and I.C. fj67-8003

(3). Defendants include in their defenses failure to exhaust agency remedies ( see

Answer).
The Court has denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C.

5

67-8003 (3) on grounds of judicial economy. Plaintiffs also include now in this
discussion Plaintiffs' Motion For Declaratory Judgment on I.C.

5 40-203a,

in the

confidence that the Court- will reconsider its Opinion and Order to deny Plaintiffs'
Motion.
First, comparison of the present case, the controversies arising under I.C.

5 40-

203a and I.C. fj 67-8003 (3) and the cited cases of Scoff K Agricu/tura/Prod~rctsCorp.,

Inc., 102 Idaho 147, and Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002) brings
to light distinguishable points. I n Scott, the Declaratory Judgment Motion was initiated
(a) by Scott (b) months before the injured defendants initiated the second action. I n
the present case, both actions, (a) civil suit CV 2008-180 and Plaintiffs Motions for
Declaratory Judgments are brought to the Court by Plaintiffs and the Motions for
Deciaratory Judgments are brought after the Complaint was filed and (b) under the
same civil case. The judicial difficulty of multiplicity of cases is not applicable in the
present case. The judicial difficulty in present case is to resolve controversies that can
be before trial.
Comparison of the present case, the controversies arising under I.C.tj 40-203a
and I.C.f j 67-8003 (3) and the cited case of Noh the present case exemplifies a real
and concrete case, not "advisoryf', as in Noh, the hypothetical question of an act yet to
be voted upon. Present case has nothing to do with a "political questionf' (see Luther v.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONIBRIEF TO =CONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDG3iENT OF 1.C. 6 40-303aAND
PLAJXTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDG_MENTUxDER I.C. § 67-8003(3)
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Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581) nor a "friendly suit" (see United States v. Johnson, 319
U.S. 302, 63 S.Ct 1075, 87 L.Ed. 14113 and is not advisory.
Secondly, the civil case GV 2008-180 contains several controversies. "The
Constitution limits the exercise of the judicial power to "cases" and "controversies".
"The term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so in that it is less
comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature." Per Mr. Justice
Field in In r e Pacjfic Rajlway Cornrnh, 32 Fed. 241, 255, citing Chisholm v, Georgia, 2
Dall. 419, 431, 432. See Muskrat K Unitedstates, 219 U.S. 346, 356, 357; OldColony
Trust Co, v Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 723, 724, cited in Aetna Life Is. Co.

v.

Haworth 300 U.S. at 239. The matters of Plaintiffs' I.C. Ej 40-203a and I.C. Ej 67-8003
(3) motions for declaratory judgments are "controversies" in the civil "case" CV 2008180 and if "distinguishable at all" from the matters of the entire civil case "is so in that
it is less comprehensive than the latter". Plaintiffs argue that the idea of pretrial

motions and discovery is to limit the limitable controversies, and undisputed facts and
to determine causes for action, and hence jurisdiction of the court, as to economize the
trial courts' and juries' time involvement. Plaintiffs filed both Declaratory Motions with
this in mind.
Thirdly, declaratory relief-that Due Process is required-is also found under
section 1983.
...except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission talten
in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief sliall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief u7asunavailable."
\I

Fourth, the idea of the judicial economy is not solely a matter of economics as it
is also a matter of justice and the economics of all those participating in the application
of justice to the case and controversies. I n the matter of judicial economy Plaintiffs
request the Court to consider the matters of economy and justice of the particular case
at hand.
PLAJNTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. $40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' bfOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUEGRIENT 'CT?'DER I.C. $ 67-8003 (3)
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On 4/12/06 three parties converged on the meeting of the NLCHD
commissioners, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and the Wagners. The controversy was the first
permit issued to the Wagners for a driveway access. The sides, issues, and economies
stood as follows:

I) The Wagners wanted a driveway access to their new home site. (The
Wagners could move their driveway access to the west and excavate the hillside and
avoid confrontation of the property line. This would be expensive, time consuming and
damaging to a stable environment.)

2) The NLCHD had altered CCR in 1996 and the historic driveway purchased by
Eli Harris in 1911 from Per and Anna Johanson had been rendered inaccessible without
major excavation, environmental damage, and financial expense.
3) The Halvorsons wanted to own and peacefully enjoy their land, be able to

restrict others from their land, and have a clear and marketable title to their land. I n
consideration of the economies of the Wagners, the environment, the financial expense
of the Halvorsons to abate the nuisance and trespass of the permitted driveway, Don
Halvorson attended the 4/12/06 meeting of the NLCHD. I n this consideration the price
of the land (Plaintiffs economic concern) involved did not outweigh any conceivable
judicial economies (resolution to the trespass). The price of the land involved at that
time was approximately $5600, the cost of a survey to determine and change the
involved property line. Don Halvorson suggested to the Wagners and the Defendants
that they, as responsible (in consideration of their wants and prior actions) and as
reasonable people, share the cost of the survey. The economics of justice now stood
Wagners $2300, NLCHD $2300, Halvorsons loss of a small piece of land which has been
rendered somewhat uneconomically workable as either farm or ranch land by the

PLAINTIFFS' I~~OTION/BRIEF
TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AKD ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLAR4TORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203aAND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGhlENT 'CiXDER I.C. ij 67-8003 (3)
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changing of CCR, but clear marketable title would be maintained by survey and
conveyance of the piece of land to the Wagners or the NLCHD.
At the meeting of 4/12/06, Defendants in a biased display of defiance and
governmental abuse, arbitrarily and with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs
constitutional rights portrayed a government function that would shock the conscience
of any elected democratic institution or people. No exigent circumstances were present
to necessitate the abridgement of any one's constitutional rights. All parties being
present at the 4/12/06 meeting denied infeasibility of a hearing. The only thing that
stood in the way of Due Process was the Defendants' own arrogance and abusive
indifference.
After the meeting of 4/12/2006 the sides, issues and issues stood as follows:
1) Wagners continued unabated use of nuisance and trespassatory driveway

access permitted by Defendants.
2) The Defendants stood in violation of Idaho State Constitution and Statutes

and the U.S. Constitution for the improper interference with Plaintiffs property rights by
the taking of land for a non public use, the taking of land for the widening of CCR and
drive way access permit issued and not revoked without Due Process and Just

Compensation and the unconstitutional claiming of prescriptive rights to the Plaintiffs
land to the northeast of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel.

3) The Halvorsons now out $5600 for the cost of a survey to abate the nuisance
and trespass permitted by the NLCHD and constructed by the Wagners, and the
beginning of a 2+ year ordeal of looking for Judicial economy in resolving the limits of
the CCR right of way.
Presently the sides, issues, and economies stand as follows:

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION'BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLilLI;"clTIFFSY
MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGhlENT OF I.C. $40-203a ,4ND
PLAWPIFFS ' &$@TIONFOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT TJXTDER I.C. $ 67-8003 (3)
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I) Halvorsons continue the expenditure of time, money, and effort to resolve
the case and the present controversies, and continue in the loss of ownership, the right
to restrict others the right of a clear and marketable title to their land and right to

peacefully enjoy their land without Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law.
2) The Wagners have a new driveway, built by the tearing down the entire

hillside of the 3+/-acre parcel.

3) The environment lost its deserved stability by the refusal of the NLCHD to
accommodate a deeded easement as a resolution to the trespass.
4) Refusal of Defendants to accept culpability in the matter heightens the

neighborly dispute as to the inaccurate claims of the Defendants to the general
community, that the Halvorsons have caused the problems.

5) Defendants continue to fight the resolution of the case and the controversies.
The Defendants continue to enjoy a comforta ble living at the expense of the Plaintiffs,
the Wagners, and the general public. NLCHD counsel continues to enjoy a comfortable
living fighting the case and controversies on behalf of the Defendants and at the
expense of the Plaintiffs, the Wagners, and the general public and now the Court, which
just increases the expenditures of the Plaintiffs and the Wagners, and the general
public.
5) Economy of Justice lies in 'Justice delayed (is expensive to those who seek it)

is justice denied (by those who delay it and pay nothing and receive remuneration for
their improper delay). True enough, the Plaintiffs could have saved a great deal of
time, money, and effort by simply acquiescing and walking away. Yet all economies
and justice suffer from the abuse of judicial economy and governmental authority.
6) The price of the tiny piece of land is now left still to be determined as well as

the limits of the CCR right of way.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONiBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPlXION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' iMO.TION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOX DECLARTORY JUDGMENT LWDER I.C. 5 67-8003 (3)
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I n the view of Plaintiffs there is nothing gained in an economic sense, in a sense
of justice, or a sense of judicial economy to deny Plaintiffs' Motions for Declaratory
Judgments of either or both of I.C.

fii 40-203a or I.C. 5 67-8003 (3) at the present time.

These Motions have been petitioned in the full light of judicial economy and economics
and justice. These matters are appropriate matters to be declared in the civil case CV
2008-180. Plaintiffs have a colorable title and in this claim have a constitutionally
protected property right. Mathews v. E/dr@e, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct.893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976) provides guidance for the direction for the Court to proceed. Mathews provides
no guidance for the Court to avoid the Due Process issue or deny Plaintiffs requests for
declaratory rulinqs on the basis of an implied requirement of "heiqhtened pleadinss"
(see Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993))

V. I n the alternative
I n the alternative, Plaintiffs allege they have been ii7dividL/a//yinjured by
Commissioners deliberate indifference of not initiating validation proceedings on their
own resolution and/or responding to Plaintiffs Requests for Regulatory Takings Analysis,
and.that the Commissioners were required to do so under their quasi-judicial capacity
(see Cooper v. Boardof County Commissioners ofAda County, 101 Idaho 4.07, 614 P.2d
947 (1980)).
The legislature has granted the NLCHD the authority to maintain and repair and
to straighten, widen, and alter CCR right of way, to issue and revoke and enforce the
revocation of driveway access permits and to obtain necessary private lands for the
straightening, widening, and altering of CCR through the civil proceedings of eminent
domain. These authorizations have given the NLCHD the authority to determine
Plaintiffs' legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests regarding
PLAmTIFFS' MOTION/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPfiTION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' hfOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203a ;ZND
PLAINTIFFS' bfOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGhiENT IiKDER I.C. $67-8003(3)
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the application of these authorizations to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' property, land (see
Hoppe v. Nichols, 100 Idaho 133, 594 P.2d 643 (1979). The decisions of the
Defendants to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit, to not revoke the first
Wagner driveway access permit, to widen CCR in 2005, to widen CCR in 2006, and
amongst others have arbitrarily and adversely determined Plaintiffs' legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests, in particular Plaintiffs' rights to own, to
peacefully enjoy their land, to be able to restrict others from their land, and to have a
clear and marketable title to their land (see Complainf, at 7, E, and at 9, L., M., N.) and
as such Defendants failure (to provide Due Process (substantive and procedural) and
Equal Treatment Under the Law) to act provides Plaintiffs cause of action under 42
U.S.C. 1983. (See Sm Diego Gas& Electric Co.

v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656, n. 23

(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), when property is taken by the government but not in
furtherance of a 'public use' the governmental entity may not be forced to pay just
compensation, but landowner may nevertheless have a damages claim cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and see Lingle v. Chevron USA, 544 US 528 (2000), "Conversely,
if a government action is found to be impermissible-for

instance because it fails to

meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process-that is
the end of the inquiry."
These controversies, of the Commissioners initiating validation under their own
resolution and responding to Plaintiffs' requests under IRTA are real and substantial and
Plaintiffs are requesting specific relief by requesting the Court to decree through decree
of conclusive character as to whether Commissioners were required to initiate validation
under their own resolution to resolve confusion of discrepancies brought before
Commissioners by Plaintiffs and/or to respond to Plaintiffs' Requests For Takings
Analysis to comply with their quasi-judicial capacity,
PLAINTIFFS' A4OTIOX/BRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPTniION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT UKDER I.C. $67-8003(3)

The only advisory, hypothetical, question on the table is the question posed by
the Commissioners advice (emphasis added)--will Plaintiffs get their questions (limits
of the right of way of CCR) answered by the Commissioners if Plaintiffs submit $750 fee
and a petition for determining if CCR is Public or not in the public interest? Considering
Plaintiffs have already submitted all the evidence necessary for Commissioners to
initiate validation proceedings on their own resolution and they have not been
responsive, it may be speculative to ask if the Commissioners will arrive at a different
conclusion if Plaintiffs pay a $750 fee. Reason would say the Commissioners would not
arrive at a different conclusion, especially in the light of the bias alleged by Plaintiffs.
This question and any implied questions as to what the Commissioners' motivation for
such legal advice is withdrawn until a later time.
Plaintiffs have alleged injuries to their fence, confiscation of land, conversion of
land, improper interference with Plaintiffs Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,
amongst others and have shown that their colorable claim may be so determined to be
so, as well as their property rights are to be so properly protected, if said limits (legal
establishment, accurate location, and proper recording) of CCR right of way were
validated and/or Requests For Takings Analysis were responded to.
Plaintiffs have alleged they suffered injury to their private property rights; that
this judicial determination is not an adjudication of an injury suffered by all citizens and
taxpayers and/or abutting landowners alike. For if the NLCHD has invalid right of ways
in regards to all abutting landowners, they would have an unconstitutional
policy/custom, or if Defendants are refusing Plaintiffs the right to a valid right of way
while providing all other abutting landowners a valid right of way, Defendants have not
treated Plaintiffs equally under the law (in either case, Defendants are liable under 42
U.S.C. 1983). The injuries Plaintiffs allege are specific to Plaintiffs. As abutting

PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONIBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. $40-203a AhTD
PL-4NTIFFS' LIOTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGL;fENTmIIER I.C.
$ 67-8003 (3)
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landowners, Plaintiffs have a right to be treated similarly as all abutting landowners and
have a legally established right of way traversing their property, conforming to the
public records, and without the errant and knowingly unlawful issuance of the first
Wagner driveway access permit in the trespass upon Plaintiffs property (Defendants
either do not know where the actual location of CCR is due to alterations of CCR or they
do and have knowingly issued the first Wagner permit and widened CCR in deliberate
indifference to Plaintiffs constitutionally protected property rights, arbitrarily denied
Plaintiffs due process, and are abusing their authority, and are trespassing). Plaintiffs
seek cause of action from Court's decree.
The judicial determinations requested by Plaintiffs are ripe. The controversy, do
the Commissioners need to initiate validation in such matters, presents definite and
concrete issues, is real and substantial, and there is a need for adjudication. No
validation can pi-oceed and/or response to Requests, and thus no agency determination
of their application of law to opinions of fact can occur if Commissioners do not initiate
validation and/or respond to Requests. Plaintiffs are denied their rights to Due Process
(Procedural and substantive) as well as the right to Equal Treatment under the Law by
Commissioners inaction, failure to establish a verbatim record and failure to respond to
Plaintiffs in a meaningful way-to
review if Plaintiffs so wish. (I.C.

give Plaintiffs a "final decisionf' and allow a Judicial

3 40-203a carries a legislative required Judicial Review

if Plaintiffs are aggrieved by Commissioners decision.)
Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgments Of I.C.

3 40-203a and Under I.C. 67-

8003 (3) are not advisory or hypothetical. They are real, substantial, concrete, and ripe
and Plaintiffs have standing.
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges Commissioners failure/s to act and initiate validation
proceedings on their own resolution and/or respond to Plaintiffs' Requests For
PLAINTIFFS' IZ/IOTION/BRIEFTO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPMION AND ORDER ON
PLAWTIFFS' MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 5 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' R5OTION FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT UNDER I.C. 5 67-8003(3)
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Regulatory Takings Analysis has/have deprived Plaintiffs of their alleged constitutionally
protected property rights, land, without procedural due process (proper notice, hearing,
right of substantive and meaningful examination of the evidence, right to a final
decision based on the evidence, the right to a judicial review of the matters, and
amongst others) and equal treatment under the law (that all abutting landowners have

a right of a legally established right of way, or to be shown cause on a reasonable basis
as to why the GCR right of way does not need to be legally established, accurately
located, and/or its location to correspond to the public record, or that Commissioners
need not evaluate their administrative actions for the possibilities of taking of private

/i1

property without the due process of law).
On this

Day of July, 2008.Q

iU(~ib9~

RESPECTFULLY SUBM?JTED,

Don Halvorson
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Don Halvorson
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIOWBRIEF TO RECONSIDER COURT'S OPIPJION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFFS' bfOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF I.C. 8 40-203a AND
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIOTU' FOR DECLARTORY JUDGMENT L%TDER I.C. $67-8003 (3)

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
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4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
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FAX (208) 883-4593
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

1

DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(I-Iusband and Wife),

) Case No. CV 2008-180

1

Plaintiffs,

)
)
VS.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR )

THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICEIhRD
ESANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,

DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE
APPLICATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
MOTION TO VACATE AND RESET
HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

1
)
)
)
)
\

I

Defendants.

1

Defendants, through counsel, make ex parte application or, alternati~ely,move tlris Cou?
under Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider filed herein on
July 11,2008, and set for hearing on July 29,2008, to a date and time convenient for the Court,
Plaintiffs and Defendants' counsel.

DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION OR, .ALTERNATIVELY, h4OTION TO VACATE
_&VDRESET IXE-mTGON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECOhTSIDER-- 1

0;tl-1

As grounds for this application m d motion, Defendants' co'~u1sslrepresents ttlat he will be
out of the office and, tberef~re,unavailable to appea before tl~:: C o ~ ~from
r t July 25,2038 through
August 25,2008.

In tlie event the Court does not 32-nt Defendants' ex paz-te applic~tion,Defendants do not
desire to file a brief but do reqt~esttelephonic oral argument upon this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of July, 2008.

LAWDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAh4, P.A.

CERTIFICATE, CF SERVICE
i liereby cenifq.that on illis 17th dzy of July, 2008, I catrsed a true a~ct
correct copy of tlGs

document to be served on the following individual in the mmner i~tlicated'nslo\v:

/

DONHLVDRSON
CHAFXOTTE HALVORSON
1290 Ah/LERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENPRICK, IDAHO 83 537

[ X] US. M3il
[ 3 Federal Express Sta~~dard
Ovelnight hlfai1
[ j FAX (208) 322-4486
[ 1 Hand Delivery

I

1
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DEFEhiDAkXTS' EX P m T E APPLICATION OR,ALTEKYATZLTELY,I\/~OTIONTO VACATE
KYD RESET H E L ~ ~ ~
OX
T PLr,&ITTIFE;S'
G
MOTION T8 FRECOXSIDER -- 2
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & G R A M , P.A.
414 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

1

) Case No. CV 2005- 180

1

)
)
VS.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMSSIONERS FOR )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE
AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

THE KORTH LATAW COUNTY HIGHWAY
1
DISTRICT, 0RI;AhTD ARNEBERG, RICE4RD
)
WANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN PAYNEi, in his official capacity and )
in his individual capacity,
1
Defendants.

1
1

THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to Defendants' Ex Parte
Application or, Alternatively, Motion To Vacate And Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion To
Reconsider filed herein, this Court having reviewed the file in tlGs matter, and good cause
appearing for granting Defendants' ex parte application;

ORDER GRAiTIKG DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION
TO VACATE ASD RESET HEARKG O X PLAINTIFFS' h/iIOTIOM TO RECONSIDER -- 1

(JLSS

NOW THEREFOE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion
to Reconsider filed herein on July 11,2008, and set for hearing on July 29,2008, is hereby reset
for hearing on

AI~L~C2L7

q :00

,7008, at the hour of

asm. Pacific T h e

in the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, Idaho.
IT IS SO ORDERED this

4%
4
day of *M

+

2008.

District Judge
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I caused a true and correct

I hereby certify that on this

in the manner indicated below:

copy of this document to be served
--

--

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537
RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE
& GRAF-IAM, P.A.
414 S. JEFFERSON
P.O. BOX 9344
MOSCOW, ID 83843

N]1

.

U.S. Mail
[ Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

Y

f ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] F M (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

CLERK OF THE COUR

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDL4NTS'EX PrlRTE APPLICATION
TO VACATE AKD RESET EEARI;\TG ON PLAINTIFFS' MO FION TO XECONSICER -- 2 ,.,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)

1
1

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

1

CASE NO. CV-08-00180
ArnNDED
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
1
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
)
LATAH COUNTY HlGHWAY DISTRICT, )
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD
1
HANSEN, S m W N CLYDE, in their
)
official capacities, and their individual
1
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official
)
capacity and in his individual capacity,
1

1
1

Defendants.

IT IS HERERY ORDERED that Friday, the 5" day of September, 2008, at the hour
of 9: 15 a.m. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse,
Lewiston, Idaho, is the tinie and place set for a Telepl~oriicScheduling Conference in the aboveentitled matter with the COURT initiating the call.
DATED this

,A1 d-

day of July, 2008.

CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge
AMENDED
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
SCI-EEDULhTGCOAFERENCE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the
foregoing AMENDED ORDER FOR
TELEPHONIC
SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE was mailed, postage
prepaid, by the
dgsigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, thii&day
of July,
2008, on:
Don and Charlotte Halvorson
1290 Ailierican Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83537
(208)289-5602

Ronald J. Landeck
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow,. ID 83 843
(208)883-1505

PATTY 0 . WEEKS, Clerk

AMENDED
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC
S CHEDULNG CONFERENCE

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & G2LM%!ihtl, P.A.
414 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

-.DE?L;TY

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT

OF THE DISTRICT OF LDAEIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAI-T
DON & CHARLOTTE EVLVORSON
(E-fusbasdand Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMfSSIONERS FOR
THE NORTH LATAI-I COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAM3, ARNEBERG, RICHARD
KANSEN, S m M CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV 2008-180

1

) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSrvTE
) BRILEF TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
) TO RECONSIDER

1
1
)

1
)
)
)

1
1
1
1

Defendants, through counsel, respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Coust's Opinion
and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. 40-203(a) and Plaintiffs' Motion
for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. $67-8003(3) ("Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider").
With due respect to Plaintiffs' efforts in this matter, Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and
Brief does not set forth any arbwent that was not previously made in regard to the underlying

motions. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not seem to understand the legal basis cited in the Court's Opinion
and Order for denying Plaintiffs' motions.
Defendants restate, by this reference, their objections to the motions as previously filed by
Defendants on May 9,2008, and request that the Court summarily deny Plaintiffs7-on

to

Reconsider.
As an additional note, Defendants consider Plaintiffs7Motion to Reconsider may have been
unnecessary and, if so, to have needlessly increased the cost of litigation. Defendants do not want to
be subjected to unnecessary legal expenses and utilize this brief as an opporhmity to remind
Plaintiffs that improper pleadings are subject to sanction.
Dated this 17th day of July, 2008.
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.

By:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certifl that on this 25th day of July, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of this
document to be senred on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CEMXLOTTE K4LVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ X ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ 1 FAX (208) 322-4486
[ 1 Hand Delivery

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

COURT MINUTES
Presiding Judge
CARL B. KERRICK
Reporter
NANCY TOINLER
Date AUGUST 26,2008
Time: 9:03 a.m.
DON & CHAUOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)

1

Plaintiffs,

Docket No. CV-2008-180

)

vs.
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
)
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT )
ORLAND ARNEGERG, RICHARD
1
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
)
Official Capacites, and in their Individual )
Capacities; DAN PAYhTE,in his official
)
capacity and in his individual capacity,
1

APPEARANCES :
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
DON HALVORSON
For, Plaintiff
RONALD LANDECK
For, Defendant

Defendants.
)

SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: h;lOTION TO RECONSIDER

BE IT KNO\&W,THAT THE FOLLOWhTGPROCEEDINGS WERE HAAD,TO-INIT:
DCY 2199
307 Don and Charlotte Halvorson present.
Ronald Landeck present.
321 Mr. Halvorson presents argument re: motion to reconsider.
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1

Page of

2

Pages

COURT MINUTES AUGUST 26,2008

CV-2008-180

HALVORSON VS. NORTE L A T M GO. HWY

90 1 Mr. Halverson presents rebuttal asgument. 1248 Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.
(1254)Recess 9:32 a.m.

JENNY LANDRUS
APPROVED:
Deputy Clerk
2
Page of

2

Pages

COURT MINUTES AUGUST 26,2008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

1

DON & CHARLOTTE
HALVORSON,

1

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. CV-08-00180

)

1

VS.

ORDER SETTIXG CASE FOR TRIAL
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

)
)

NORTH LATAH COUNTY
- HIGHWAY DISTRICT; BOARD
1
OF COMMISSIONERS FOR THE
1
NORTH LATAH COUNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ORLAND 1
ARNEBERG, RICHARD HANSEN, )
SHERMAN CLYDE, in his official
capacity and in his individual
1
capacity,
1

1

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY O m E R E D that the above-named case be set for JURY TRI.4L
before the Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge, at the Latall County
Courtl~ouse,at Moscow, Idaho, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on the 2oth day of April, 2009,
for T H E E to FOUR (3-4) days.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following:
disclosure of Plaintiff's

expert witnesses shall be on or before

October 3 1, 2008;
disclosure of Defendant's expert witnesses shall be on or before

ORDER SETThTGCASE FOR TRIAL
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFEPSKCE

1

December 12,2008;
all discovery shall be completed by March 20, 2009;
the last day for hearing dispositive motions shall be March 3,2009;
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on April 13,2009, at the hour of
11:00 a.m., at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, at Lewiston, Idaho. Lead counsel trying
the case must be present at the pre-trial conference.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party shall:
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pre-trial
hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses asserted by
that party:
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial
conference to be marked;
3)

Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared to
submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing;

4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibits or to make
specific objections to its admissibility;

5) Furnish opposing counsel with the names and addresses of all
witnesses, the nature their testimony, experts' reports, and like
instruments, and complete all other matter which may expedite both
the pre-trial and trial of this case:

6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement;

ORDER SETTIKG CASE FOR TRIAL
AND PE-TRI_rlLCONFEAWNCE

2

7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law relied
upon:

8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions counsel
intends to request. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies,
one copy containing citations of authority and one copy suitable for
submission to the jury. The Court uses the following instructions from
IDJI and it is not necessary for counsel to submit them: 100, 109, 110,
112, 122, 123, 124, 140, 141, 143, 144,145, and 900.
DATED this

c" day of September, 2008.
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILJNG
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, this S*day
of September, 2008, on:
Don & Charlotte Halvorson
1290 Arnerican Ridge Road
Kendrick, ID 83537
Ronald J. Landeck
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham
P.O.Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843

ORDER SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL
An'D PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAIZO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

1
DON and CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife)
Plaintiffs,

)

1
CASE NO. CV 2008-00 180

v.
NORTH LATAI-I COUNTY HIGHWAY )
DISTRICT; BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH
)
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, )
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RTCHARD
)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their
official capacities, and their individual
)
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official
)
capacity and in his individual capacity,

OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'
htOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Court's
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratoly Judgment of I.C. 5 40-203A and the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3). The Court heard oral
argument on August 26, 2008. The Plaintiffs proceededpro se ill the matter, and Mr. Halvorson

OPINION AND ORDER ON PLX-WTIFFS' MOTION 1
FOR RECONSIDER4TION

presented argument. The Defendants were represented by Ronald Landeck, of the firm Landeck,
Westberg, Judge & Graham. The Court, having heard argument and being fully advised in these
matters, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
A comprehensive background of this matter is located within the Opinion and Order on

PlaintiSfs ' Motion for Declaratory Judgment o f 1 C. j40-203A and Plaintiffs' Motion for
Declaratory Judgment Under l: C. J 67-8003(3), filed on June 9, 2008. At that time, this Court
denied the Plaintiffs' motions for declaratory judgment, determining that, based upon the
outstanding issues of fact and for purposes of judicial economy, declaratory judgment is not
appropriate on these issues. Further, the issues raised will be appropriately addressed through the
underlying civil action. The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to reconsider its determination
regarding both inotions for declaratory judgment.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD
On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. I l(a)(2)(B), the court iziust take into
account any new facts that may affect the correctness of the prior interlocutory order.

hiationsbanc -Mortgage Cory. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879, 884,908 P.2d 572,577 (Ct. App. 1995),
citing Coeur d t4lene i2fining Co. v. First Aral'l Bank of hrorfh Idaho, 118 Idaho 8 12, 823, 800
P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The burden is on the moving party to bring the new facts to the court's
attention; the court is not required to search the record to determine 'ivlzether there are any new
facrs that would affect its earlier decision. Coeur d 'Alene Afining Go., 118 Idaho at 823, 800
P.2d at 1037. Finally, the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the

OPINION AhD ORDER ON PLAnlTI?FS' &/TOTION 2
FOX RECONSIDERATIOH

sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Beeh, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908,914
(200 1).

ANALYSIS
The Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is timely, however, no additional facts, nor
errors of law, have been presented which persuade this Court to alter its previous ruling.
When considering a motion of this type, the trial court should take into account
any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the
interlocutory order. The burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's
attention to the new facts. We will not require the trial court to search the record
to determine if there is any new information that might change the specification of
facts deemed to be established.
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank ofNorth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026,
1037 (1990). This Court notes that it is not necessary for the party seelung reconsideration to present
new facts to the court,' however, the party must not simply reiterate its original argument, but must
instead present additional information or set foifn an error of the Court in the previous ruling. See
Joh~zsonv. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,473, 147 P.3d 100,105 (Ct. App. 2006). Nothing presented by
the Plaintiffs leads this Court to the conclusion that declaratory judgment is appropriate on this
matter.

1

In Johnson, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed several cases dealing with motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the trial court. Most of these cases involved the trial court granting a motion for sumnary judgment,
which in effect dismissed all or portions of a case. The Johnson Court found:
None of these authorities preclude reconsideration of a trial court's interlocutory decision on the bases
of the initial evidence. Indeed, a rule requiring new evidence on a motion for reconsideration would be a
cause for concern. It uould prevent a party from drawing the trial court's attention to errors of law or fact
in the initial decision, precluding correction of even flagrant errors except though an appeal.
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,473, 137 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. Xpp. 2006). The case presented by the
Halvorsons is unique in that this party is seeking declaratory jud-ment on the issues presented to the Court.
This Court's denial of the motions for declaratory judgment does not dismiss the case before it, instead this
Court determines that the matter is best left for factual determinations to be made by a trier of fact regarding the
underlying civil actions.

OPINION AND ORDER ON PL,.llNTIFFS' MOTION 3
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As a matter of clarification, the denial of the Plaintiffs' motions for declaratory judgment
does not eliminate the underlying claims made by the Plaintiffs; these issues are preserved for a trial
on the merits of this case. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the adjudicationof these
claims, and such evidence must be determined by a finder of fact. Thus, declaratoryjudgment is not
appropiate on this matter and the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied.

CONCLUSION
On June 9,2008, this Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment of
I.C. tj 40-203A and Plaintiffs7Motion for Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. tj 67-8003(3). This
Court determined that the motion pursuant to I.C. tj 40-203A requires the Court to issue an
advisory opinion, which is not an appropriate role of the judiciary. Further, the Court determined
that both motions for declaratory judgment are appropriately addressed through the underlying
civil action. For reasons of judicial economy, both motions for declaratory judgment were
denied. The Plaintiffs ask this Court to recoiisider its determination, however, the Plaintiffs have
presented no additional facts on the matter, nor have the Plaintiffs established that the Court
erred in its previous determination. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

OPmION Ah3 ORDER Oh PLAINTIFFS'1IOTION 4
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ORDER
The Plaintiffs' hfotion to Reconsider the Court's Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion
for Declaratory Judgment of I.C. $ 40-203A and Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment
under I. C. fj 67-8003(3) is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this $&day

of September 2008.

:ARL B. KERRICK - District Judge

OPINION Ah-D ORDER OX PLAIhTTFFS' MOTION j
FOR RECONSLDERATIGN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECO,NSIDERATION was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at
Lewiston, Idaho, thisEday
of September, 2008, on:
Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick ID 83537
Ronald Landeck
LANDECK TVESTBERG JUDGE & GRAHAM
P 0 Box 9344
hfoscow ID 83843
Clerk of the Court
Latah County Courthouse
P 0 Box 8068
Moscow ID 83843
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK
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Don Halvorson
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1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife))

Case No. CV 2008-180

)

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

)

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

Plaintiffs
VS.

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

OF THE ISSUE OF THE

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

NULLIFICATION OF THE

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

RIGHT OF WAY AND

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF

Individual Capacity

)

PROOF OF PRESCRIPTION

Defendants

)

AND/OR VALIDATION OF A

)

LEGALLY ESTABLISHED

1

RIGHT OF WAY

Under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure rule 56, Plaintiffs move/petition Court, as a
matter of law, for Partial Summary JudgmentlAdjudication of the Issue of the status of
the original prescriptive right of way on Camps Canyon Road in light of the undisputed
facts that in 1996 Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N 3WBM undewent
alteration in which the physical location of the highway/right of way was changed and
the width was increased. As a matter of law, the establishment of a prescriptive

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADSUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF
WAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF OF PRESCRIPTION AND/OR
VALIDATION OF ,4LEGALLY ES'r"AB!,ISHED RIGHT OF WAY

easement rests on the usage of the identical strip of land over which the right was
originally claimed. Subsequent to these admissions and answers to Plaintiffs'
interrogatories this identity can no longer be claimed. "[lit is well settled under ldaho
Law that any judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the
character, width, length and location of the easement. This Court does not hesitate to
remand cases because of an inadequacy in the district court's description of an
easement." Schneider K Howe, 142 ldaho 767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006)
(internal citations omitted)
The nullification of the establishment of the Camps Canyon right of way shifts the
burden of proof to the one presently claiming prescription, and lor the legal
reestablishment of Camps Canyon Road.
Without a valid right of way, Defendants operate without the basis of their authority.
Camps Canyon Road no longer lies on the identical strip of land it did before the 1996
alteration which is presumed (neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants bring evidence or claim
to the contrary) to be identical to the strip of land occupied by Camps Canyon Road at
the end of the prescriptive period in the absence of any known changes to Camps
Canyon Road between the prescriptive period and 1996. The United States Court of
Appeals, Federal Circuit Hash v. US., 403 F.3d 1308 at 577 "This authority is consistent
with "the long established rule" in ldaho "that any right gained by prescription is confined
to the right as exercised during the prescriptive period. It is limited by the purpose for
which it is acquired and the use to which it is put." /&ho Forest /ndus., /nc. v. Hqya'en
Lake Wafershed/mprovementDisf.,112 ldaho 512, 733 P.2d 733,736 (1987) (citation
omitted). As the ldaho Supreme Court explained in Gibbens K Weisshaupf, 98 ldaho
633, 570 P2d 870, 875 (1977), "prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and
thus the rights obtained by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by the
courts." (Emphasis added.)

UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU~$I\/ARYJUDGhlENTIADJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF
WAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF OF PRESCRIPTION A?JD/OR
VALIDATION OF A LEGALLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT OF WAY

I . 39 American Jurisprudence 24 Highways, Streets, and Bridges 530. "Location
and termini of way. The public cannot acquire a right by prescription to pass over a
tract of land generally, but only in a certain definite line of way. To establish a
public road by prescription there must be a use of the identical strip of land over
which the riqht is claimed. It is not indispensable, however, to the establishment of
a highway by adverse user that there be no deviation from a direct line of travel if
the travel has remained substantially unchanged; it is sufficient although at times
there may have been slight deviations from the common way to avoid
encroachments, obstacles, or obstructions upon the road." (Emphasis added.)
2. In a case involving a prescriptive highway the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1901
that "It was an easement in the land, not the fee to the land, which the public
acquired by the road, and the measure of the easement was the width of the road."
District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 92 at 108 (1901), 21 S. Ct. 283.
(Emphasis added.
3. 39 American Jursprucfence 24 Highways, Streets, and Bridges §63 "Prescriptive

ways As a general proposition, the width of a highway established solely by
prescription or user is determined by the extent of such user, and the width of the
road a s used at the end of the period of prescription fixed by the statute of
limitations is the established width of the highway in such cases , at least where
that width has been used throughout the prescriptive period.
While there are cases which appear to recognize that a highway acquired by
prescription or user does not extend beyond the beaten or traveled path, it is more
generally held that the public easement is not necessarily confined strictly to the
actual beaten path or traveled track in every instance, but such right extends to
such width a s is reasonably necessary for public travel.
The easement for a street includes such use of the land at or beneath the surface
a s will make the easement effective, and in determining the width or extent of an
PLAINTIFFS ' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/,4DJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF
LVAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF OF PWSCRIPTION AND/OR
VALIDATION OF A LEGALLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT OF WAY
3

easement by prescription, a similar concept of use must be employed. The width
of a highway acquired by prescription or user is not necessarily the same as that of
a formally established highway. It is sometimes provided by statute that highways
acquired by user shall be made a certain width. However, it has been held that if a
statute were construed to provide that any road dedicated by adverse public use
was dedicated to a specified width regardless of the width of actual usage, the
statute would be unconstitutional. Such a statute raises only a rebuttable
presumption and, where the presumption is rebutted, the roadway is restricted to
that area actually appropriated and used for road purposes." (Emphasis added.)

4. Eo =Ro,where Ro= the road width of Camps Canyon Road at the end of the
prescriptive period, and Eo = the width of the right of way easement at the end of
the prescriptive period. The ruling on whether Camps Canyon Road lies within the
~for any ,.
original prescriptive right of way width lies in whether R x Ro

5. Rlg96

(1) =

ROand Elgg6(1) = EOwhere Rlgg6 (1) = the road width of Camps Canyon

Road in 1996 and EIgg6(1) = the width of the right of way easement of Camps
Canyon Road prior to the alteration of Camps Canyon Road. Generally, Plaintiffs
do not dispute that conditions precedent were performed or have occurred. Camps
Canyon Road met the requirements for acquisition and establishment as a
prescriptive right of way/highway and continued as such under the presumptions
that the centerline was located in 1996 prior to the 1996 alteration as the centerline
was located at the end of the prescriptive period and the width prior to the 1996
alteration was the width at the end of the prescriptive period.
6. On questioning Defendants bring forth no specific information to indicate any
substantial change in Camps Canyon Road from its establishment to 1996.
Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories, INTERROGATORY NO. 3 -"List all available
information and documents you know of, the names, addresses, phone numbers
and whereabouts of anyone, who may have information of or the possession of
documents concerning the acquisition of the prescriptive right of wayihighway,
CCR, the time of the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right-of-way/highway,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU-MMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF
WAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF OF PMSCRIPTION AVD/OR
VALIDATION OF A LEGALLY ESTL4BLISHEDNGHT OF WAY
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CCR, the establishment of the prescriptive right-of-wayihighway, CCR, at the end
of t h e prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of way/highway, CCR.
RESPONSE: Object to this Interrogatory a s unduly burdensome and oppressive in
that it covers an unlimited time frame and seeks information and documents not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without
waiver of objection, Documents regarding CCR in NLCHD1s possession are
primarily set forth in District foreman's journals and Commissioner Minutes. Width
of CCR was widened on the north side in 1996 to approximately its present width.
CCR was widened on south side in 2005 and 2006 by approximately four feet of
road surface and the addition of sloping cut banks. All District Commissioners and
the foreman, including Payne, for the CCR where subdistrict is located have
knowledge of this information."
7. Defendants' objections a r e unfounded. The determination of a prescriptive way is

dependant on all the circumstances pertaining regardless of the extent of the
history. Meservey K Gullifor4 14 Idaho 133, 93 P.780 (1908) ("Width of Highways
established by prescription or public use had to be determined from a
consideration of circumstances peculiar to each case...")
8. In 1996 Camps Canyon road was widened. RIgg6(2) > RIgg6(1) and therefore Elgg6(2)
> E1g96(1) where Rlgg6(2) = the road width of Camps Canyon Road in 1996 and Elgg6
(2) = the

width of the right of way easement of Camps Canyon Road after the

alteration of Camps Canyon ~ o a d There
~ . is no dispute that width was added to
Camps Canyon Road in 1996. The amount of width and on which side of the road
the width was added are not relevant to present argument.
9. Therefore R199s (2).> Ro and El996 (2) > Eo. (Eo=Ro=R1996(1)<R1996(2))
10.The centerline of a road is a function of its width by definition of centerline.
Therefore any unequal additions of width change the centerline, and any equal
additions of width are an increase of width which results in R1996(2).>ROand

is not identical to the land originally claimed.
Defendants acknowledge this. Plaintiffs First Request For Admissions, "Request
> Eo . The land occupied now

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTIL4DJUDICATIONOF
THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF
WAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF OF PRESCRIPTION AND/OR
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No. 3, subpart c. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3. - The 1996 alteration
exceeded the limits of the prescriptive right of way in the following manners:
subpart c. The actual physical location of CCR was altered in the straightening of
the curves and the extension of the road bed around the rock outcropping and the
washout of the roadbed. RESPONSE: Object as to relevance of 1996 activity.
Object as to form of request to the extent it calls for legal conclusion. Without
waiver of objection: Admitted." Defendants' objections are unfounded. The 1996
alteration is relevant to any and all subsequent circumstances pertaining to the
legal establishment of Camps Canyon Road. Defendants generally admit to a
specific Request. Defendants have the authority to straighten, widen, and alter
Camps Canyon Road and to apply their authority to specific situations and
individuals in a quasi-judicial capacity. (See I.C. §§ 40-605 and40-1310. See

Cooper v. Board of County Comrn'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P2d 947
(1980)')
In support of Plaintiffs' MotionlPetition For summary JudgmentfAdjudication of
the Issue Of The Nullification Of the Original Prescriptive Right Of Way And Subsequent
Burden of Proof Of Prescription AndfOr Validation Of A Legally Established Right Of
Way, Plaintiffs offer these points.
First the end of anything, by way of reason, requires a beginning. An end and a
beginning are inextricably joined. As Plaintiffs wish an end to this dispute, they begin
with this summary judgment motion as the beginning to that end.
Secondly, the heart of the dispute lies within the notion of the limits of the right of
way of Camps Canyon Road. These limits, such as the location of, the width of, the use
of, and the very type of right of way, amongst others, provide the boundaries of the
authority of the Defendants. Further there are matters which are contested to be
contained within the limits of this authorization which don't even occur therewithin and
the determination of what belongs tofor is authorized under a right of way shall shed
light on these matters also.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUh4LMARY JUDGh4ENT/ADJUDICA4TION OF
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Third, the present dispute of the Complaint wanders aimlessly in an
argumentative circle around this issue. Without a determination of the status of the
original prescriptive right of way, the effects of the 1996 alteration to that determination,
and a proper showing of where the burden of proof lies (Plaintiffs have no obligation to
establish a legal or valid right f way for Defendants), Plaintiffs chase the same rabbit
(due process) around the same tree (final decision).
Fourth without the delineation of the basis for Defendants' authority to operate
they are free to alter and widen Camps Canyon Road, issue permits and fail to revoke
driveway access permits, and to destroy any of Plaintiffs property that lies in
Defendants' path with impunity and without notice or hearing and to do so with the
freedom to destroy all evidence in the process, leaving Plaintiffs without any legal
remedy or ability to stop Defendants' continued assaults.
Fifth, Plaintiffs' challenges to Defendants' operations out of the bounds of their
authority, trespass, is needful of a concrete definable right of way and not an amorphous
constantly fluctuating easement defined on the arbitrary whims of the Defendants.
Sixth, sufficient contrary and undisputed evidence to the presumption of the
location of Camps Canyon Road as it was at the end of the prescriptive period and to
the presumption that the width of the right of way is as it was at the end of the
prescriptive period exists and no fact finder is necessary as both parties agree that
Camps Canyon Road was widened and changed in location. As a matter of law no
theory of prescription would allow for these undisputed changes.
Seventh, this summary judgment deprives Defendants of the free evidence of the
presumption, and as the reasonably designated caretakers of the evidence of proof, this
summary judgment will properly obligate the Defendants with their rightful duty of
maintaining a valid and adequately and legally defined right of way.
Finally this motionlpetition for partial summary judgment should be granted to
begin to narrow the dispute to its elemental parts and thus not present a morass of
obfuscated opinions of fact and opinions of the applications of law to a bewildered jury

6

On this _ i f i a y

of September, 2008.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

QhD&5P3
Don Halvorson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this f l t h day of September, 2008, I caused a true and correct
copy of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GRAHAM, P.A.
414 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501-0896

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight h4ail
[ ] FAX (208) 883-4593
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[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180

)

PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN

)

SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'

Plaintiffs
vs .

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

1

OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)
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Defendants
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STL4TEOF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Latah
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Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say:
1) We are the plaintiffs named in the above case.

PI ATNTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' -MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE
ORIGINAL PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF WAY AND SUBSEQUENT BURDEN OF PROOF
OF PRESCRIPTION
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2) We first became aware of Defendants adverse actions and improper interference with
regard to our property rights underlying to and abutting to Camps Canyon Road in the
late fall of 2005 when the NLCHD graded the road and pushed 6 inches of gavel to
the northeast into the buffer (area between the fence and the road and its supporting
structures) left by us when we reconstructed the line fence in 1997.
3) We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription to the lands abutting to
and underlying Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in our fee
simple title on 4/12/06 at the regular meeting of the Comlnissioners of the NLCHD.
4) We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence,
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Camps
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2085 on 4/12/06.
5 ) We gave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of

prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence, to
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to widen Camps Canyon
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06.
6) We continued to give Defendants fair wanling of our f a d s opinionls of fact/s and
interpretation of the application of law to our facts and opinion/s of facts and sought
remedy and settlellient with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum of either
paying $750 and file for petition to validate Czrnps Canyon Road or getting a lawyer
in September of 2007.
The above statements are true to the best of our knowledge.
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of September, 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this x t h day of September, 2008,I caused a true and correct
copy of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:
RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GRAHAM, P.A.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501-0896

[XI U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 883-4593
[ 1 Hand Delivery
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Don Halvo<son

PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT I
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JUDGMENTIIIDJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE NULLIFICATION OF THE
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OF PRESCRIPT1ON
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife))
)

Plaintiffs

Case No. CV 2008-1 80

1

VS.

North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
Commissioners for the North Latall County

) SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

) ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE

Hallsen, Shennan Clyde, in thsir Official
- -

-

Y

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

) OF THE NLCEJD'S STANDING

D m Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

) OPERATING PROCEDUREIPOLICYI

Iadi;.-i&a! C~paciry

) CLSTOM OF 'LTiil>Ei\iB~G.I

Defendants

1 PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-WAY

Urzder I.R.C.P. Rule 56, Plaintiffs come before this Court seeking a Partial Summary
JudgmentlAdjudication of the Issue Of The Facial Validity Of The NLCHD's Standard
Operating ProcedurelPolicylC_ustomFor Widening Of A Prescriptive Right Of Way under Case
No. CV 2008- 180. As a matter of law, the NLCHD's standard operating

procedurelpolicy/custonl/administrativeprocedurels for their broadly delegated power for
widening of 2 prescriptive right of w-ay does not circumscribe deprivations with constitutionally
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUhlMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDmTGOPERATING
PROCEDtJItElPOLICY/CUSTOM FOR WIDENING A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-WAY
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adequate procedures. Procedural safeguards provided by Idaho Statutes are not built into the

procedure/policy/custom~adrninistrativeprocedurels effecting deprivations, and/or remedy/s for
erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law are not built into the

procedurelpolicy/custom/administrativeprocedurels. (See Zinef-mon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113
starting at 124, Zimmernzan v. City ofOaklarzd, 255 F.3d 734, (9thCircuit, 2001), Logan v.
Zimfizerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982)(availability of postdeprivation remedy is
inadequate when deprivatiou is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official
conduct was not "unauthorized").
The civil procedures of proper interference witb an abutting, adjoining and underlying
landowners' property rights and landowner right to proper notice and hearing and right to be
heard at a meaningful time and right of a meaninghl response and right to be treated as all
similarly situated persons or to be shown that not to be so similarly treated is rationally related to
a legitimate govei-nnlent interest, is left uncircwnscribed to the discretion of the Defendants.
Deprivations to abutting, adjoining andlor underlying land owners are predictable and
easily identifiable as widening, straightening, altering andlor changing a highway are planned
activities. The authority to deprive has been given to the defendants, that is, the authority to
widen, straighten, alter and/or change a prescriptive right of way. The Defendants have also
been given the concomitant duty to insure only proper interference u-it11abutting, underlying and
adjoining landowner's property rights and to initiate procedural safeguards set up by state
statutes to guard agzii~stunlawfii deprivatio~san2 to set fo'ctri'il remedial procedures for erroneous
deprivations.
Relevant factors include the affected private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation,
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the governnlent's interest, including
burdens that additional safeguards would entail. See &fathewsv. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 3 19,335
(1 976). In most cases, some type of predeprivation notice and hearing are constitutionally
required before a property interest is invaded. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978),

Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113, and Parratt v. Taylor, 45 1 U. S. 527, (198 1).
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL, SUM,VARY SUDGME'NT/ADJUDICL4TIONOF
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UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

PLAINTIPFS' SECOND INTERROGATORIES (PAYNE)

Plaintiffs' Second Illterro~atories1 Please state the standard operating procedure for
straightening, widening, altering, and/or changing CCR.
Response:
"The standard operating procedure for North Latah County Highway District public roads
established by psescription or public use, except those of a lesser width presently existing at the
time those highways are establislied, is to widen such roads as required for proper construction
and maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width of 50 feet. On information and
belief, CCR is a public highway established by prescription or public use and, therefore, would
be constructed and maintained in the discretion of the District as such forth above.

2.

As stated in the response to the intenogatory, there are no operating procedures in place.

The standard operating procedure simply is at the discretion of the District to "widen such roads
as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width
of 50 feet." No operational procedures, safeguards andlor remedies for erroneous deprivations
are outlined or described.

3.

Neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs dispute the District's lack of discretion to widen a

prescriptive right of way that is already 50 feet.
4.

Neither Defendants nor Plaintiffs dispute the District's discretioil to widen roads which

are of a lesser width presently existing at the time ;hose highwaj-s [roadsj are established.

ARGUhfENT FOR GFUNTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
5.

There exists no set of circumstances under which the NLCHD policy for the widening,

straightening, altering andlor changing of a prescriptive road/highway which are of a lesser width
presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established would be valid without the
circumscription by and inclusion of the requirements of the proper governmental interference,
including statutory safeguards and statutory remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMh/IARY JUDGMENTIADSUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDING OPEMTING
3ROCEDU~%/POLICY/CUSTOh~FOR WIDENNG A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGE-IT-OF-TVA4Y
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Idaho State statutes, to assure an abutting, adjoining, andlor underlying landowner's right to due
process (procedural and/or substantive) andlor equal treatment under the law andlor compliance
-4th Idaho State Statutes.

6.

39 American Jurisprudence 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges $30. "Location and

termini of way. The public cannot acquire a right by prescription to pass over a tract of land
generally, but only in a certain definite line of way. To establish a public road by prescription
there must be a use of the identical strip of land over which the right is claimed. It is not
indispensable, however, to the establishment of a highway by adverse user that there be no
deviation from a direct line of travel if the travel has remained substantially unchanged; it is
sufficient although at times there may have been slight deviations from the common way to
avoid encroachments? obstacles, or obstiuctions upon the road." (Emphasis added.)

7.

In a case involving a prescriptive highway the U.S. Supreme Cowt stated in 1901 that "It

was an easement in the land, not the fee to the land, which the public acquired by the road, and
the measure of the easement was the width of the road." District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180

U.S. 92 at 108 (1901), 21 S. Ct. 283. (Emphasis added.)
8.

Eo = Ro, where Ro = the road width of roads which are of a lesser width presently existing

at the time those highways [roads] are established (at the end of the prescriptive period), and Eo =
the width of the right of way easement of roads which are of a lesser width presently existing at
the time those highways [roads] are established (at the end of the prescriptive period).
At the discretion of t l ~ eDistrict, any a d a11 chsilges In width a;zcl/or changes in location in any
roads which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are
established (at the end of the prescriptive period) would require statutory safeguards and
remedies for erroneous deprivations as any change in width and or location negates that those
roads would lie within the identical strip of land over which the right is [was] claimed.

9.

Any land outside of the identical strip of land over which the right is [was] claimed lies

outside the authority of the NLCHD.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUh.IPL/IARY JUDGMENT/AD.JUDICATION OF
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PROCEDU~/POLICY/CUSTOR/I
FOR VI?DElimG A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-?YAY
3

0

!'-2

u

td

10.

The Defendants have the discretion and authority to widen, straighten, alter or change a

highway, however, once the choice has been made the Defendants have no discretion as to how
the operation is performed. "In order that act of county commissioners in laying out highway be
valid, whether upon public domain or private property, board must conform to law giving such
authority, as power to establish highways rests in legislature and right may be exercised only in
such manner as legislature provides." Gooding Hwy. Dist. V Idaho Irrigation Co. 30 Idaho 232,
165 P 99 (1917).

11.

The authority to widen, straighten and/or change a highway lies in I. C.

$8 40-605 and

40-1 3 10, as do statutory safeguards of survey prior to taking of private property, accurate
description of land required, attempts to make agreements with landowners, recording and
conveyance:
I.C. 6 40-605. LAYING OUT OF NEW HIGHWAYS WIDENING, CHANGING, OR
STRAIGHTENING EXISTING HIGHWAYS PURCHASE OF RIGHTS-OF-WAY BY
AGREEMENT. ". . .Commissioners may also change the width or locatioil or straighten
lines of any highway under their jurisdiction. If, in the laying out, widening, changing or
straightening of any highway it shall become necessary to take private property, the
cornrnissioilers or their director of highways shall cause a survey of the proposed
highway to be made, together with an accurate description of the lands required. The
commissioners shall endeavor to agree with each owner for the purchase of a right-ofway over his land inc!uded within the description. If they ase zble zo agree with tke

owner, the commissioners may purchase the land out of the county highway h n d under
their control, and the land shall then be conveyed to the county for the use and purpose of
highways."
I.C.

6 40-13 10 2) The highway district shall also have the right to acquire either by

p~urchase,or other legal means, all lands and other property necessary for the
construction, use, maintenance, repair and improvement of highways in their system. The
highway district may change the width or location, or straighten lines of any highway in
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADmDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDING OPERATNG
PROCEDURE/POLICY/CUSTO,I/I FOR VIIDENIRTG A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-TVAY
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their system, and if in the constructing, laying out, widening, changing, or straightening
of any highways, it shall become necessary to take private property, the district director
of highways, with the consent and on order of the highway district commissioners, shall
cause a survey of the proposed highway to be made, together with an accurate description
of the lands required. He shall endeavor to agree with each owner of property for the
purchase of a right-of-way over the lands included within the description. If the director
is able to agree with the owner of the lands, the highway disirict commissioners may
purchase the land and pay for it out of the funds of the highway district, and the lands
purchased shall then be conveyed to the highway district for the use and purpose of
highways.

12.

When Defendants have been given the authority to straighten, widen, and alter roads

which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established
and to apply their authority to specific situations and individuals they do so in a quasi-judicial
capacity. (See Cooper v. Board of County Cornrn '7s ofAda County, 101 Idaho 307, 614 P2d 947
(1 9(50).) Due Process and Equal Treatment Under the Law are required in all specifically and
individually applied instances.
13.

Prior survey, conveying and recording are required in all instances of changes beyond

identical strip of land over which the right is claimed whether the activity is straightening,
widening, altering, andlor changing. The NLCHD has no authority to do otherwise. The
YLCHD's Standard Qperatlng Procedure for xideni~igall roads :vhich ase of a lesser width
presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established does not circumscribe the
broad authority the NLCHD has to widen, straighten, andlor change u~iththese statutory
safeguards. Further, Idaho Statutes and procedural and substantive due process rights are
ignored when such changes are made without prior notice, hearing, survey, agreement with
ou7ner,proper and accurate record keeping, recording, and conveying.

14.

The NLCHD's Standard Operating Procedure for widening all roads which are of a lesser

width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established violates procedural
PLAINTIFFS' h/iOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDING OPERATING
PROCEDURE/POLICYICUSTOR/IFOR I$iIDENING A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-OF-TTri4Y
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due process rights by not providing adequate notice and predeprivation hearing and ignores and
violates statutory safeguards in Idaho Statutes (see I.C. Title 7 Chapter 7, I.C. Title 40 Chapter
20,I. C. $5 40-604, 40-605,40-608,40-13 10,40-2302,40-1336, I. C. 40-204, Idaho State
Constitution (Article I $ 5 13 and 14), and U. S. Constitution (5" and 14" Amendments)
15.

The NLCHD's Standard Operating Procedure for widening all roads which are of a lesser

width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established violates procedural
due process rights by arbitrarily ignoring any remedies for erroneous d6privations provided by
notice and hearing and Idaho statute or tort law. (See I.C. $ 40-302a, IRTA, ITCA, exhaustion of
agency remedies, amongst others.)
16.

The NLCHD's Standard Operating Procedure for widening all roads which are of a lesser

width presently existing at the time those highways [roads] are established effectively avoids,
denies, andor does not make allowance for any notice andlor hearing whether predeprivation or
post deprivation. (In acknowledging the absence of post deprivation hearing Plaintiffs do not
acknowledge such post deprivation remedies are adequate, rather in the alternative to the denial
of predeprivation notice and hearing, Plaintiffs are saying Defendants policies, customs, and
procedures also deny any exhaustion of agency remedies, judicial review, andlor tort claim
remedies. Trespass, nuisance, andor inverse condemnation arc: not covered by the ITCA and
such actions are denied by the arbitrariness and capriciousness of Defendants actions/failures to
act and abuse of Defendants discretionary powers. (See Lingle v. Chevron USA IEc. (04-163)
544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F. 3d 846 and Crolvn Pitiizt L?evelopmerzl:Irzc. v. City oYSz~r2Valley,
506 F.3d 851 (9'' Circuit 2007).)
17.

The NLCHD has no authority to create a prescriptive right of way only the authority to

acquire and maintain a prescripti-ye right of way. Defendants cannot do clandestinely (create a
prescriptive right of way) what they could not do in the open Court Room (See U. S. v.
Diekinson, 33 1 U.S. 745 (1947).

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUh4h4ARY SLTDGhZENTIADJUDICATION OF
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As a matter of law this facial challenge is not a small matter. The potential that this
standard operating procedure/policy/custom rnight operate as invalid in some strained set
circumstances andor in some conceivable manner is insufficient to sustain a ruling of invalidity.
In the present case, however, it is not a set of special or speculative circumstances which could
cause an event of inadequate safeguards andor lack of remedies for erroneous deprivations; it
would be in all such cases of widening of all roads which are of a lesser width presently existing
at the time those highways [roads] are established. All such roads would be under the same
constraints.
If there are 600miles of roads under the authority of the NLCHD, many of which were
acquired by prescription, there are 1200 miles of property lines for which the proper respect and
proper interference is demanded. The respect for property lines is no less required for
prescriptive rights of way than it urould be for deeded rights of way. Where there is an implied
distinction (that the bounds of a prescriptive right of way are amorphous, vary with the
Defendants' discretionary change in the road and are changeable at the discretion of the
Defendants and deeded rights of way are rigid) between prescriptive and deeded rights of way
andlor betureen individual abutting, adjoining, and /or underlying landowners to prescriptive
rights of way which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time those highways [roads]
are established, any unlike treatment must be reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest and none are stated. "[I]t is well settled under Idaho Law that any judgment determining
the e:;istence of an easement m s t also specifjj the cliaracter, width, fengih and location of the
easement. This Court does not hesitate to remand cases because of an inadequacy in the district
court's description of an easement." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232,
1239 (2006) (internal citations omitted)
All prescriptive rights of way which are of a lesser width presently existing at the time
those highttrays [roads] are established are in the same set of circ1mstances. They have the
potential to be widened to the limit of 50 feet at the discretion of the Defendants. Deprivation is
foreseeable and predictable. A predeprivation notice and hearing is not impracticable andlor
PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION FOR PARTIL4LSUMhfARY JUDGh/lENT/,4DJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCWD'S STANDTNG OPERATING
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infeasible. The choice to widen a prescriptive right of way is a matter of planning, and not of
exigent circumstances-it

is not "unauthorized". This combination makes a post deprivation

remedy inadequate
In the alternative, in the event that a post deprivation remedy would be adequate, there
exists no set of circumstances under which the NLCHD policy for the widening, straightening,
altering and/or changing of a prescriptive rosdlhighv~aywhich are of a lesser width presently
existing at the time those highways [roads] are established would be facially valid as this
policy/custom/standing operating procedure is not circumscribed by any agency remedy.
For the Plaintiffs to prevail in this partial summary judgment does not take away the
Defendants discretion to widen a prescriptive right of way, it simply promotes that the
interferences with abutting and underlying landowners' property rights is done properly, as is
statutorily and constitutionally required. The statutory safeguards and/or remedies are in place,
in the Idaho Code, but tlieir workability remains unknou.11 if the safeguards are not implemented,
in the policies/customs/standingoperating procedures of the NLCHD.
Failure to circumscribe and/or provide for or to ignore statutorily provided safeguards
and/or remedies for erroneous deprivatioi~sis abuse of the broadly delegated power to widen,
straighten and alter prescriptive rights of way which are of a lesser width presently existing at the
time those highways [roads] are established
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1 990) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is
inadequate ivhen deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official
conduct was not "unauthorized").
"Each of ous due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that
because hiniinum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its ow11 procedures that it may deem
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.' Vitek v. Jones, 435 U.S.
480,49 1-(1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 6 U.S., at 166-167 (POJVELL, J., concurring in part);
id., at 2 1 1 (MARSHL4LL,J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU-Mh4ARY JUDGMENTiADJUDICATION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE FACIAL VALIDITY OF THE NLCHD'S STANDING OPERATING
PRCCEDURE/POLICY/CUSTO-MFOR T4'IDENlKG A PRESCNPTIVE RIGHT-OF-'&'AY

destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered and
rejected such an approach: 'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, . . .
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without
appropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [Tlhe adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of
a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.' Vitek v. Jones,

445 U.S., at 490--491, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 167-(opinion concurring in
part)." Logan v. Zirnnzerrnarz Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, at 332 (1982)
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit Hash v. US., 403 F.3d 1308 at $77
"This authority is consistent with "the long established rule" in Idaho "that any right gained by
prescription is confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive period. It is limited by
the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to which it is put." Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v.
Hayden Lake WatershedIrnprovement Dist., 112 Idaho 512,733 P.2d 733,736 (1987) (citation
omitted). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Gibbe~sv. @'eisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570
P2d 870, 875 (1977), "prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and thus the rights
obtained by prescription should be closelv scrutinized and limited bv the courts." (Emphasis
added.)
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
4 14 S . Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 833-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, IN ANL)FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CE4RLOTTE FFALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

1
) Case No. CV 2008- 180

1
Plaintiffs,

)
)
vs.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COL'WVIISSIONERSFOR )

DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE
APPLICATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
MOTION TO RESET 2-IEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL,
S W A R Y JUDGMENT

THE NORTH LATAE-I COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, R T C H m
)
HANSEN, S H E f L I W CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and )
in his individual capacity,
1
Defenda~~ts.

1
1

Defendants, through coullsel, make ex parte application or, alternatively, move ths Court
under Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary
Jud-ment filed herein on September 19,2008, and set for hearing on October 21,2008, and to reset
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the hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at 9:00 a.m. at the designated courtroom of the Nez
Perce County Courthouse at Lewiston, Idaho.
On Friday, September 26, 2008, Plaintiff Don Halvorson and Defendants' undersigned
counsel Ronald Landeck ("I" or "my") met at my office to discuss Mr. Halvorson's pending
Motion for Partial Sunmary Judgment. During that meeting, I explained to Mr. Halvorson that
my schedule in the upcoming weeks would make it extremely difficult to respond to the motion
within the allotted time. Mr. Halvorson then agreed, without any conditions, to the resetting of
the hearing to Tuesday, November 18, 2008, to Defendants' filing any opposing affidavits and an
answering brief on or before October 28,2008, and to Plaintiffs' filing a reply brief no later than
7 days before the date of the hearing. I told Mr. Halverson that I would prepare a Stipulation for

his signature and that I would also prepare a proposed Order and, upon our execution, submit the
signed Stipulatio~iand Order to the Court. The attached, proposed Stipulation, Order and draft
transmittal letter to Judge Kerrick were prepared by me and picked up by hfrs. Halvorson at my
office on the following Monday, September 29, 2008. Based upon my discussion with Mr.
Halvorson, I expected to receive the signed Stipulation the next day. When the signed
Stipulation had not arrived by October 1, 2008, I asked my assistant to call Mr. Halvorson (as I
t

was out of the ofiice) and Mr. Halvorson told her, in essence, that he wanted other issues
resolved in the case before he would sign the proposed Stipulation. I called Mr. Halvorson on
October 2,2008, and he told me that fie wanted certain issues resolved in the case before he
would sign the proposed Stipulation. I told Mr. Halvorson that he had not placed any co~iditions
upon his agreement to enter into the Stipulation, that I had relied on his word and that because
almost a week had passed since we had agreed to the new schedule it would be even more
difficult for Defendants' counsel to meet Defendants' existing response deadlines in respect to

DEFEhBAUTS' EX PARTE MPLIGATION OR, ALTEItYLATIVELY,RilOTIOY TO RESET
I-TL-iimTG
ON PL,-4IN-TIFFS' icriOTlON FOR PARTIAL SUlZ3IAJYY ~L73i;hlFNT-- 2
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment than when the scheduling agreement was made
on September 26. 1told Mr. Halverson that I would be filing this pleading with the Court if he
was not going to keep his word.
As Eurther grounds in support of Defendants' application or motion, Defendants' counsel
represents that he was/is scheduled out of the office on October 1,2, 3, 8 and 9, 2008, and is also
in the midst of relocating his office. In addition, undersigned counsel's only legal assistant is out
of the office hom October 3 to October 13,2008.
For good cause shown, Defendants request the Court enter the Ex Parte Order granting
the relief requested. In the event the Court does not grant Defendants' Ex Parte Application,
Defendants request a hearing on this Motion at the earliest possible time.
RESPECTFULLY SUl3MITTED t h s

7% day of October, 2008.

RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.

By:
At$rneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7*

I hereby certify that on this
day of October, 2008,I caused a true and
correct copy of this document to be sewed on the following individual in the manner indicated
beiow:

DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ XI U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

Ron d J. Landeck

t!

DEFEhQAKTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION OR, AALTERNRN4TIVELY,
LVOTIOhT TO RESET
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September 30,2008

Honorable Carl B. Kerrick
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 83501
Re: Halvorson v. North Latah Cozinty Highway District,
Case No. CV-2008- 180, Latah County District Court
Dear Judge Kerrick:
The parties in this action filed today in Latah County District Court, the enclosed
Stipulation to Reset Hearing Schedule Re Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Jud,gnent. I am enclosing for your use a proposed Order Resetting Hearing Schedule Re
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgnient. We have hrnished the Latah County
District Court Clerk with copies of the proposed Order to be collformed and eiivelopes
for mailing to the parties.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A.

Ronald J. Landeck

Enclosures
c: Don Halvorson
(w/encls.)

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.
414 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, I'N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
'

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMI\/nSSIONERS FOR
TEE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, R I C m R D
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, iil their individual
capacities; D;I;N PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
Defendants.

1
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80

1
) STIPULATION TO RESET HEARING
) SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
) FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

?
?

1

)
)
)

?

1

1

Plaintiffs and Defendants, tlxough counsel, hereby stipulate to vacate the hearing noticed
by Plaintiffs for October 21, 2008 at 9:00 a.111. on Plaintiffs' hiIotion For Partial Surnrnar-y Jud-gnent
filed on September 19,2008, and to reset the hearing 011Tuesday, November 18, 2008, at 9:00 a.m.
at the designated cow-troom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse at Lesviston, Idaho.

STIPULATION TO RESET HEARING SCEDLTLE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMhL4RY KJDGh4ENT -- 1

Plaintiffs and Defendants m h e r stipulate that Defendants shall serve any opposing
affidavits and an answering brief at least by October 28,2008, and PIaintiffs may thereafter serve a

reply brief not Iess than 7 days before the date of the hearing.
Plaintiffs and Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an order in accordance
with this stipulation.
Dated this -day of

,2008.

Do11 HaIvorson, Plaintiff
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GR4WAM, P.A.

By:
Attornkys for Defendants

STIPULATION TO RESET H E A m T GSCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' R?OTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMM'iZRY SUDG5IENT -- 2

O'qg
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
JAMES L. WESTBERG, ISB No. 2264
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GR/1_HAM, P.A.
4 14 S . Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRTCT COURT

DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
VS.
NORTH LATAW COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COh4MISSIONERS FOR
THE XORTH LATAJ3 COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND AIZIYEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in IGs individual capacity,

1
) Case No. CV 2008-180

1

) OROER =SETTING HEARING
) SCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
) FOR PARTIAL SUhjlMilRY JUDGMENT

1
1
)

1
)
)
)

1
)

Defendants.

1

THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to a Stipulation To Reset
Hearing Schedule filed herein by the parties and good cause appearing;

ORDER RESETTlhTGI-IEAmTGSCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUlcflMARY JUDGMENT -- 1

0341

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The hearing noticed by Plaintiff for October 21,2008, at 9:00 a.m. on Plaintiffs'
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed in the above-entitled matter on
September 19,2008, is hereby vacated.
2.

The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment filed in the above-entitled
nsatter on September 19,2008, is reset for hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008,
commencing at 9:00 a.m. at the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County
Courtliouse at Lewiston, Idaho.

3. Defendants shall serve any opposing affidavits and an answering brief at least by

October 28,2008, and Plaintiffs may thereafter serve a reply brief not less than 7 days
before the date of the hearing.
Dated this

day of

,2008.

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge

ORDER RESETTTKG K E A L W GSCHEDULE RE PLAINTIFFS' LriOTiON FOR PiZRTIAL

CL,ERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this -day of

,2008, I caused a true and correct copy

of this documelit to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CHAlLOTTE E-fALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ IFAX
[ ] Hand Delivery

RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE
& GRAHAM, P.A.
414 S. JEFFERSON P.O. BOX 9344
MOSCOM/: ID 83843

[
[
[
[

] U.S. Mail
] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
] FAX (208) 883-4593
] Hand Delivery

Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk
By:
Deputy

ORDER RESETTlhTGHEARTNG SCEEDULE R E PLADTTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL

P.M. =#%ST 9% iMM3

R O W D J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
OF THE DISTRICT OF IDAI-IO, IN AhD FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAII:
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

)
) Case No. CV 2008-180

1

)
)
VS.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR )

THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARhEBERG, RICHARD
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and
in Iis individual capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE
AND RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
)
)
)
)
)

1

THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to Defendants' Ex Parts
Application or, Alternatively, Motion To Vacate And Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Jud,gnent filed herein, this Court having reviewed the file in this matter, and
good cause appealing for granting Defendants' ex parte applicatio~~;

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACL4TE
Ah33 RESET HE~UIXTGON PLA41;VTLt;'FS'LMOTIONFOR PARTWL SLMMARY
JbDG34ENT -- 1

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Jud,gnent filed herein on September 19, 2008, and set for hearing on
October 21, 2008, is hereby reset for hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at the hour of

9:00a.m. Pacific Time in the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse,
Lewiston, Idaho.
IT IS SO ORDERED this l ~ l ' k i of
y October, 2008.

Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this\

%ay of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of

this document to be sewed on the following individuals in the manner indicated below:
DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

] U.S. Mail
& F ederal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

RONALD J. LANDECK
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
4 14 S. JEFFERSON
P.O. BOX 9344
MOSCOV?, JD 83843

[ f i u .s. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-3486
{ ] Hand Delivery

ORDER GRANTmTGDEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE
1A'D RESET H E a G ON PLAINTIFFS' hlOTlOK FOR PARTIAL SL3lMAXY

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
4 14 S . Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF I D M O , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,

)
) Case No. CV 2008-1 80

1

)
)
vs.
)
)
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHW14Y
)
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR )

DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE
APPLICATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
MOTION TO RESET HEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL,
StJh4MARY JUDGMENT FILED
OCTOBER 6,2008, AND BREF

THJ3 NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
1
DISTRICT, OR.LAI\,TD ARNEBERG, RICHARD
)
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in h s official capacity and )
in h s iildividual capacity,
1
Defendants.

1
1

Defendants, through counsel, make ex parte application or, alternatively, move this Court
under Rule 7@)(3) I.R.C.P. to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Susnmary
Judgment filed herein on October 6,2008 (the October 6 Motion"), and set for hearing on
Kovenlber 4,2008, and to reset the hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at 9 0 0 a.m. at the
designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse at Lewiston, Idaho.
DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATIOX OR, KTERNATPVELY, MOTION TO RESET
HEA&RJXTGON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTUL SL%MARYJUDGMEIIT FILED
OCTOBER 6,2008, Ai2D BRIEF -- 1

i)J 4 j

As grounds for this application and motion, Plaintiffs did not serve the October 6 Motion at
least twenty-eight (28) days before November 4,2008, the time Eixed for the hearing, in violation of
Rule 56(c) I.R.C.P. The record before this Court establishes that the October 6 Motion was filed on
October 6,2008, and served on Defendants7counsel by mail only and that Defendants noticed the
hearing on this Motion for November 4,2008. Rule 56(c) I.R.C.P., supplemented by Rule 6(e)(l)
I.R.C.P., require that a motion for summaryjudgnent be served at least 3 1 days in advance of the
hearing, that is, the 28 days required under Rule 56(c) and the additional 3 days that must be
allou.ed for response under Rule 6(e)(I). Therefore, Plaintiffs' service by mail 29 days before the
hearing date did not meet the mininlum 31 days, advance notice of the hearing required under Idaho
rules of civil procedure. See Ponderosa Paint Manufactu1-ing, Inc. v. Yuck, 125 Idaho 310,316,870
P.2d 663,669 (Ct.App. 1994).
As fk-ther grounds in support of Defendants' application or motion, Defendants7counsel
represents that Defendants' Ex Parte Application filed on October 7,2008, sets forth good cause to
reset Plaintiffs' other pending Motion For Partial Summary Judgment filed on September 19,2008,
for hearing on November 18,2008, and that same cause, incosporated herein by this reference, also
applies in large part to this application or motion. In addition, the issues set forth in Plaintiffs' two
(2) pending motions are related and judicial economy would be best served by hearing these
motions on the same date.
Defendants also intend to file a motion for s m a r y judgment in this action such that
Defendants' motion can also be heard on November 18,2008.
For Plaintiffs' failure to coniply with applicable civil d e s and for good cause shown,
Defendants request the Court enter the Ex Parte Order granting the relief requested. In the event

DEFEhDANTS' EX PARTE ,QPLICATION OR, ALTERNATN-ELY, AIOTIO&- TO RESET
m m T GON P L M I F F S ' MGTiON FOR PARTLX SU343Z-2RYSUI3GPimm FILED

OCTOBER 6,2008, A
D
'\

BRIEF -- 2

0917

the Court does not grant Defendants' Ex Parte Application, Defendants request a hearing on this
Motion at the earliest possible time.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of October, 2008.
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
i
1,

By:
Rondld J. Landeck
~ t t & e ~for
s Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of

this document to be served on the following-individual in the manner indicated below:
DON HALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537

[ X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FA)( (208) 322-4486
[ ] Hand Delivery

eRon d J. Landeck

DEFENDLkUTS'EX P m T E APPLICATION OR. _&TERNATIVELI', MOTION TO RESET
HE,?JXIKG ON P L L W E F S 'MOTION FOR PL.?illTLALSL142vLiY 3t-DGhGNT FILED
ill33 BRIEF -- 3
OCTOBER 6,2008,

(j1!4d
kd

A

RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
4 14 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, I
D 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .JUDICIAL,DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
(Husband and Wife),

)
) Case No. CV 2008-180
)
Plaintiffs,
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
) EX PARTE APPLICATION TO VACATE
) AND RESET HEARING ON
vs.
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
) SU_MMARY JUDGMENT FILED
NORTH LATAEI COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIOmRS FOR ) OCTOBER 6,2008

THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
1
DISTRICT, ORLAND A N B E R G , I Z T C W
)
HANSEN, SKERMAN CLYDE, in their individual )
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and )
in his individual capacity,
1
Defe~dants.

1
1

THIS MATTER having come before this Court pursuant to Defendants' Ex Parte
Application or, Alternatively, Motioil To Vacate And Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' h'fotion for
Partial Summary Jtrdgment filed herein, this Court having reviewed the file in this matter, and
good cause appearing for granting Defendmts' ex parte application;

ORDER GRPINTIT.TG DEFENDAVTS' EX PAATE APPLICATION TO VACATE
AT
\D RESET HEARING ON PLAIitTPFS' hfCITION FOR PARTIAL SWL"\ilil~?Y
JLIDGMENT FILED OCTOBER 6,1008-- 1

(j"<s
C,

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial S u m a r y Judgment filed herein on October 6,2008, and set for hearing on November
4, 2008, is hereby reset for hearing on Tuesday, November 18,2008, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.
Pacific Time in the designated courtroom of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, Idaho.
IT IS SO ORDERED this

-2$ h a y of ~ctober,2008.
Carl B. Kerrick
District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

of October, 2008,I caused a true and correct copy of

this document to be served on the following individuals in the manner indicated below:

DON HALVORSON
CEJLARLOTTE KALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KEhr>RICK, IDAHO 83537
RONALD J. LANDECK
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C.
414 S. JEFFERSON
P.O. BOX 9344
MOSCOW, ID 83843

~ + +U.S.
j
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] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
[ 1 Hand Delivery
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[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
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[ ] Hand Delivery
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

iN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Haivorson (Husband and Wife))
Plaintiffs
VS.

1
1

Case No. CV 2008-180
PLAINTIFFS'

North Latah County Sighway District; Board of )

INTERROGATORIES AND

Commissioners for the North Latah Cor~niy

)

REQUESTS

Highway District. Orrand Arneberg, Richai-c!

1

FOR ADMiSSIONS AND

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

Individual Capacity

1

(PIRADR)

Defendants
Plaintiffs submit these Defelldarits xspcnszs ds true anli acirr!-ate responses to Plainliffs'
Requests for Admissic;nr; and Interrogatories:
1. m n t i f f s ' First Reque~tFor Admissfons (Ar.nehea.p, Clyde, Hansen, Pavnel Request for
Admission No. 3 The 1996 alteration excrecied the limits of the prescriptive right of \yay in the

following manners: subpart c The acrtlal physical location of CCR was altered in the
straightening of the c u 7 e sand the extension of the road bed around the rock outcropping and the

PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES AX11 REQUESTS FOR 4DhlTSSIONS AT43
DEl?Eh-DANTS' RESPONSES (PIYADR) 1

O ,J ,:; I
w-

washout of the roadbed. Response: Object as to relevance of 1996 activity. Object as to form of
request to the extent it calls for legal conclusion. Without waiver of objection. Admitted.

2. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Arneberg, Clyde, Hansen, Payne) Interrogatory
No. 3. List all available information and documents you know of, the names, addresses, phone
numbers and whereabouts of anyone, who may have information of or the possessio~lof
documents concerning the acquisition of the prescriptive right of waylhighway, CCR, the time of
the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of way/l~ighway,CCR, the establishment of the
prescriptive right of wayhighway, CCR, and /or the width, location and use of the prescriptive
right of way, CCR, at the end of the prescriptive period for the prescriptive right of
waylhighway, CCR. Response: Object to this Interrogatory as unduly burdensome and
oppressive in that it covers an unlimited time frame and seeks inforn~ationand documents not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiver of
objection, Documents regarding CCR in NLCHD's possession are primarily set forth in
District's foreman's journals and Commissioner minutes. Width of CCR was widened on the
north side in 1996 to approxirnatefy its present width. CCR was widened on south side in 2005
and 2006 by approximately four feet of road surface and the addition of sloping cut banks. All
District Commissioners and the foreman, including Payne, for the CCR where the subdistrict is
located have knowledge of this infor~nation.
3. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 7. When did you issue the first driveway

access permit to the Wagners? Response To PIaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 7. On
information a i d belief, during Spring 2006.

4. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 6. When did you first become aware of a
property Iine dispute between the Wagners and Plaintiffs in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel?
Response To Plaintiffs' Second Interro~atories6.

In Spring 2006 Robert Wagner informed

District Foreman Dan Payne that Don Halvorson does not agree that Mr. IYagner's driveway
approach is located wholly on Wagners' property. The District Commissioners first b=
,came
aware of the dispute when Mr. Halvorson attended a meeting in Spring 2006 to ask that the
District perform a survey of the Halvorson/Wagner property lines.
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGi/lTORIES AKD REQUESTS FOR ADLfISSIONS ARTD
DEFEND-ANTS' RESPONSES (PIKAOR) 2

5. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Armberg. No. 10, Clyde No. 8, Hansen No. 10,
Pavne No. 10) State the number of meetings you have had with the Halvorsons in trying to

resolve the dispute over CCR. Response: One meeting in July, 2007 at CCR. I was present at
several meetings of NLCHD commissioners in 2006 and 2007 where Mr. Halvorson was present
and addressed CCR issues.
6. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) f 2. subparti, What are the dates of
the "issue" with reference to the dealings of the Halvorsons with the NLCHD on the matter from
your knowledge; that is, how long have the Halvorsons been talking to the NLCHD about the
driveway permit and/or the NLCHD's unauthorized activities on CCR in the SENE of Section 15

T39N R3wBM? Response: Since 4/12/06.

7. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 1. Please state the standard operating
procedure for straightening, widening, altering, and/or changing CCR. Response: "The
standard operating procedure for North Latah County Highway District public roads establisl~ed
by prescription or public use, except those of a lesser width presently existing at the time those
highways are established, is to widen such roads as required for proper construction and
maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width of 50 feet. On information and belief,
CCR is a public highway established by prescription or public use and, therefore, would be
constructed and maintained in the discretion of the District as such forth above.

8. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories Ilt-fansen)30.

Wow have you, as Commissioner

of the NLCHD, applied the law to the facts and opinions of facts you ascertained of Plaintiffs'
colorable claim and/or allegations of you're their taking of their land, your damages to Plaintiffs'
fence, and your issuing and not revoking driveway access permit for unlawful and unauthorized
acts (if so please state these facts, opinions of fact and the application of the laws to these facts
and opinions of fact) or have you intentionally stonewalled Plaintiffs with inaction and
deliberate indifference (if not, please state what deterrningtions you have made, what the rational
basis was for these determinations, what final decisions of these determinations you have related
to Plaintiffs, and how these final decisions ha\-a been transmitted to Plainriffs during the last two
years)? Response to PIaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 30: In addition to statements set forth

PLAINTIFFS' Tr\,TTERROC,4TORTESAND REQUESTS FOR XDhflSSIONS AhTD
DEFEND,ANTS' RESPONSES (PIR4DR) 3

OyyJ

in Responses to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories, Richard Hansen met with Don Halvorson a
week or so after the 4/12/06 meeting to understand Mr. Halvorson's position on these matters
and to attempt to resolve Mr. Halvorson's concerns. The District has not made "final decisions"
on any matters involving CCR.
9. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Hansen) 4. For what reasons did you turn dov;n
Plaintiffs' request that you initiate validation proceedings of CCR? Response to Plaintiffst
Second Interrogatories (Plansen) 4. Because it was not in the District's interests to do so as

CCR was a public road established by prescription for public use.

10. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arnebrg) 5. What steps did the NLCHD take
to insure no private property was improperly taken and/or not recorded in the widening and
changing of the location of CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996? Response to
Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Axeberg) 5. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge

but generally knows that the District makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50)
foot right-of-way in connection with public roads established by prescription or public use.
11. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneber~;)6. What steps did the NLCHD take
to insure no private property was improperly taken and/or not recorded in the widening and of
CCR in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 2005 and/or 2006? Response to Plaintiffst Second
Interro~atories(Arneberg) 6. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally

knows that the District makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-ofway in connection txith public roads established by prescriptioii or public use.

12. Plaintiffs' Second Interro~atories(Arneberg) 13. In Plaintiffs' First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 28, your response, an objection to the Request For
Admission was that the form of the request, "...misstates the state~nentsmade". Please restate
thk statements in your own words. Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interropatsries (L4rneberg)
13. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but generally knows that the District makes
-

every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50) foot right-of-way in connection with public
roads established by prescription or public use.

PLAINTIFFS'NTELPROGATORTES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSfOKS AND
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13. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 14. In Plaintiffs' First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 28, your response, an objection to the Request For
Admission was that the form of the request, ". ..misstates the statements made". Please restate
your words and/or your meaning to the words, if the words are to imply anything but what your
words stated as recorded in the minutes of the 3/21/07 meeting, "Orland Arneberg said he's lived
out there his whole life and can testify that the road hasn't moved". Response to PIaintiffs'
Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 14. Orland Arneberg has no specific knowledge but

generally knows that the District makes every reasonable effort to remain within its fifty (50)
foot right-of-way in connection with public roads established by prescription or public use.
14. Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 12. In Plaintiffs First Request For
Admissions, Request For Admission No. 26, you stated, "Admitted. I first became aware of this
issue when Halvorsons and Wagners appeared at a Commissioners meeting to discuss it. I had
no further conversations with Mr. Wagner during the permitting phase. I have since spoken to
Mr. Wagner on several occasions concerning his problems with Mr. Halvorson." In regards to
this admission and your stated qualifications, answer the following interrogatories. Subpart d.
How did the different parties become aware of the same Commissioners' meeting to discuss the
same issue; that is how did John Bohman, Gary Osborn, Bob Wagner, Kate Wagner, Patsy
Wagner, Francis Wagner, and Don Halvorson all arrive at the same place at the same time; that
is, were John Bohrnan, Gary Osborn, Bob Wagner, Kate Wagcsr, Patsy Wagner, Francis
Wagner, on the meeting agenda, or was Don Halvorson on the meeting agenda and who put them

on the agerida? Respsnse to Plaiatiffs' Second Ir,f,errogatsrffss(Ameberg) 12. S u h ~ a rd.
t I
do not know. Subpart e. Did either or both parties receive notice and if so how was notice
provided? Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Ameberrr) 12. Subpart e. I do
not know. Subpart f. Was the issue put on the meeting agenda; that is, why did you choose to
address Don Halvorson rather than any of the other people in the room? Response to Plaintiffs'
Second fnterroeatories (Arnebere) 12. Subpart f. I believe because District secretary Dan

Carscallen informed me that Dan Hdvorson wanted to address the Commissioners. Subpart g.
Do you have any reasonable explanation for the confluence of both parties arriving at the same
PLAINTIFFS' IiVTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS AND
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meeting with the availability of the time on the meeting schedule to address the issue? Response
to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg) 12. Subpart g. The word we had was that
Don Halvorson was going to speak to the Commissioners about an issue involving the Wagners,
although I do not knotv how anyone else learned that information. Subpart h. Was any
conlmunication directed by the NLCHD (including commissioners and/or employees) to either
party about discussing the issue at a commissioner's meeting? Response to PIaintiffs' Second
Interrogatories (Arneberg) 12. Subpart h. Not to my knowledge. Subpart i. Was the
meeting you refer to the 4/12/06 meeting? Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories
(Arneber~)12. Subpart i. Yes. Subpart j. What are the dates of the "issue" with reference to
the dealings of the Halvorsons with the NLCHD on the matter from your knowledge; that is, how
long have the Halvorsons been talking to the NLCHD about the driveway permit andlor the
NLCHD's unauthorized activities on CCR in the SENE of Section 15 T39N R3wBM?
Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arnebertr) 12. Subpart i. Since 4/12/06.
15. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 6. When did you first become aware of
a property line dispute between the Wagners and Plaintiffs in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel?
Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interro~atories(Pavne) 6. In Spring 2006 Robert Wagner
informed District Foreman Dan Payne that Don Halvorson does not agree that Mr. ?Vagner's
driveway approach is located whollyhon Wagners' property. The District Conmissioners first
became aware of the dispute when h4r. Halvorson attended a meeting in Spring 2006 to ask that
the District perform a survey of the HalvorsodMiagner property lines.

16. Plaintiffs' Second interrogatories (Pavne) 7. T+~rhen
did jTW issue the first
driveway access permit to the Wagners? Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrotratories
(Pawe) 7. On information and belief, during Spring 2006.
17. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 8. When did you take final action on
the first Wagner driveway access permit (Latah County Building department shows record of
you signing off on the question of road access for the Wagners' building permit in hlarch 2006)?
Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavnef 8. Object as this interrogatory is
ambiguous as to what is meant by "take final action". Without waiver of said objection,
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES AND E Q U E S T S FOR .ZDbfISSfONS AND
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following District's issuance of the first driveway access permit to the Wagners, the Wagners
requested a substitute driveway access permit sometime within several months after March 2006,
the District issued that second Wagner driveway access permit as a replacement for the first
driveway access permit, and the first permit was impliedly revoked by the District as a condition
of the issuance of the second permit.
18. PIaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Payne) 9. What was the final action taken on

the first Wagner driveway access pennit? Response to Plaintiffsf Second Interrogatories
(Pavne) 9. See Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 8 -- Object as this interrogatory is
ambiguous as to what is meant by "take final action". Without waiver of said objection,
following District's issuance of the first driveway access permit to the Wagners, the Wagners
requested a substitute driveway access permit sometime within several months after Marc11 2006,
the District issued that second Wagner driveway access permit as a replacement for the first
driveway access permit, and the first permit was impliedly revoked by the District as a condition
of the issuance of the second permit.

19. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 10. Did the Wagners apply for a second
driveway access permit? Response to Plaintiffsf Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 10. Yes.
On this 21st Day of October, 2008.
20. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Pavne) 1 Please state the standard operating

procedure for straightening, widening, altering, andor changing CCR. Response to Plaintiffs'
Second Interrogatories CPavne) 1. The standard operating procedure for North Latah County
. .
Highway District public roads established by prsscnption or public use, except those of a lesser
width presently existing at the time those highways are established, is to widen such roads as
required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of the District up to a width of
50 feet. On information and belief, CCR is a public highway established by prescription or

public use and, therefore, would be constizzcted and maintained in the discretion of the District as
such forth above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Don Halvorson

PLAINTIFFS' NTERROGATONES AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS AND

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21Stday of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

RONALD J. LANDECK
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE &
GRAHAM, P.A.
414 S. Jefferson
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
CARL B. KERRICK
DISTRICT JUDGE
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston, ID 8350 1-0896

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[XI

/

U.S. Mail
Federal Express Standard Overniglit Mail
FAX (208) 883-4593
Hand Delivery

[X ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail
[ 1 FAX
[ ] Hand~&livc)-y 9(,
/&-k,m-.
Don Halvorson
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North Latah County Highway District
1132 White Avenue
&foscow,Idaho 83843
Deary Phone; (208) 877-1101 Moscow Phone: (208) 882-7490 PotIatch Phone: (208) 875-0317
F a : (208) 877-1298
Pax: (208) 883-3926
Fax: (208)875-8967
nlchd@nlcXld.corn

April 3,2008

To Whom It May Concern:

The following twenty-six (26) pages are genuine copies of Highway District documents given to
Don Halvorson. I have copies on file of the same documents to show they are genuine.

Dan Carscallen
Clerk
North Latah County Highway District

The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of
Commissioners was held at the Moscow office on April 12,2006 at 1:30 pm. Present
were Chairman Orfand Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan Carscallen.
T h e minutes from the meeting on March 8,2006 were approved as read.
Richard Hansen made a motion to pay the bills as they appear on the back of this page.
Orland Arneberg seconded. T h e motion passed.
Don Halvorson came in with concerns about development along and improvements to
Camps Canyon Road. Mr. Halvorson's main complaint was that improvements to the
road increase traffic and encourage development. He complained that there was no
speed controI on the road, and the creek crossing was hard for a vehicle with a trailer.
Mr. Halvorson also said there were property line disputes from road widening and
moving of the roadway. Mr. Halvorson brought in hand-drawn maps showing where
he contended the road used to be versus where it is now. Mr. Halvorson also said he
wanted a survey of his and his neighbor's property, but he wanted his neighbor and the
Highway District to pay for it. Bob Wagner said he had no issues with the Highway
District, and he has had s u n e y s , but they did not meet with Mr. Hafvorson's
satisfaction. Frances Wagner said there was really only one issue today an that was the
road has not moved, and the south side is where it has always been, therefore there was
no historical difference on the south side of the road which borders hlr. FTalvorson's
property. Mr. Halvorson said he'd be keeping an eye on what the Highway District did
on that road.
T h e commissioners went into executive session to discuss pending legal matters a t 2:35

The commissioners came out of executive session at 4:20
T h e commissioners set the budget hearing for July 26
Richard Hansen said the brush cutter would be on Big Creek Road the week of April 17
Speed limit classes are on April 18 and 19,2006
Paul Stubbs said Lou Lively wants to use public right-of-way on the platted streets in
H a r v a r d to access property outside Harvard city limits. The commissioners said it was
okay to use the public right-of-way, but the Highway District would not be maintaining
them.
T h e next meeting was scheduled for April 26,2006.
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 3:35 pm

Chairman

Secretary

T h e regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Commissioners
was held a t the Moscow office on &larch 21,2007 a t 2:30 pm. Present were Chairman

Orland Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan Payne, Paul Stubbs a n d
Don Brown, a n d Dan Carscallen.
The minutes from the meeting on March 7,2007 were approved as read.
T h e bids f o r rock a t the Nagfe/Shattuck pit were opened. They were as follows:
North Idaho Crushing

Deatley Crushing
tons

40,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
1,000

s~ze
314"mlnus
1 1/4"m ~ n u s
1/2"ch~ps
Sand Eq
6"m~nus

priceiton

extens~on

$480 $192,00000
$4 65 $23,25000
$6 30 $18,90000
$6 20
$6,20000
$4 62
$4,62000
total

$244,970.00

tons

40,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
1,000

size

314"minus
I 114"minus
1/2"chips
Sand Eq.
6"minus

priceiton

extension

$4.42 $1 76,800.00
$4.42 $22,100.00
$4.42 $13,260.00
$4.42
$4,420.00
$4.42
$4,420.00
total

$221,000.00

Richard Hansen made a motion to accept North Idaho Crushing's low bid. Orland
Arneberg seconded. T h e motion passed,
Don Halvorson came in to discuss issues he has with the alignment of the C a m p ' s Canyon
Road. (Mr. Halvorson's letter is at the end of these minutes) Ron L a n d e c k asked about the
old driveway. M r . Halvorson said the driveway was west of the original a n d brought
pictures to show it. Richard Hansen asked Don Halvorson if he h a d any problem with B o b
Wagner's c u r r e n t driveway. Don Halvorson said he had no problem with it. Don Halvorson
said the road is not where it used to be. Richard Hansen showed pictures from 1949 a n d
1965 t h a t show the road in the same place it is today. Don Halvorson said t h e picture may
not show enough detail to sflow a 50 to 80 foot difference in roadway position. O r l a n d
Arneberg a n d Richard Hansen doubted the road could have moved that f a r a n d it would
probably show even a t this scale. Don Halvorson said the original piece of property was
deeded to give road access. Richard Hansen asked w h a t any of this had to d o with the
highway district. Don HaIvorson said he didn't want the road moved but would like some
assurance t h a t the road would stay here it is. Mr. Halvorson was also concerned with how
people parked on the road. Tami Van Houten said she parks on the road a n d walks down
the hill to h e r house on occasion. Richard Hansen asked Dan Payne if a n j thing else would o r
could be done to the road. Dan Payne said he's done most everything that could be done
~ i t h o um
t a j o r construction. Don Halvorson said he just wanted assurance that there would
be some conferring with property owners if there were to be any m a j o r road changes. Dan
Payne asked Don Halvorson about the road frontage that was missing a n d where the 200 feet
could have gone. M r . Halvorson explained that it tvas due to the movement of t h e road. D a n
Payne said when he originally approved Bob Miagner's approach he measured off w h a t it
was supposed to be b u t Don Halvorson claimed he was off. Bob W a g n e r has since moved t h e
driveway. Ricflard Hansen asked Don Halvorson w h a t he wanted. Don HaIvorson said he
and Bob W a g n e r wanted input if the highway district planned on making any changes to t h e
road. Don HaIvorson said he wanted to know if anything near his fence so he wouldn't have
to deai with damage. kilr. Halvorson said he didn't w a n t a n y problems. Richard Hansen

explained that technically the fence encroached on the right-of-way. Ron Landeck quoted
I d a h o Code 40-109 that says t h e - ~ i ~ h wDistrict's
ay
right-of-way is what they need to
maintain a safe roadway. Don Halvorson said he had people who corrld testify t h a t the
roadway had moved. OrIand Arneberg said he's lived out there his whole Iife a n d can testify
t h a t the road hasn't moved. Richard Hansen said the property Iine issues have nothing to do
with the highway district. Ron Landeck explained that the highway district doesn't just
build roads a t will without consulting with Iandovvners. Landeck said the highway district
makes themselves aware of concerris a n d would keep don informed. Ron Landeck said that
by looking at the aerial photos one could see there have been no major changes in the
position of the roadway in the Iast 40 years. Don Halvorson asked about him a n d Bob
Wagner giving a deed to North Latafi County Highway District for the road right-of-way.
Mr. Wafvorson said his biggest deal was getting money back for the survey he had done.
Richard Hansen said that was between him and Bob Wagner. Richard Hansen asked Don
Halvorson if he and Bob Wagner wanted the ultimate decision on any road improvements.
ilk.Halvorson said he just wanted input. Richard Wansen said there is a n existing road with
a 50 foot prescriptive right-of-way and Don Halvorson seemed only to b e worried about
movement of the road without his prior knowledge. Kichard Hansen asked Mr. Halvorson if
h e felt his fence was more than 25 feet from the center of the road. Don Halvorson said he
thought it was. Richard Hansen said he thought it wasn't. Don Halvorson said his only
intent was to maintain his fence. Dan Carscallen asked Don Halvorson if -- as long as
nothing moves without first consulting with Nalvorson a n d '~F'agner - everything is oltay.
Don Halvorson said that everything was okay.
J o h n and R'felanie Wolf attended to discuss a road access farther down Camp's Canyon
Road. Dan Yayne said he would discuss it with them on site when they had a chance.
T h e Cornniissioners went into executive session at 2:55 Dm.
T h e Commissioners adjourned from executive session at 3:50 pm.

T h e Conlrnissioners asked that excavator specs go out so bids can be opened on April 11.
Don Rro.a;n asked if the Case roller should be auctioned off or if thejp should continue to run
it. Kichard Hansen said he'd rather not run it, OrIand Arneberg said to go ahead a n d
auction i t off with the surplus equipment. The surpirrs auction is scheduled for April 25.
'There was some discussion about a gravel road standard. The e o ~ r ? ~ i s s i o n efelt
r s that a
gravel standard should be included in the specifications for certain cases.
Don Bran-n asked about sight distance. T h e cornmissioners said to continue with the 200 foot
standard until the new road standards are adopted.
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 4:50 pm
The next meeting was scheduled for April 11,2007.

Chairman

Secretary

AGENDA
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGPHFVAY DlSTRZCT

Wednesday, September 12,2007,1:30 P.M.
Highway District Office

1132 White Avenue

1.

Call to Order

2.

Approve minutes July 25, 2007

3.

pay bills

4.

Open Rock Bids

5.

Open surplus grader bids

6.

Don Halvorson

7.

Latah Trail proposal - Tom Lamar

5.

Blaine Street Extension - Susan Wilson, Team Idaho

9.

Map, Bridge Discussion - Hodge and Associates

10.

Caterpillar discussion - Butch LaFarge

11.

Executive Session pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-2335(1) if necessary

12.

Other Business

The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Gomrnissioners
was held at the Moscow office on September 12,2007 at 1 3 0 pm, Present were Chairman
Orland Ameberg, Commissioners Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen, Foremen Paul
Stubbs and Tim Sturman, and Dan Carscallen. Commissioner-Elect Charles Bond also
attended.

The minutes from August 22,2007 were 'approved as read.
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed on the back of this page. Richard
Hansen seconded. The motion passed.
The cornmissioners opened bids for rock in Moscow and Deary. They were as follows:
DeAtley Crushing
Hunt Pit (Deary)
45,000 tons 518" minus
2,000 tons 1 112" minus
1,000 tons 112" chips
1,000 tons 3" minus
1,000 tons Anti-Skid

$3.93
$3.83
$4.43
$3.83
$4.43

/ton
/ton
/ton
/ton
iton
Total

$176,850.00
$7,660.00
$4,430.00
$3,830.00
$4,430.00
$197,200.00

$3.99 Iton
$4.49 /ton
Moscow Total

$179,550.00

$22,450.00
$202,000.00

Grand

Total

$399,200.00

$4 75
$4 75
$4 75
$4 75
$4 75
Deary

Iton
/ton
/ton
Iton
Iton
Totai

$213,750 00
$9,500.00
$4,750 00
$4,750 00
$4,750 00
$237,590.00

$4.30 /ton
$4.30 Iton
Moscow Totai

$ I 93,500.00
$21,500.00
$21 5,000.00

Grand

$452,500.00

Deary

Jensen Pit (Moscow)
45,000 tons 518" minus
5,000 tons 112"chips

North Idaho Crushing
Hunt Pit (Deary)
45,000 tons 518" minus
2,000 tons 1 112" mlnus
1,000 tons 112" chips
1,000 tons 3" mrnus
1,000 tons Anti-Skid

Jensen Pit (Moscow)
45,000 tons 518" minus
5,000 tons 112" chips

Totai

The Commissioners decided to discuss the bids later in the meeting so they could get
through the agenda.
Don Hafvorson attended to ask if the photos of the Camp's Canyon Road that the Highway
District had were evidence in substantiating the North Latah County Highway District's

claim that the road has never moved. Mr. Halvorson asked if those photos could be
orthogonally rectified so the commissioners7ruling could be an informed one. Ron
Landeck said that no proceeding has been in front of the commissioners to have them make
a ruling. Landeck said that if Mr. Halvorson wanted a ruling of some kind he needed to
file a petition for validation of public right-of-way, then the commissioners could formally
accept any evidence and have a public hearing regarding the road. Mr. Halvorson said he
has come before the commissioners with a complaint a n d tried to get it rectified, but to no
avail. Landeck said the form for validation is available. Mr. Hafvorson said it was never
offered. Dan Carscallen said that was because the Highway District was never sure what
Mr. Halvorson wanted, and he gave Mr. Halvorson an application for validation of public
right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson asked why he had not been offered the form before. Landeck
said that the commissioners were trying to work this out as informally as possible. Mr.
Halvorson asked why the process was not yet formal. Landeck explained that the formal
process requires a public hearing, Mr. Nalvorson said that the Highway District's ability
to prove that the Camp's Canyon Road is still located where it has always historically been
located has not been shown, in his opinion. Landeck said it was not the Highway District's
responsibility to initiate the validation proceeding, but as a landowner Mr. Halvorson can
file a petition to initiate the formal proceedings. Don Halvorson asked if he could have a
response to his earlier filings regarding regulatory takings or would he have to re<file those.
Landeck said there would be no official response to those filings as they do not technically
relate to. the proceedings, but that Mr. Halvorson would not have to re-file them. Mr.
Halvorson said he did not feel time was being well spent and there should be quicker
response to his communications. Dan Carscallen said that the response to his earlier
communications was that he should petition for validation of public right-of-way. Mr.
Nalvorson said he was not getting the answers to his questions. Landeck said the questions
submitted were not really something the commissioners could answer. Mr. Halvorson
asked how complaints were normally dealt with by the commissioners. Landeck said that
they deaI with complaints all the time and usually they a r e resolved informally. Sherman
Clyde said that the fence that the tree fell on was in the public right-of-way. Mr. Walvorson
contended that it didn't used to be until the road was moved, in his opinion. Mr.
Halvorson asked that if he filed for validation of public right-of-way would he get his
money back if he prevailed. Landeck said there was no guarantee that he would get his
money back, as the frling fee was put in place to cover legal fees and research. Landeck
said the response to said petition was outlined in Idaho Code and that the North Latah
County Highway District would respond as required. Don Halvorson said there was pubiic
a n d private interest overlapping in this situation. Mr. Halvorson said that the Highway
District had a responsibility to the public interest. hlr. Halvorson asked Ron Landeck if he
represented the Highway District or the commissioners. Landeck said h e represented the
Highway District, a n d he represented the commissioners as well, since they a r e the elected
representatives of the North Latah County Highway District. Landeck said he also has
advised the commissioners on several issues in the past. M r . Halvorson said that he may
have a lack of knowledge regarding highway district issues and that may not entitle him to
resolution, but he felt that Ron Landeck and the highway cornrnissioners could use their
knowledge. Mr. Halvorson said that the validation petition was not exactly what he
wanted, but he feels the North Latah County Highway District is abusing the statutes.
Richard Hansen said that Mr. Halvorson's assertion that the highway district is impeding
his interests shows a lack of sensibility on Mr. Halvorson's part. Mr. Halvorson said that
the tree through the fence was still a big issue. Richard Hansen said rhe highway district
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could remove the tree if it was within the prescriptive right-of-way. Mr. Halvorson said
t h a t the highway district did not have that right. Richard said the tree belonged to the
landowner. Mr. Halvorson said the tree came from across the road. Dan Payne asked Mr.
Halvorson if he saw him o r one of his crew pushing the tree through the fence. Mr.
Halvorson said he did not. Dan Payne said that unless Mr. Halvorson eould prove the
highway district pushed the tree through the fence he should drop that issue. Mr.
Hafvorson asked Landeck if that was the Highway District opinion. Landeck said that was
Dan Payneys opinion and that until Mr. Halvorson filed his petition for validation of public
right-of-way he would advise the commissioners to not talk specifics. Mr. Halvorson said
that 40-203 i n the Idaho Code provided for the commissioners to initiate validation
proceedings on their own. Sherman Clyde said that there were other people who are on the
agenda a n d h e asked hlr. Halvorson to wait until the end of the meeting to finish his
business. Mr. Halvorson said he would wait.
T o m L a m a r came in representing the Latah Trail Foundation to follow up o n a meeting
that was held out a t the Wallen Road/Latah Trail intersection. Tom said t h a t the
Foundation, Latah County Board of Commissioners, a n d representatives from the Idaho
Transportation Department and North Latah County Highway District met out there to
talk about a bridge across Wallen Road. Bids are going out for the bridge a n d trail
improvements. Tom asked if the highway district could grade and rock the road with
gravel to make it a usable surface. Tom said that volunteers had cleared vegetation a n d
brush to allow room for improvement work and would continue to do so over the next
weekend, finishing by September 15. Tom Lamar wanted to officially request the highway
district's assistance in making the trail usable. Tom said it might not serve all cyclists, but
i t .vvould help the majority of users. Tom asked if the commissioners h a d any ideas, but
that he would like 3 inches of gravel graded and compacted. Sherman Clyde asked Tim
Sturman his feelings on the project. Tim said some of the rail bed is i n good shape and
would tune u p nice, b u t other parts had more of a river rock base and would need 518"
gravel to make a usable surface. Sherman Clyde asked who would pay for t h e rock. T o m
L a m a r said the Latah Trail Foundation would set up a n account a t Nor.lh Idaho Crushing
if the highway district would donate the hauling, Dan Payne said that the Deary crew
worked on the City of Troy's part of the trail. Dan said the City of Troy paid for the rock
while NLCHD and ITD hauled it, and NLCHD graded the rock, but it was paved shortly
thereafter a n d not left for a n extended period. Dan Payne said that with a grader working
on the road that width is a n issue. Sherman CIyde asked Tom L a m a s when they planned
on paving the trail. T o m said they weren't sure since the bridge is the priority and they'll
pave what they have money for, and they plan to do it in the spring. Richard Hansen asked
about doing the rock in the spring, since the road would have to be reprocessed before
paving anjway. T o m said they would like to use it as much as possible in the meantime.
Sherman Clyde thought it might be more cost effective to do aI1 the work in the spring.
T o m L a m a r asked about putting half the rock down in the fall then doing the rest in the
spring. Dan Payne said there would have to be quite a bit put do%n to be processed, then
be prepared to replace about 113 of it in the spring to make sure you have a good base for
the asphalt. Dan Paqne wondered about peeling off the marbles to get down to some
harder base. Tom L a m a r asked if just doing some smaU bits here arid there where
necessary to get through the winter would be good, and would the highway district commit
to coming back in the spring to put a finish job on the trail. Richard Nansen said that
should be okay, and Sherman Clyde and Orland Arneberg agreed. Tom Lamar said be

would tell Latah County Parks Director Andy Grant to coordinate with Tim Sturman on
the work.
Scott Becker reported on the Boulder Creek Bridge. Scott said the abutments were okay
a n d are s u n k well into the bedrock. Scott said that right now there needs to be a structural
analysis of the bridge. The decking is getting bad and the bridge is only rated for 50,000
Ibs. Dan Payne said it may be time to replace the bridge or a t least the decking. Scott
Becker was going to ask if there were any other options and maybe go after emergency
funds to replace the bridge. Sherman Clyde thought this was a good opportunity to go
after grant money for a project. Scott Becker said most grant money for bridges is federal
a n d would be about two to four years out. Scott said there may be other ways to make the
bridge work, and there may be other funds to go after with fewer strings attached. Scott
said he would have enough information for a decision by the next meeting.
Butch LaFarge asked about how the commissioners planned on paying for the excavator,
a n d he suggested they take the sales order around to various banks to find out what kind of
financing is out there. Butch also asked if the commissioners still planned on a new road
grader. Butch said he would bring up a machine and a simulator for the men to have some
time with the new setup.
T h e commissioners went into executive session at 3: 15 pm.
T h e commissioners adjourned from executive session at 3:30.
Don Halvorson asked what he could d o to solve his situation. Ron Landeck said Mr.
Halvorson should file a petition for validation of right-of-way. Sherman Clyde said if Mr.
Halvorson would file it the commissioners would act on it. M[r. Halvorson said the right-ofway was invalid. Sherman Clyde said -Mr. Halvorson had to fde for validation of right-ofway. Mr. Halvorson asked why the highway district would not file for validation. Both
Sherman Clyde a n d Richard Hansen said they felt the road is where it always has been, so
they were okay with the road's location, therefore there was no reason for them to initiate
\ratidation proceedings. Mr. Halvorson asked how to get a contested case. Ron Landeck
said to s t a r t mith a validation petition. Landeck said that if Mr. Halvorson had other issues
he should get an attorney. Mr. Halvorson said that the validation petition would not deal
with the trespass issues. Landeck said that hiring a lawyer would be M r . Malvorson's first
step. Sherman Clyde said that both sides were just going round and round over the same
issues a n d that Mr. Halvorson should just hire a Ianyer.
Sherman Clyde made a motion to accept DeAtley's rock bid. Richard Hansen seconded.
The motion passed.
Ron Landeck said the new zoning ordinance is eausing right-of-way issues. In order to get
a building permit, people have to show that they have access to a public road .i-ia an
easement o r public right-of-way, Ron said the right-of-\yay maps will go a long ways to
solving some of these probferns,
There was some genera1 discussion about S k y ~ i e wEstates. The Latah County Zoning
Commission is having a hearing on it on September 19.

There was some talk about the tractor/mowers and how they don't work as they were
promised, Ron Landeck wanted Dan Carscatfen to get the Info to him from the bid and he
would see if the highway district had any recourse regarding them.
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 4:20 prn
The next meeting was scheduled for September 26,2007.

Chairman

Secretary

The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of
Commissioners was held a t the Moscow office on February 8,2006 a t 1:30 pm. Present
were Chairman Orland Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Eansen, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan Carscallen.
The minutes from the meeting on January 4,2006 were approved with the change of
"Bollman" to "Bohman" on page 2.

Richard Elansen made a motion to pay the bills as listed on the back of this page.
Ortand Arneberg seconded. T h e motion passed.
Kyle Steele from the DEQ in Lewiston attended to discuss with the commissioners a
Watershed Advisory Group for the South Fork of the Paiouse River. Mr. SteeIe said he
was soliciting members for the group. T h e commissioners thought Sherman Clyde
would be the best representative from the Highway District, and thought Don Brown
could also attend when Sherman couldn't.
Mr. Steele then asked about widening of Camp's Canyon road, saying he got calls from
the University of Idaho -who was conducting a study on erosion near the road - saying
that there was too much erosion happening. Dan Payne assured Mr. Steele that he had
seeded grass to the banks on the road and that should help cut down on erosion.
Butch LaFarge came in to clear u p some miscommunications that were had between the
Highway District and Western States Caterpillar about the Accu-Grade system. Butch
said Weftern States was willing to absorb all costs related to the misunderstanding,
which would amount to approximately $3000.00, Butch asked if the Sighway District
was willing to cover any of the costs, but he said h e would a o t require it. Richard
Hansen said that since blame could be shared by both sides for the misunderstanding,
the Highway District would pay for labor costs involved in instaffing the Accu-Grade
hardware. Orland Arneberg agreed to that plan. Butch said he would bill the Highway
District for the labor, not to exceed $1000.00.

Laura Taylor aiid Scott Eecker gave a presentation to the commissioners about their
progress on the transportation pfan. They said the Advisory Committee would be
meeting on March 8,2006, at Deary High School,
hlike McDowell came in to discuss insurance options, A meeting with the employees
was set u p for February 24,2006 at the I\.loscow shop a t noon.
Dan Payne said he'd like to get some rock crushed in the P a r k area. The
commissioners told him to pursue it.

Dan Payne also mentioned the bridge proposal for Camp's Canyon road. Richard
Bansen told him to contact Henry from Roscoe a n d see what it would cost.

The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of
Commissioners was heId a t the hloscow office on March 8,2006 a t 1:30 pm. Present
were Chairman Orland Arneberg, Commissioner Richard Bansen, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan CarscalIen.
T h e minutes from the meeting on February 22,2006 were approved as read.
Richard Hansen made a motion to pay the bills as they appear on the back of this page.
OrIand Arneberg seconded, The motion passed.
The bid opening for a weathered steel bridge on the Camp's Canyon Road took place.
There was only one bid from Roscoe Steel. The total bid from Roscoe Steel was
$54,000.00. Richard Hansen made a motion to accept the bid minus the abutments,
which were $7,800.00, thereby making a total of -@6,200.00. Ortand Antebe*
seconded. T h e c 6 6 ~ s s i o n e r shad Dan Carscallen call Henry Kallis from Roscoe Steel
to tell him a n d ask about the engineered plans. Henry did not want to throw in the
plans, but after some negotiating, he threw in the plans a n d the special bolts f o r
$700.00, making the total $46,900.00. Richard Hansen made a motion to accept that
price. Orland Arneberg seconded. The motion passed.
There was some general discussion about road conditions and other meetings t o be
attended by various Highway District personnel later in the evening.
The next meeting was scheduled for April 12,2006.
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned a t 2 4 5 pm

Chairman

Secretary
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APPLIGATfON AND PERMIT TQ USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY

-- APPROACHES

COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTlON

1

. .

Start Date:

/

Est. Completion Date:
Road Name:
Location:
Sight Distance:

NOTICE
This permit shall not be valid for excavation
until. or unless. the orovision of Idaho code,
Title 55, Chapter & have been complied
with.
PRIOR TO EXCAVATION, CALL ONE
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE
Telephone No.

Posted Speed:

I

1-800-342-1585

APPROACH
Single Residence

Muttiple Residence

WIDTH

No. Served

Businss type

SURFACE TYPE
(VEHICLE COUNT)

ESTiMATED ADT

Must meet the requirements of North Latah County Highway District (NLCHD)
Approach Pdlcy and 349-221, ldaho Code.

Agriculture

I

Other

Explain:

ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS:
SPECIAL PROViSfONS:
Sett reverse side b r General Provisions.
I CERTlFY THAT I AM ft1E OWNER OR AUTHOREED REPRESENTATIVE Of= THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF
THIS PERMIT.
[ NAME OF PERMITTEE
[ APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT

I

ADDRESS

SIGNATURE OWNERIAUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

CITY STATE ZfP

DATE

I

SUEUECT TO ALL TERMS, CONWTIMJS, AND PROViSfONS SHUWN ON THIS FORM OR ATTACHMENTS, PERMlSSDN fS HEREBY
GRANED TO THE A W E N A M E D APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRIBED ABOVE.

I

I

NORTH U T A H COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT USE
TEklPORARY PERMIT
Tentative appmval subject to inspection of installatiin

NLCHD Autkxkecf fteprenbtive

Appmved
Me:
Corrections Required:

FINAL PERMIT
d j e c t e d

t] Date:

,4pFrovd by:
NLCHD A~thomed,Repesentatk~e

1

1

.

*

.

. .

..

p

2. The NLCHD may change, amend or terminate this permit or any of fhe conditions herein enumerated if permittee
fa% to cornpfy with its provisions or requirements as set forth herein.

,3.Approaches shall be for the bona fide purpose of s w i n g access and not for the purpose of parking, conducting
business, or servicing vehicles on the public right-of-way.

4. No revisions w 8dditCons shall be made to an approach or its appurtenances on the public right-of-way without

the writfen permission of tfie NLCHD.
5. The permiftee shall furnish all material, labor and equipment involved in the consbudion of the approach and its
appurtenances. This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on perrnit (12 inch
minimum) curb and gutter, concrete sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall be good
quality and are subject to inspection and approval by the NLCHD.
6. The NLCHD reserves the right to require the permibe, its successors and assigns, at any time, to make such
changes, additions, repairs and r e b t i o n s to any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way
as may be necessary to perrnit the relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, and maintenance of the
roadway andlor to provide proper protection to life and property on or adjacent to the roadway.
7. Approaches shall conform to tfie plans made a part of this permit. Adequate drawn
i gs
or sketches shall be
induded showing tbe design, materials, construction requirements and proposed location of the approach. All
approaches shall be in accordance with Exhibits 9 ahd 2 3 of the Manual for Use of Public Right of Way Standard Approach Policy.
8. During the construction of the approach(es), such barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be
erected and maintained by the permittee, as may be deemed necessary by the NLCHD. Said devices shall conform
to the current issue of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and stored maten'ak
shall be as far from the traveled m y as feasible. Items stored within 30 feet of the traveled way shai! be marked
and protected. The NLCHD may provide barricades (when available) upon request.

9. In accepting this permit, the permittee, its successors and assigns, agrees to hold the NLCHD harmless from any
liability caused by the installation, construction, maintenance or operation of the approach(es).
10. If the work done under this permit interferes in any way with the drainage of the roadway, the permittee shall
thtidly and at his o m expense make such provision as the NLCHD may direct to take care of said drainage
problem.
? 1. Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and debris shall be immediately removed and
the roadway and roadside shall be left neat and presentable and to the satisfaction of the NLCHD.
12. The permittee shall maintain at his or their sok expense the structure or object for which this permit is granted
in a condition satisfadory to the NLCHD.

13. Neitfier the acceptance of this permit nor anytfring herein contained shalt be construed as a waiver by fAe
permittee of any rights given it by the constitution or laws of the state of Idaho or of the United States.

14, No work shall be started until an authorized representative of the NLCHD has given witten notice to the
permittee to proceed, except in case of an emergency when verbal authorization may be given with a writfen pennit
and fee required M n five (5) working days.
15. This permit shall be void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before 30 days
unless otfremisct arranged with local road foreman.
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The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of Commissioners
was held a t the Moscow office on August 8,2007 a t 1:30 pm. Present were Chairman
Orland Arneberg, Commissioners Sherman Clyde and Richard Hansen, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Tim Sturman, and Dan Carscallen.
The minutes from July 25,2007 were approved as read.
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed. Richard Hansen seconded. T h e
motion passed.
Sherman Clyde took a moment to introduce Charles Bond, who was elected on August 7,
2007, as the new commissioner from the kloscow Area.
Jay McMunn from Cantenrood Estates came in to ask the commissioners if they had made
a decision regarding the acceptance of the road system in Canterwood Estates as a part of
the Highway District system. Richard Hansen asked that if the Highway District accepted
the roads into the system and chip sealed it, would the homeowners association reimburse
for labor and materials for that first chip seal. Mr. McMunn said that he understood that
to be the deal. There was some discussion about costs, especially since the commissioners
were unsure about whether the road was wide enough and whether the road's base would
be sufficient. Sherman Clyde said he would rather have the homeowners pay a contractor
to chip seal the road, since the fact contractors are available to bid the project precludes
the highway district from doing the ~vork.Sherman Clyde was also still concerned about
the road base, The commissioners discussed that they may not want to take on the road
"as-is" because of width and road base concerns. Richard Hansen said he was also
concerned about the proximity of the pump houses to the road right-of-way. The
commissioners said they were not ready to make a decision yet, and wanted to move on
with the meeting, but they nould deliberate on it later. klr. hlcklunn said he 1ooI;ed
forward to their decision.

Dan Carscallen showed the commissioners the contract that Ron Landeck wrote up for the
Bernard Olson rock pit. The con~missionerssaid it looked okay and said that Don Brown
wouId take it to Bernard to get it signed.
Don Halvorson came in to say he wanted a third party mediator to negotiate a settlement
regarding his issues on the Camp's Canyon Road. hlr. Halvorson asked if he could taIk
directly to the Highway District attorney. Sherman Clyde said he was not in favor of M r .
HaIvorson talking directly to the Highway District's attorney. Richard Hansen didn't
know hat hlr. Halvorson would gain other than not having to pay his own attorney.
Sherman CIyde said the only thing hfr. H a l ~ o r s o nwanted was to not haye to pay a lawyer.
Orland Arneberg said the Highway District's lawyer could not represent both sides.
Richard Hansen asked if hlr. F-falvorson was going to hire another lawjer. h'fr. Halvorson
said he would represent himself. The cornmissioners said they would not Iet Mr. Halvorson
deal directIy ~ v i t hthe highway district attorney,'so hlr. Halvorson presented a proposal to
settle his issues with Camp's c a n i o n Road. Dan Carscallen &ld hlr. Hal\ orson that the
gigirway-District's attorney would-be gone for the kliowing week, so he hoped to have a n
answer to 3Zr. Hafvorson sbrnetime before September 12, 2007.

Tim Sturman said the New HoIlandiLand Pride tractor/mower was not living up to
expectations. Dan Payne said he was not satisfied with Deary's setup either. T h e
commissioners decided to go meet with the staff a t St. John Hardware after the meeting.
Scott Becker came in and thanked Sherman Clyde on behalf of Hodge and Associates for
his time as Commissioner. Scott also took time to congratulate Charles Bond for his
victory in the election on the prior day. Scott said that the right-of-way m a p project was
progressing and that all the permits for the investigations of the bridge by Boulder Greek
campground were submitted and he was awaiting an answer. Scott said he expected to be
able to begin work in September. Dan Payne said he was worried about how they would
get a hoe down into the creek without disturbing too much of the bank. Richard Hansen
said that a n y brush taken out could be repIaced by planting some willow branches and they
should use the new Cat trackhoe to prevent oil leaks into the creek. Scott aIso said that
applications would come out in September for investment funds, so the commissioners
might w a n t to look a t what projects to apply for. Scott said there were also some bridge
funds available, and he would alert the commissioners to what could be done.
The commissioners went into executive session a t 2:33 prn
The cornmissioners adjourned from executive session at 2:48 prn
Alan Martinson came in to tell the commissioners that he got a grant to pay for weed
control a n d would like to share it with the highway district. Alan said he would get with
Dan CarscaIIen on how to get the funds.

Sherman Clyde made a motion to deny the acceptance of the Canterwood subdivision
roads into the highway district system, citing that he had to take the entire public interest
into account when thinking about what roads to take into the system, a n d that he could not
in good conscience take that road into the system when there were so many questions
regarding road width and the road's base. Richard Hansen seconded. T h e motion passed.
There was some discussion about getting bids for road graders. T h e commissioners were
each given a list of specifications so they could decide what to have listed in the specs for a
road grader bid.
Sherman Clyde said he was not satisfied vrith the way things were looking on Cameron
Road. Sherman said the road should be ~.ridenedanother 100 feet north.
Being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 3:10 pm
The next meeting was scheduled for August 22,2007.

Chairman

Secretary

The regular meeting of the North Latah County Highway District Board of
Commissioners was held a t the Moscow office on January 4,2006 at 1:30 pm. Present
were Chairman Orfand Ameberg, Commissioner Sherman Clyde, Foremen Dan
Payne, Paul Stubbs and Don Brown, and Dan CarscalIen.
The minutes of the regular meeting on December 14,2005 were approved.
Sherman Clyde made a motion to pay the bills as listed on the back of this page.
OrIand Arneberg seconded. The motion passed.
The commissioners opened rock bids. They were as follows:
Bidder:
Pit

DeAtley Crushing
tonnage

material

priwAon

extension

Hunt

25000
2000
2000

518" 1 112" 1/2 chips

$4.20
$3.95
$5.00

$105,000.00
$7,900.00
$10,000.00

Jensen

30000
10000
10000
2000

5/8" 3" 1/2 chips

anti-skid

$4.15
$3.95
$5.00
$5.50

$124,500.00
$39,500.00
$50,000.00
$1 1,000.00

30000
4000
1000
2000

314" 1 114" 6" 112 chips

$4.10
$3.90
$3.65
$4.90

$123,000.00
$15,600.00
$3,650.00
$9,800.00

grand total

$499,950.00

priceiton
$3.34
$3.34
$3.34

extension
$83,500.00
$6,S80.00
$6,680.00

Potlatch,

Bidder:
Pit

H~jni

North Idaho Crushing
tonnage

25000
2000
2000

Jensen

30000
70000
10000
2000

material
38" 1 112" 112 chips
518" -

3" 112 chips
anti-skid

$3.34
$3.34
$3.34
$3.34

Potlatch

grand total

V

Sherman Clyde made a motion to accept the fow bid from North Idaho Crushing for
the Deary, hloscow, and Potiatch area;. Orland Arneherg seconded. The notion
passed.
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Grec Mann and Pam Ailliardfor--

Ron Landeck presented the petition brought by
validation of public right-of-way. Ran pIaced into record the petition for validation,
the notice of hearing published in the Daily News and delivered to abutting
landowners, and road packet information from Latah County showing the opening
and recording of Road #480 which took place in 1905 and 1906, showing the
achowledgement of that being a public road.

Orland Arneberg asked those in support of the petition to speak
Greg Mann mentioned that there was no record of the road ever being
formaIly abandoned.
Pam Hilliard said she has lived there for almost SO years and it has always
been a public access road. Ms. Hilliard also said she was not looking for maintenance,
just continued public access
Harold Ott said that when he bought the property to the North of the road he
was told it was a public road and that it was the southern edge of his property. R e
told the same thing to the peopIe he sofd the property to. Mr. Ott supported
vaiidation.
Myron Emerson from Bennett Lumber Company said that Bennetts have been
using that road for access for over 32 years and support validation.
Gene Riggs said he has used t h e road for over 30 years for recreational
purposes and has always thought of it as public access. Mr. Riggs supported
Validation.
Maw S a g e r said he has always ridden horses there and would like to see it
remain a public access.
Harriet Akin wanted to address issues other than recreation. Ms. Akin said
that the road was needed for fire access, since it is the only way to get into and across
the canyon. Ms. Akin said local ranchers also retrieved their cattle using that road.
John Bohman, rural captain for the Troy Volunteer Fire Department, said that
road is B crscfa! fire access to the canyon lands.
Gary Osborn also said that road was the only fire access to the canyon, and
that he has been using the road for 45 years. Be also said that he would think that at!
property owners would be in favor of keeping that public access for fire protection.
Kenny Cadson, Troy Rural Fire Commissioner, said the road should stay
public access to protect the public from fires in the canyon.
Ron Landeck asked what kind of historical uses there were. H e was told
matorcycle, ATV, horseback riding and hunting were t h e main uses. Ron was told
that use has lessened in the past few years, and a lot of that had to do with certain
property owners voicing their opposition to access. Dan Pagne said most activity is
during huntiag scason.
Orland Ameberg then asked if there was any opposition to the petition.

<if5!

Mark Moorer, on behalf of Shawn and Michelle Oneil, showed the
commissioners photographs of the road and said it wss too much in: disrepair to allow
the public to access it. Mr. Moorer aIso showed the Commissioners a survey of the
road done by Melvin Taggart. The survey showed the existing road versus the
unrecorded deed that he found at the courthouse, Mr. Moorer said the existing road
did not exactly match the deed. Mr. Moorer said the Oneits owned the property to
the North of the road, as they were told this when they bought it from the Otts. Mr.
Moorer said that Mann and Ott were the ones who put up the gate and no trespassing
signs up on the road. Mr. Moorer said the photographs showed the Iack of
maintenance and deterioration of the road, Mr. Moorer also said the road may
qualify as a "404 waterway" and be subject to federal reguIations. He said the
R i l i a r d m a n n group had been logging down there in prior years and used another
road for hauling the lags out across their own property. ~ r - h f o o r esaid
t the OneiIs
purpose in opposing the road validation was not to keep hunters and others from
accessing the public lands, not to keep Iandowners from accessing their lands. They
just fee1 this road in unnecessary since a11 Iandowners had road access to other roads
in the area. H e also said there haven't been any fire trucks in there for some time, a t
Ieast not in the last two years. Mr. Moorer wanted the commissioners to be sure they
took into account what kind of public road this would end up being, what kind of
improvements they would be making, and what kind of cost to the public validation
would entail. Ee said this road really only appeared to conrteet two other public
roads. Mr. Moorer said it appeared the only legitimate purpose for validation was to
allow a cheap logging road for the petitioners. He also wanted to know why the road
was gated, and why the no trespassing signs were put up by Mann and OtL
Shawn Oneil wanted to cIarify that while Mann and Ott put u p the gate, Mr.
Oneil put u p the "No Trespassing" signs. Ron Landeck asked Mr. Oneil how long he
had owned the property, and hfr. Oneil said 4 years.
Orfarid Arneberg asked if there was any rebuttal.
Greg Rlann said the gate was put u p by himself and hlr. Ott to discourage
access by kids looking for a place to get drunk and start fires, but it ivss never locked
or signed, and they never ran anyone off the road. Mr. Mznn said that roads don't
stay improved when there is no logging going on, H e also said that just because there
hasn't been a fire truck down there doesn't mean there haven't been any fires. Mr.
,Mann said the condition of the road was due to heavy snowfa11 and rain and floods in
the Iate 90's after t h e last logging job was done using that road. B e said the reason
lags were took off through a CRP field is because the ground was frozen and it %--as
easiest. Mr. Mann said the road is on a good rock base and was in good shape before
the floods and could be brought back into shape easily.
Ron Landeck asked Greg Mann if he had ever been denied access. hls.
Eilliard said she talked to Mr. Oneil in mid-November and totd him they planned on
doing some logging in that area, and hlr. Oneil said he had a problem with them using
that road. She said there were other neighbors who have told her they were denied
access. Ron asked when the "No Trespassing" signs showed tip. Mr. Mann said they

showed u p in 2003, 1Mr. Mann said he was told by Mr. Payne a n d iMr, Kirkland that
iMr. Oneil had told them they could no longer go through on that road because of
reforestation.
Harold Ott said his family was told they could no longer access the canyon via
that road. Mr. Ott said his wife was riding her horse on Bennett land and Mr. Oneil
grabbed the reins of the horse a n d ordered her out of there. Mr. Ott said that the
Oneils' claim that they don't care if the public is still allowed access via that road is
totally untrue.
Kevin Sandquist said his father was doing some fogging in J u n e 2005 and got
permission from Mann and Billiard to go across their land to the road in question.
Mr. Sandquist then talked to Mr. Oneil about opening u p the road to get the logs out
since it made better sense. Mr. Oneil told Mr. Sandquist that he would stop Mr.
Sandquist. Mr. Sandquist asked permission to go across private land and increase the
length of haul and the expense of logging io general so he would not have to enter into
w h a t he perceived would be a costly legal battle. Kevin Sandquist felt this was a case
of access being denied. Mr. Sandquist asked Mr. Oneil if he had anything to add
since it was only he and Sandquist's father, Mr. Oneil said he did not have anything to
add.
Greg Mann said that every togging project he has done on his property has
been approved by the Idaho Department of Lands. He said if there had been
violations the IDL would have corrected them.
Harriet Akin said she was denied access by Mrs. Oneil when she and her
daughter were riding horses on that road. She also asked why the condition of the
road was an issue since the only issue was right-of-way, not road maintenance.
Gene Riggs asked about the other road that goes down into the canyon, a n d
there was clarification that it was across private ground, and the road petitioned for
validation is the only pubfic right-of-&ay in the area.
Greg Mann showed a copy of the corrected warranty deed between the Otts
and Oneils that showed that the property line was the "county road", so it was
understood a t the time that the road was public right-of-way.
Orland Arneberg closed the public hearing a t 2:25 prn. Ron Landeck explained that
there was goirrg to be firrdings of fact and csnc!usions. As a pofr?t of c!ariEcrrtiaa, Ren
explained the difference between "public highway" and "public right-of-way". Ron
then said that based on testimony, t h e commissioners needed to decide whether
validation of the public right-of-way was in the public interest.
Sherman Clyde said it looked like the road has been used by the public a n d it
was in the pnbIic interest to validate it as pubfic right-of-way based on testimony he'd
heard- Orland Arneberg agreed t h a t testimony favored validation. There was some
discussion about the original deed versus the survey of the existing road. Sherman
Clyde made a motion to validate this section of road as pubfic right-of-way, using
Taggart's survey of the existing roadway as the legal definition of the right-of-way.
Orland Arneberg seconded. The motion passed. Ron Landeck said he would
generate the findings of fact 2nd conclusions of law and have those avnilahle by the
meeting on February 8,2006:

Karen Stubbs came in to discuss Cameron Road. Ms. Stubbs was asking for the
Highway District's preferences with that road. Sherman CIyde said he would like
Camerons to deed right-of-way on that section of road so there would be room to p u t
snow if there was ever a need. The commissioners asked Ron Landeck to write
something up clarifying what the Highway District wants.
Ron Landeck said he and Chairman Arneberg met with Taggart's attorney a n d had
a n offer of settlement. Sherman Clyde said he was uncomfortable making a decision
without Potlatch Commissioner Richard Hansen present to know what is going on. in
his area.
The next meeting was scheduled for February 8,2006.

Being no further business, the meeting adjourned a t 4 0 0 pm
Chairman

Secretary
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JUDGMEN7/ADJUDICATION

Commissioners for the North Latah County
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Highway District, Qrland Arneberg, Rickird
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CAUSE FOR ACTION UNDER

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in rheir Official
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42 U. S. C. 1983

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

1

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

lndividual Capacity

)

Defendants
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Under lRCP liul-2 56 and purs~tant o "2 U. S.C 1953, and for the reasons set forth in the
attached Memorand~im,?laintiffs hcre5y Kosi=this Covrt for an order granting of partial
summary judgment. As set forth nore full:; irr the acco;~panyingh4einorandumn of Law, at the
present state of extensive discovery in this ma,tter and fcir this Motion, rhere is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact. rZll of the reiol-J evideilce cor~fillnsthat Plaintiffi have requisite elements
for sustaining an action under 42 U. S, C. 1983, and that Defendants, acting under the color of
PLANTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTI,-11; SU3,lhl;IRY JUDCMENTIADJUDtCi4TION OF
THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSE Ft3R ;?._t:TI.3?: UNDER 32 U.S . C. 1983
1

law, are liable under said statute for the alleged deprivationis of Plaintiffs' property rights, liberty
rights, and right to be free fi-om the alleged seizure of their property by Defendants ~vlietherfor
public use or private use. In the alternative Plaintiffs have requisite elements for sustaining an
action under 42 U. S. C. 1983, and that Defendants, acting under the color of law, are liable
under said statute for tlie alleged improper interference by Defendants with Plaintiffs' property
rights.
This motion is based on the records and file herein, the supporting memorandum
submitted herewith, Plaintiff's concise statement of material facts, and Plaintiffs affidavit and
exhibits.
As a rnatter of law, Plaintiffs bring forth this Motion for granting of cause of action under
42 U. S. C. 1983 against Defendants or alternatively entry of liability of Defendants to Plaintiffs
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 1983. Plaintiffs are entitled to this partial summary judgment as a matter
of law.
Oral argument requested.

DATED this 2 1st day of October, 2008.

Don Halvorson, plaintiff pro se
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte ~alvorson(Husband and Wife))

Case No. CV 2008-180

Plaintiffs

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM

VS

.

)

IN SUPPORT OF

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

Highway District, Orland Arne berg, Richard

)

JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

OF THE ISSUE OF THE

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

CAUSE FOR ACTION UNDER

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

42 U. S. C. 1983

Individual Capacity

)

Defendants

1
INTRODUCTION

On March 3, 2008 Plaintiffs brought action to redress alleged deprivations effected by
Defendants, acting under the color of law, of rights secured to Plaintiffs by the Idaho State
Constitutio~iand statutes and the laws and Constitutioil of the United States. Plaintiffs brought
these actio~isagainst the Defendants for declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief, damages, and attorney fees and costs under Idaho and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
PLAINTIFFS' M E M O M N D M IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' hlOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUhlMARY JUDGhfENTIADJUDIC12TION OF THE ISS'C'E OF THE CAUSE FOR ACTION
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Idaho statutes, Idaho and Federal Constitutions and 42 U.S.C. $5 1983, 1985, and 1988 for the
improper and unconstitutional infringement of their property rights and in the alternative for
negligence, negligence per se, inverse condemnation, trespass, nuisance, amongst others.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The NLCHD has the authority to widen, straighten, and change roads/highways/rights of
way. See I.C. $$ 40-605,40-13 10, amongst others.

2. The NLCHD has the authority to issue and revoke driveway access permits. See I.C. $5
40-604, 40-1 3 10, amongst others.
3. The NLCHD has the authority to survey, record changes in roads/highways/rights of

way, and convey. see I.C.59 40-604,40-605,40-608,40-6 10,40-13 l0,40-1336,40-2302.
4. The NLCHD has the authority to hold public meetings and hearings and to keep records,
including verbatim transcripts of, of meetings and hearings. See I.C. Title 40.
5. Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected property interest (right, entitlement) in the fee
simple title to their land located in SENE Section 15 T39NR3WBM and as their lands underlie
and abut and adjoin to Camps Canyon Road. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as the basis
for their property right, a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as instrument #4244 11 dated
12/9/1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the real property, situated in the State of
Idaho, County of Latah as described in said instgurnent, including that land ~ ~ h i underlies
ch
Camps Canyon Road as described in said deed. (See Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary .Tudgment/Adjudication Of The Issue To Grant Plaintiffs
Cause For Action Under 42 U. S. C. 1983 (PA) at 7.)

6. Plaintiffs property rights, liberty rights, right to be free of improper seizure of their land
(permanently or temporally, for public or not for public use), and right to redress for grievances
against a government agency without being subject to retaliation for seeking to protect their
property rights are protected by and found in the 1St, 3th, 5th and 14thAmendments to the U. S.
Constitution and Article I: $1, $2, $3, $ 13, $14 and $17 of the Idaho State Constitution.

PLAINTIFFS' h'lEMORhXDUhI P\I SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' h4OTION FOR PARTIAL
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7. In 1996 the NLCHD straightened, widened, and altered Camps Canyon Road in the
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. (See Plaintiffs' Interrogatories and Requests For Admissions and
Defendants Responses (PIRADR) at I., 2.)

8. In the late fall of 2005, the NLCHD once again began to widen Camps Canyon Road in
the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel. (See PIRADR at 2.)

9. In the spring of 2006 the NLCHD issued the Wagners a driveway access permit,
Plaintiffs allege ivas trespassing of their property. (See PIRADR at 3 .)
10. Plaintiffs first noted the construction of the first Wagner driveway access on or about
4/08/06. (See PA, at 8.)
1 1. On 4110106 Plaintiffs called NLCHD district foreman Payne and notified him that the
first Wagner driveway access, on Plaintiffs' information and belief, was on Plaintiffs property.
(See PA at 9).

12. On 4/12/06 Plaintiff, Don Halvorson, attended NLCHD regular Commissioners'
meeting and complained to commissioners that on his information and belief that the permit for
the Wagner driveway access was issued for access across Plaintiffs' property. Don Halvorson
also coinplained about the late fall 3005 extensioii of width to Camps Canyon Road and the
injury to his fence allegedly due to the pushing of a wind fallen tree through the fence by the
grader operator. Defendants stated all matters were within their 50 foot/25 feet from centerline
prescriptive right of way. Plaintiff reminded Commissioners that the NLCHD had altered Camps
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 1996 and that on his information and belief
there no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel and even
if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no extension of the right of way
(prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline encumbering Plaintiffs' property greater
than die width of Camps Canyon Road and its supporting structures. (See PA at 10; see Exhibit #
2 at page 1; see PIRADR at 14, 10, 11, 12, and 13.)
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13. Plaintiffs requested a survey of the pertinent area by Rimrock Consultants. On
information and belief after the stakes were set for the survey the Wagners obtained a second
driveway access permit. (See PIRADR at 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19.)
14. In the summer and fall of 2006 Defendants once again commenced widening of Camps
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 311- acre parcel and in doing so Plaintiffs allege Defendants
have encroached on and done damage to Plaintiffs' fence and have physically invaded and
continue to occupy Plaintiffs land. ((See PIRADR at 2; See Complaint)
15. On several occasions, Plaintiffs have mitten letters to Defendants and have attended
several meetings of the commissioners of the NLCHD, in which they have sought action on tlie
iss-~les
of the location, width, -use,character, and the clarification of their legal rights under tlie
Camps Canyon right of way. ((See PIRADR at 4, 5, 6, 15 subpart j.; See Complaint; See Exhibit
% 2.)

16. There have been no hearings afforded Plaintiffs at any time and the Defendants have
offered no final decision 011 any and all matters. No hearing in any or in all matters of trespass,
nuisance, inverse condemnation, property damage, deprivations of rights has been afforded
Plaintiffs. See Court transcript Plaintiffs' Motions for declaratory judgments under I. C. $Ij 40203a and 67-8003 (3) (Defendants' defense to hlotion for Declaratory Judgment Under I. C. Ij
67-8003 (3) "No final decision"). See Exhibit ff 2 at page 6, (LMinutesof the 9/12/07 meeting of
the NLCHD Commissioners), "Ron Landeck said that no proceeding has been in front of the
con~missionersto have them make a ruling." (See also PIRADR at S.)
17. On their information and belief Plaintiffs continue to complain that Defendants on a
routine basis of maintenance impact their fence and land on a continued and inevitable basis. It
is not if Defendants ~villagain widen the road but rather that with each grading of Cainps
Canyon Road in the vicinit~~
of the 3+/- acre parcel Defendants take more land and further impact
on and threaten Plaintiffs' fence. (I. C. Title 40 gives Defendants authority to grade and
jurisdiction over Camps Canyon Road.)

N SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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18. On September 12,2007 Defendants told Plai~ltiffsthat they would not consider
Plaintiffs allegatio~isof property right violations unless Plaintiffs paid a $750 fee and if they
would not do so Plaintiffs needed to get a lawyer. (See Exhibit # 2 at page 8.)
19. Defendants in any manner or at any time in the process of altering Camps Canyon Road,
in the coliductioli of any meeting of the Commissio~lersof the NLCWD or in issuing driveway
access permits to the Wagners do not deny or bring forth any other manner of operation other
than in their capacities as employees or commissioners of the NLCHD, that is they were
actinglfailing to act under the color of law.

20. Exhibit # 2 minutes from NLCHL) Commissioner's meetines;

A, Exhibit # 2 page 2-3 "Richard Elansen explained that technically the fence
encroached on the right of way.

"

In light of history of changes in Camps Canyon Road

dispute requires a predeprivation hearing.

B. Exhibit #2 paEe 3 "Richard Hamen said the property line issues have
nothing to do with the highway district.

C. Exhibit #2

page

"

Deliberate indifference to the deprivations.

6 "Sherman Cljjde said that the fence that the tree fell on

Hrasin the public right of way.

"

In light of l~istoryof changes in Camps Canyon Road

dispute requires a predeprivation hearing.

D. Exhibit # 2 page 8 "Sherman C l ~ d and
e Richard Hansen said theyfelt tlze
road is where it has always has been, so they were okay with the road's locatiorz,
therefore there was no r*easonfor them to ir~itiatevalidation proceedings. " In light of

history of changes in Camps Canyon Road doubt and dispute requires a predeprivation
hearing. Determination of the accurate location, valid establishment of, and!or lack of
agreement with the public record are objective, not based on the subjective feelings of the
Commissioners.

E. Exhibit ff 2 page 20 "i2rlr. Halvorson asked $'he could talk directly to the
Highway Distf-ictattorizey. She~manClyde said he was not in favor of Mr. Halvorsorz
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talking directly to the Highway District attorney. Richard Hansen didn't know what
ikhar. Halvorson would gain other than not having to pay his own attorney. Sherman
Clyde said the only thing Mr. Halvorson wanted was to not have to pay a lawyer. Orland
Arneberg said the Hingway District S layyer could not represent both sides. Richard
Narzsen asked ifMr. Halvorson was going to hire a lawyer. Mr. Halvorson said he
would represent hirnselJ: The commissioners said they would not let Mr. Halvorson deal
directly with the highway district attorney ...

"

ARGUMENT
Standard of Review

Summary judgment can only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and,
as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 758 P.2d 406 (Ct.App.
1987), rev. denied (1 988).

No Due Process (substantive and/or proceduraf)
It is with Defendants refusal to deal fairly, equitably and/or constitutionally with Plaintiffs
that they now appear in this Court, and for relief in these matters now seek partial summary
judgment. As Defendants' counsel candidly admits, there has been no hearing before the
Comissioners. No final decision has ever been forth coming to Plaintiffs in any m d all
matters.
Defendants' policies/custorns/standard operating procedures hal'e not afforded
Pfaintiffs adequate due process-Elements

of a 1983 Claim

42 U. S. C. 1983 reads, '"very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
PLAINTIFFS' h4EMORANDUM I
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o~nissiontaken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Colu~nbiashall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
Persons: Defendants in their official capacities. "Local governing bodies (and local officials
sued in their official capacities) can, therefore, be sued directly under 5 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations where, as here, the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy. In addition, local governments, like every other § 1983 "person," may be sued for
constitutioiial deprivations visited pursuant to govermnental "custom" even though such custom
has not received formal approval through the government's official decisionmaking chantiels."
Monell v. Department ofSoc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Persons: Defendants in their individual capacities. "State officers may be held personally
liable for damages under 1983 based upon actions taken in their official capacities." Hafr v.
itilelo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)
Under the color of state statute. There has been no inferelice for any party to the contrary
that Defendants were not acting under the law while altering Camps Canjron Road, issuing the
IVagners driveway access pennits or holding or failing to hold meetiiigs/hearings.
Subjects orAcauses to be subjected to A local government is said to have an unconstitutional
policy wlien it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the
employee making a wrong decision. See City of Canton 11. Harris, 489 U.S. 3 78 (1989) Gold v.
City oflZ/iriar??i, 1998 14% 54803 (I 1th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town qflake Barnilton, 117 F.3d 488
(1 lth. Cir. 1997) (When proper course of action "is obvious to all without training or
supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not 'so likely' to produce a wrong
decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to

PLAIXTIFFS' IMEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
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train or supervise." At 490.) Unconstitutional policies may also exist if an isolated action of a
government employee is dictated by a "final policymaker" (See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 337 (1997). An uncollstitutional
policy/custom may be present if the authorized policylnaker approves a subordinate's decision
and the basis for it. (See City of St. Louis v. Pi~aprotnik,485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). All matters
alleged by Plaintiffs are the result of the policy makers' authority and approval. The alleged
matters of deprivation to Plaintiffs' property are the result of the carrying out of the policy
makers policies and not the "unauthorized" activity of a tort feasor for an employee. (See
PlRADR at 10, 11, 12, and 13.)
NOTE The Supreme Coui-t has rejected the notion that a plaintiff must meet a heightened
pleading standard to state a claim against a murlicipality for an ullconstitutional custom or policy.
(See Leatlzer~zanv. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1 993)).

Deprivation of rights In order to state a claim for a deprivation of Due Process, a plaintiff
must show: (1) that he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest; (see Board of

Regents ofstate Colleges v. Rotlz, 408 U.S. 564, (1972); Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudernzill,
470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)), and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without due process of
law (see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)). Plaintiffs' fee simple
title affords a collstitutional property right.
Defendants admit that no hearing and/or final decisio~ihas been afforded Plaintiffs in their
possible/plausible claim to the lands underlying and abutting to Camps Caiiyoli Road in the
vicinity of the 341- acre parcel. No valid explanation has been given to Plaintiffs for the
location, width, use, and/or character of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road subsequent to
the alteration in the precedent conditions of the right of way in 1996, and for that matter the
widening of 2005 and 2006. No notice or hearing has been provide Plaintiffs to request rhem to
rem0.i-e their fence. Such action, as notice and hearing to abate an encroaclme~~t,
could result in
a judicial review-an

action the Defendants urant to avoid.
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Due process requires that "a deprivation of life, liberty, or property" be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (see Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v.
Louderrnill, 470 U.S. at 542; Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palnzer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)).
If Defendants can feasibly provide a pre-deprivation hearing, it must do so regardless of the
post-deprivation remedies available. See Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124,
Zirnmerman. v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9thCircuit, 2001), L o p v. Zinzrnerman Brush

Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982)(availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when
deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not
"unauthorized"). Any and all actions and/or failures to act under the color of law could feasibly
be preceded by notice and hearing. Altering a road is a discretionary activity, there are no
exigent circumstances. Defendants have not brought forth any reason for infeasibility of
predeprivation notice and hearing. The 4/12/06 meeting was attended by all necessary parties
and was afforded time on the agenda. The only thing preventing a hearing was the Dcfendants
not wanting it to be recorded. (See PIRADR at 14.)
In the absence of any hearing and/or final decision in any and all matters as so complained
and alleged in Plaintiffs' Con~plaint,Defendants' standard operating procedures/policies/customs
are facially invalid and/or invalid as applied, for it is not that Plaintiffs have not tried to elicit
action and resolution to the matters, and it is quite evident that the actionsifailures to act which
Plaintiffs complain of have effected alleged depril-ations of Plaintiffs' property rights are
authorized NLCHD activities. The standard operating procedures/policies/customs brought forth
by Defendants under the broad authority delegated to the Defendants by the Idaho State
Legislature to widen, straighten, change, and or alter rights of way/roadslhighways, to issue
and/or revoke driveway access permits, to determine and/or deal with encroachments to rights of
way/roads/highways, to maintain valid rights of ways/roads/highways in view of doubts of the
legal establishment, in view- of the numerous alterations to rigfits of ways!roadskigh~vays and in
view of the in congruencies of public record with the Location of rights of wayslroadsjhighm~ays,
PLAJNTIFFS' NIEIMORANDU~VIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIOX FOR PARTIAL
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and amongst other standard operating procedures/policies/customs are uncircumscribed with
statutorily provided safeguards and/or remedies for erroneous deprivations. See Zinerrnon v.
Bzkrch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124, Zitnnzerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9thCircuit,
200 I), Logan v. Zimrnerrnan Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-43 6 (1982)(availability of
postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process
was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). (See P I W D R at 20, 10, 11, 12, 13.)

No dispute exists as to the alteration in the original prescriptive right of way. Defendants
bring forth no objective data to support the original official establishment of Camps Canyon
Road, or its reestablishment after the alterations in 1996,2005, or 2006. (see PIRADR at 1. and
2.1
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have the authority to
widen, straighten, and/or alter Camps Canyon Road.

No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have the authority to
issue and revoke driveway access permits.
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have not begun to alter
Camps Canyoil Road, in the vicinity of the alterations, anew after 2005 and beyond. (see
PIRADR at 2.)

No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have issued the
Wagners driveway access permits in the vicinity of the alterations to Camps Canyon Road.
No dispute exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants that Defendants have provided no due
process and/or equal treatment under the law (Defendants bring forth no rational basis of a
legitimate government interest not to)
Technically the Defendants could follow their standard operating procedure for widening a
prescriptive right of way and never see the light of a hearing room and move Camps Canyon
Road across the entirety of SENE Section 15, annihilate anything in their path and destroy all of
evidence of precedent conditions in the process as long as tJlere is no final decision to be
evaluated by a judicial review
PLAINTIFFS ' MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' RfOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUM-MARY JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSE FOR ACTION

In addition to protection against these deprivations of procedural due process of invalid
policies which do not afford Plaintiffs any hearing on any matter, the Due Process Clause has
two substantive components--the substantive due process simpliciter, and incorporated
substantive due process.
Plaintiffs may state a claim for a violation of the substantive due process simpliciter if the
defendant engaged in conduct that was "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional
sense." See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
It is clear now that this applies to land cases and to Plaintiffs in the present case now also.
"Conversely, if a government action is found to be iinpermissible for instance because it fails to
meet the public use requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process that is the end of the
inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action." Lingle v. Chevron, U.S. A. Inc.
(04-163), 544 U.S. 528, 363 F.3d 846, (2005). (See also Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun
Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim. On
these grounds then Plaintiffs have due process rights of a predeprivation hearing-a

simple

notification of the intentions of the NLGHD to alter the right of way of Camps Canyon Road,
and or when all parties were present and time was available on the meeting agenda at the 4/12/06
meeting necessary to discuss and receive a rationally based decision on a legitimate government
interest to lawfullly issue a driveway access pernlit. (See San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. Sari
Diego, 450 U. S. 621,656, n. 23 (1981)(Brennan J., dissenting)(when property is taken by the
government but not in furtherance of a "public use," "the government entity inay not be forced to
pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, [but] the lando'ix,~ler
may nevertheless have a
damages cause of action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment due process
violation.").
In acknowledging the absence of statutory provided remedies for erroneous deprivations
andlor post deprivation hearing, Plaintiffs do not ackbowledgesuch post deprivation remedies
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are adequate, rather in the alternative to the undisputed denial of predeprivation notice and
hearing, Plaintiffs are saying Defendants policies, customs, and procedures also deny any
exhaustion of agency remedies, judicial review, and/or tort claiin remedies. Trespass, nuisance,
and/or inverse condemnation are not covered by the ITCA and such causes for action, post
deprivation tort claim, are not deemed adequate (see Parratt v. Taylor, as compared to
"unauthorized" actions not found in Zinernzon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124) 451 U. S.
527 (198 I), by the arbitrariness and capriciousness of Defendants actions/failures to act and
abuse of Defendants discretionary powers. See also Lir-zglev. Chevron USA Inc. (04-1 63) 544

U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F. 3d 846 and Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City ofSun Valley, 506
F.3d 851 (gthCircuit 2007).
shall be liable . . . in an action a t law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceedingfor redress
This Court has jurisdiction, (see-Elbwlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)) and Plaintiffs are not
required to exhaust all administrative and judicial state remedies as a prerequisite to a section
1983 action (see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1 96l)(exlnaustion of judicial remedies is
not a prerequisite)). Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section
1983 action (see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1930)). Further, tort claim notice
requirement prior to initiating suit does not apply (see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)).

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have adequately filled the requisites of a 42 U.S. C. 1983 claim.
Plaintiffs have an ei~titlement/propei-tyriglit (the ownership and peaceful enjoyment of
their land) given them under the statutes and Federal Constitution ( 5 Amendmei~t
~
including
substantive and procedural due process and equal treatment under the law) as well as under the
statutes and Constitution of the State of Idaho (Article I $5 13 &I.?.).
Plaintiffs have a right to be free of retaliatory pieceinleal intrusions, invasions and
occupations of their land and continued damages to their fence ( 5 Amendment
~
including
substantive and procedural due process and equal treatment under the law).
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Plaintiffs have a right to be free of the Defendants' abridgement of Plaintiffs right to
petition for the redress of grievances (lStAmendment of Federal Constitution). (This
abridgement is, just as prosecutions are, "wrenching disruption[s] of everyday life." Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 48 1 U .S. 787, 8 14 (1987). "Every prosecution, like every
arrest, "is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free
on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his
friends." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,320 (1971).)
Plaintiffs have a right to be free of the improper seizure of their property, whether for non
public or public use (4"' Amendment to the Federal Constitution).

In the alternative, Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected property right which
demands only the proper interference of due process (substantive and procedural) and equal
treatment under the law (5ti1-4mendrnent to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article I $5 13 and

14 of the Idaho State Constitution). After which just compensation may be deemed as
appropriate.
Further, in the in the absence of either predeprivation or post deprivation hearing or
possible statutory remedial action (see Exhibit $2 starting at page 5 for Plaintiffs inquiries of
Defendants counsel on matters of I. C. $ 40-203a and IRTA), Defendants fail to act (officially
and/or fail to train employees in deprivation effecting actions andlfailures to act) in deliberate
indifference to obvious alleged and continued complaints by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have rights, as so enumerated above and specifically alleged to be deprived of,
under the color of law: (1) Right to Due Process (substantive and procedural), (2) Right to be
free of abusive governmental actions a i d failures of government to act, in deliberate
indiffsrence to obvious and continued violations, (3) Right to be free of retaliations for
expression of Plaintiffs' property rights (including damages to their fence and fmher piecemeal
ilitrusions on their land), ( 3 ) Right to notice and hearing for any and all expressions of the
authority of Defendants to act as to enforce and/or effect deprivations of Plaintiffs' property and
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or rights, status, or immunities through application of general laws, ordinances, policies,
customs, and/or standard operating procedures to Plaintiffs or to their specific situation and/or
land, ( 5 ) Right to the redress of grievances brought forth by the improper interference with
Plaintiffs' property rights and elitra~iceto judicial review of that improper interference, (6) Right
to be free of seizure of Plaintiffs' land or the improper interference with Plailitiffs' property
rights whether it be for public use or not for public use (whether or not such 11011 public use be
afforded to a friend, neighbor aidlor relative of any NLCHD Commissiolier andlor foreman),
and (7) Right to Equal Treatment Under the Law in tlie application of any asid all statutes, laws,
ordina~ices,policies, custosns and/or standard operating procedures or to be given a rational basis
of a legitimate government isiterest for not affording Plaintiffs any such equal treatment.
These rights are covered and protected by and extended to the State of Idaho and its local
government agencies through the 14th~~lnendrnelit
of the Federal Constitution. Plaintiffs cannot
be deprived of these aforesnentiolied rights without due process and equal treatment under the
law and Plaintiffs may be afforded at the minimum such siomizial damages, declaratory and
iiijunctive relief as this Court so deems appropriate. This snotiosi seeks only the granting of
cause of action under 42 U.S. C. 1983, damages to be determined at trial.
It is ~iow,as a matter of law, then that Plaintiffs petition this Court to declare their rights,
status, immunities, and/or privileges under 42 U. S. C. 1983 and such Federal and State of Idaho
statutes and Constitutions as aforementioned a i d with notice request Defendants to show cause
why tlie full effect and force of 42 U. S. C. 1983 and such Federal and State of Idaho statutes
and Constitutio~isas aforementioiled should not be afforded Plaintiffs in any or all
aforementiolied actslfailures to act and/or to bring forth rational basis of a legitimate govemrnei~t
interest for not affording Plaintiffs equal treatment under the law as all similarly situated abutting
underlying property owners and to show cause why further actionlrelief should not be so granted
to Plaintiffs. (See Bivens v. Six U T T ~ T OATaiimed
W E Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (United States
Supreme Court ruiecl that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth
Amendment freedom fiom unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by federal
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agents.) See McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F. 2d 47 (5th Circuit 1980), (plaintiff was entitled to
Due Process before road was built over land of disputed ownership). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14th Amendment property right even though
dispute exists). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042,55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)
(". ..riglit to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon tlie merits

of a claimants' assertion.. ."). See Cooper v. Board of County Conzmissioners ofAda County,
101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), (the test for functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity and due
process requirements).)
With respect to the extent of darnages available, the Supreme Court has noted that the
basic purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate the victims of official
misconduct, and therefore held that there is no limit on actual damages if they can be proven (see

Carey v. Piphas, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)). But where they are not proved, only nominal damages of
$1 .OO may be awarded (see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992)). Punitive damages may
also be awarded, but not against a inunicipality (see Smitlz v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of
iVe~.tiportv. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981)). A municipality may, however, be joiritly and
severally liable (see Finch v. City of Verrzon, 877 F.2d 1497 (I 1th Cir. 1989)). Injunctive and
declaratory relief is also permitted (see 42 U. S. C. 1983).
"It is abundantly clear that one reason tlie legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise,
state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state
agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 36.5 US. 16 7 (1961)
Relevant factors include the affected private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation,
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and the government's interest, including
burdens that additional safeguards would entail. See lWati~ewsv. Eldridge, 324 U. S. 3 19, 335
(1 976). In most cases, some type of predeprivation notice and hearing are constitutionally
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required before a property interest is invaded. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 (1978),

Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113, and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, (1981).
Plaintiffs petition Court to grant Plaintiffs partial summary judgment in this matter and as
such grant Plaintiffs cause of action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 having fulfilled the requisite
elements.
On this 21st Day of October, 2008.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Don Halvorson
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1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHG, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180
Plaintiffs
VS.

)

PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN

)

SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'

North Latah County Highway District; Board of )

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

Commissioners for the North Latah County

)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT/

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

ADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

OFTHE

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

CAUSE FOR ACTION

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)

UNDER 42 U. S. C. 1983

Individual Capacity

1

Defendants

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Latali

)

Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say:
1. We are the plaintiffs named in the above case.

PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDG?IIIENT/ADJUDICATIONOF THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSE FOR ACTION

2. We first became aware of Defendants adverse actions and improper interference with
regard to our property rights underlying to and abutting to Camps Canyon Road in the
late fall of 2005 when the NLCHD graded the road and pushed 6 inches of gavel to
the northeast into the buffer (area between the fence and the road and its supporting
structures) left by us when we reconstructed the line fence in 1997.
3. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription to the lands abutting to

and underlying Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+1- acre parcel in our fee
siniple title on 4/12/06 at the regular meeting of the Cornniissioners of the NLCHD.
4. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence,
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Canips
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2005 on 411 2/06.
5. We gave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of
prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence, to
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to widen Camps Canyon
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06.
6. We continued to give Defendants fair warning of our f a d s opiniods of factls and
interpretation of tlie application of law to our facts and opiniods of facts and sought
remedy and settlement with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum of either
paying $750 and file for petition to validate Camps Canyon Road or getting a lawyer
in September of 2007.
7. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as

instrument #424411 dated 12/9/1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the
real property, situated in the State of Idaho, County of Latah as described in said
instrument, including that land which underlies CCR as described in said deed.
8. We first became aware of the construction of the Wagners first driveway access to

Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3%'- acre Parcel on or about 4/8/06.
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9. On 4/10/06, I, Don Halvorson, called NLCHD foreman, Dan Payne, and Clearwater
Power new construction foreman, known only to me as Clint, to inform them that the
Wagners driveway access was on information and belief to be on our property
crossing the east property line of the 3+I- acre parcel.
10. On 4/12/06, I, Don Halvorson, attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD
Commissioners at 1132 White Ave Moscow Idaho. Those in attendance were Orland
Arneberg, Richard Hansen, Ron Landeck, Dan Payne, Dan Carscallen, Paul Stubbs,
Don Brown, Gary Osborn, John Bobman, Bob and Kate Wagner, Francis and Patsy
Wagner, and a woman unknown to me. I complained to Commissioners that on my
information and belief the permit for the Wagner driveway access was issued for
access across our property. I also complained about the late fall 2005 extension of
width to Camps Canyon Road and the injury to our fence allegedly due to the pushing
of a wind fallen tree through the fence by the grader operator. Defendants stated all
matters were within their 50 foot/25 feet from centerline prescriptive right of way. I
reminded Cornmissioners that the NLCHD had altered Canips Canyon Road in the
vicinity of the 31-1- acre parcel in 1996 and that, on my information and belief, there
no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and
even if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no extension of the right of
way (prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline encumbering our property
greater than the width of Camps Canyon Road and its supporting structures.

ofi/u-

The above statements are true to the best of our knowledu
Dated this 2 1" day of October, 2008.

Don Halvorson

;My cornrnission expires:
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' LMOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENTIADJUDICATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSE FOR ACTION
UliBER 42 U. S. C. 1983

U!
c,%. uCharlotte Halvorson
SUBSCRI

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 21Stday of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
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Don Halvorson
1290 American Ridge Road
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537
(208) 289-5602
Plaintiff, Pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife)) Case No. CV 2008-180
Plaintiffs

) PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE
) APPLICATION/MOTION FOR

VS.

North Latah County Highway District; Board of ) ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO NAME
Commissioners for the North Latah County

) EXPERT WITNESSES

Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard

)

Hansen, Sherman Clyde, in their Official

)

Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities;

)

Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his

)
)

Individual Capacity
Defendants

Plaintiffs make ex parte application or, alternatively, move Court under Rule
7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. to enlarge time for Plaintiffs to name expert witnesses as scheduled on
September 5, 2008 at pretrial telephone conference for October 31, 2008 and
reschedule for December 31,2008.
As grounds for this application/motion Plaintiffs cite recent order of this Court to
extend time for and reschedule hearing for Plaintiffs motions for summary judgments
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properly scheduled for 10/21/08 and 11/4/08 and rescheduled at 11/18/2008. This
rescheduled date for the hearing of these motions is beyond the scheduled date for
Plaintiffs determinative date for naming expert witnesses and denies Plaintiffs the
knowledge of the results of such hearings in the determinative process of the necessity
of expert witnesses.
Further as grounds in support of PlaintiffsFs' appIication/motion, Plaintiffs represent
that the manner and grounds under which Defendants' counsel obtained rescheduling of
Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgments was exploitive and abusive of process
and/or process of discovery.
Defendants' counsel notes as grounds for his rescheduling of Plaintiffs' motions
for partial summary judgment as "[tlherefore, Plaintiffs' service by mail 29 days before
the hearing date did not meet the minimum 31 days, advance notice of the hearing
required under ldaho rules of civil procedure." (see Defendants' Ex Parte Application Or,
Alternatively Motion to Reset Hearing On Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment Filed October 6, 2008, And Brief.)
Plaintiffs aver that U.S. Postal Clerk at the Moscow, ldaho post office on October
6, 2008 stated three postal rates and the delivery dates at each rate and each rate
represented a delivery date of October 7, 2008-next day delivery. Any and all such
error as claimed by Defendants' counsel is harmless-the additional days are intended
for mail delivery and not for additional time of notice (see Keeven v. E s t ~ t of
e Keeven,
126 ldaho 290, 882 P.2d 457) and the intent of the "error" is oniy meant to deiay the
properly and adequately noticed partial summary judgments. In addition the Court's
order granting Defendants' vacating and resetting hearing dates was signed and sent as
of 10/14/08 from the Nez Perce County courthouse in Lewiston and Defendants' brief
was sent from the Latah County courthouse in Moscow and both were received the next
day, 10115/08, by Plaintiffs (evidence that U.S. Postal assertion of next day delivery
works) Defendants do not say that the paper work did not arrive within the allotted
required time , only that it was not mailed within the required allotted time.
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Further, Defendants' counsel incorporated reference to Plaintiffs' partial summary
judgment filed on September 19, 2008 as "...and that same cause, incorporated herein
by this reference, also applies in large part to this application or motion" is patently false.
September 19, 2008 to October 21, 2008 is a total of 32 days. Additionally in reference
to this Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment filed on September 19, 2008, Plaintiffs aver
to the following history.
Plaintiffs noted in a per se manual that in the sense of judicial economy, that is in
requiring court time to resolve issues, attorneys may meet and stipulate to issues
instead of using valuable court time. In this vein, Plaintiffs called and asked Defendants'
counsel if he would view and respond to Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment and call
back to discuss the motion. Defendants' counsel said he would and Plaintiffs submitted
a copy of said September 19, 2008 submitted partial summary judgment motion several
days before the September 19, 2008 filing. Plaintiffs never heard from Defendants'
counsel and went ahead and filed the motion. This action extended Defendants'
counsel's notice of the partial summary judgment even further, making Defendants
claims even less applicable.
On September 25, 2008 Plaintiffs once again called Defendants' counsel, this
time to schedule time to discuss Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' interrogatories and
requests for admissions and the inadequacy and evasiveness of Defendants' responses
and Plaintiffs asked Defendants' counsel to comment on the September 19, 2008 filed
partial summary judgment. Defendants' counsel set a meeting time on the next day
(9126108) at his office at 10:OO a.m.
Plaintiffs spent two hours revealing Plaintiffs' legal positioning in the litigation,
requesting discussion of the admissions, interrogatories and the filed September 19,
2008 motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants' counsel spent the two hours in
argumentative posturing and avoiding any discussion of the intended matters and
referenced his scheduling problems with going to Bellingham, Washington to visit his
children, moving his office and aluded to other required time away from the office.

PLAlXTLFFS' EX PARTE APPLICXTIOhi/AMOTIONFOR EXLARGEMENT 0%TIME TO
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Defendants' counsel's only apparent intent on accepting the meeting was to obtain
stipulation from Plaintiffs to reschedule hearing times to better serve his life choices.
The meeting ended with Defendants and Plaintiffs agreeing to submit their
stipulations for the other to consider. On Monday 9/29/2008 a.m. Plaintiffs hand
delivered Plaintiffs stipulation list to Defendants' counsel and agreed to return at the end
of the day to pick up Defendants stipulations (Defendants' counsel did not have paper
work completed). Plaintiffs did pick up Defendants stipulations at the end of the day and
waited to hear from Defendants' counsel. Tuesday evening Defendants' counsel's
secretary called asking why Plaintiffs had not returned the signed stipulations and
Plaintiffs told her they were waiting for Defendants' counsel to call as to what he would
agree to. The next day Defendants' counsel called and in an angry tirade accused
Plaintiffs of reneging on some deal and insulted Plaintiffs' integrity. Plaintiffs asked
Defendants' counsel if he would stipulate to any of the facts Plaintiffs had submitted and
Defendants' counsel angrily ended the conversation and hung up.
As further grounds for Plaintiffs' in support of Plaintiffs' application/motion to
enlarge time for Plaintiffs to name expert witnesses Plaintiffs not only represent that
Defendants' counsel is abusing process by needlessly and/or without cause delaying
motion practice and now does further abuse process of discovery by shortening limited
time for discovery and resolution of undisputed facts not only by the obfuscation of the
admissions requested and interrogatories asked, but also now by shortening the time
available to determine what needs further discovery.
Plaintiffs hold that the difficulties Defendants' counsel has with the extenuating
circumstances of his life and career have no bearing on whether this case will ever be
tried on its merits, rather only on the success he may have in abusing process of this
litigation.
For Defendants failure to show good cause and/or abuse of motion practice
and/or abuse of the process of discovery and for Plaintiffs' good cause shown, Plaintiffs
request Court enter the Ex Parte Order granting the relief requested, rescheduling the
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NAME EXPERT TVImESSES
I

date for naming of expert witnesses to December 31,2008. In the event the Court does
not grant Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application, Plaintiffs request a hearing/conference on this
AppicationlMotion at the earliest date.
On this a s % a y

of October, 200

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Don Halvorson
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001
RONALD J. L N E C K , P.C.
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9
P.O. Box 9344
Moscow, ID 83843
(208) 883-1505
FAX (208) 883-4593
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THX STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
DON & CE-IARLOTTE HAL,VORSON
Ofusband and Wife),
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NORTH LATAW COUNTY EZIGKWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
TEE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, R I C W
HANSEN, SHlERMAN CLYDE, in their individual
capacities; DAN P A m , in his official capacity and
in his individual capacity,
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DEFENDANTS' FIRST MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND BRIEF

)
)
)
)

1

Defendants.

Defendants, through counsel, (i) move this Court pursuant to Rule 2S(c) Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure for its Order protecting Defendants £ram annoyance, oppression and/or undue
burden or expense in responding to each of Plaintiffs' additional discovery requests set forth in
Items 1 through 10 below by vacating such discovery and declaring that additional discovery by
DEFENDANTSyFRST hlOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR EhiLliRGESENT OF
Tl;r\lE ,rtW FOR ATTORnEY FEES Ai'JD BRIEF -- 1

041.5

Plaintiffs not be had except by Court order for good cause shown and (ii) move this Court pursuant
to Rule 33(a)(3) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for its Order vacating PlaintiEs additional
interrogatory requests set forth in Items 1 through 5 below and prohibiting Plaintiffs fi-om serving
additional interrogatory requests in this action without first obtaining an order of the Court upon a
showing of good cause.
Defendants move this Court pursuant to Rule 6(b) I.R.C.P. for an enlargement of time to
respond to Items 1 through 10 below should the Court not vacate such discovery requests.
Defendants move pursuant to Rules 26(c) and (f) and 37(a)(4) that Defendants attorney fees in
connection with tlSs pleading be paid by Plaintiffs wliose conduct necessitated its preparation and
prosecution.

BRIEF
PENDING DISCOVERY REOUESTS AT ISSUE
This motion addresses Plaintiffs' pending discovery requests in this action, as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' Third Interrogatories (Ameberg).
2. Plaintiffs' Fourth hterrogatories (Arneberg).
3. Plaintiffs' Third liiterrogatories (Clyde).
4. Plaintiffs' Third Interrogatories (Hansen).

5. Plaintiffs' Third Interrogatories (Payne).

6. Plaintiffs' Third Request for Admissions (Ameberg).
7. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Clyde).
8. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Hansen).

9. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Payne).
10. Plaintiffs Request fcr Discovery cf NLCKD Standing Operatlog Procedrtresllzolicies.

DEFEhDANTS' FIRST MOTIOX FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR ENLrL-lRGE&ENT
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Items 1 through 10 above are contained in Defendants' First Record Supplement In Support of
Defendants' First Motion for Protective Orders filed herewith ("'Defendants' First Record
Supplement") as Items 1 through 10, respectively.
RULE 33(a)(3) RELIEF
Plaintiffs have previously served discovery requests on Defendants in this action that
Defendants have either answered or responded to, as follows:
11. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Arneberg).
12. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admission (Arneberg).
13. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Payne).

14. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions (Payne).
15. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Hansen).

16. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions (Hansen).

17. Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories (Clyde).
18. Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions (Clyde).
19. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Arneberg).
20. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories mansen).

2 1. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Payne).
22. Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories (Clyde).
23. Plaintiffs' Second Request for Admissions (Arneberg).

Items 11 through 23 above are contained in Defendants' First Record Supplement as
Iterns 11 through 23, respectively.
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Individual Defendants have already responded to interrogatories, including sub-parts,
contained in Items 11, 13, 15, 17 and 19 through 2 2 in the number set forth opposite their name,
as follows:
o h e b e r g - 183
o Hansen- 144

o Clyde - 148
o Payne-189

See paragraph 3 and Items 11, 13, 17 and 19 through 22 of Defendants' First Record
Supplement.
Rule 33(a)(3) I.R.C.P. limits to forty (40) the number of interrogatories that a party is
allowed to serve on another party without obtaining a stipulation from such party or an order of
the court. Plaintiffs have not obtained either. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have now served the
individual Defendants with additional interrogatories, including subparts, contained in Items 1
through 5 above requesting responses related to corresponding, additional requests for
admission contained in Items 6 through 9 m d 23 in the number set forth opposite tlieir name, as
follows:
o Arneberg- 78
o Hmsen-40
o Clyde-40
o Payne-40

See paragraph 3 and Items 1 through 9 and 23 of Defendants' First Record Supplement.
Plaintiffs are in substantial violation of Rule 33(a)(3) in that they have already far
exceeded the number of interrogatories allowed to be served without stip~lationor court order
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and they now propound additional interrogatories in Items 1 through 5 above. Defendants
request that the Court vacate Items 1 through 5 and prohibit that Plaintiffs from sewing
additional interrogatory requests in this action without first obtaining an order of the Court upon
an showing of good cause.

RULE 26(c) RELIEF
Further, prior to sewing Items 1 through 11 above, Plaintiffs had previously served
individual Defendants have already answered those requests for admission, including sub-parts,
contained in Items 12, 14, 16, 18 and 23 in the number set forth opposite their name, as follows:
o Arneberg- 130
o Hansen- 83
o Clyde- 83

o Payne-93.

See paragraph 3 and Items 12, 14, 16, 18 and 23 of Defendants' First Record Supplement.
While Rule 26(a) permits various methods of discovery, the frequency of use of such
methods is subject to Court scrutiny and discretion under Rule 26(c) I.R.C.P. Specifically, Rule
26(c) allows a court "to make any order wlic11 justice requires to protect a party.. . from
annoyance.. . oppl-essionor undue burden or expense.. .." Justice in this case requires
intervention by the Court.
A colnparisoli of Items 11 tfirough 23 above, containing those intellrogatories and
requests for admission that Defendants have already answered or responded to, with Items 1
through 10 above, the interrogatories and admissioli requests that have been recently served and
~ J i c are
h the subject of this motion, demonstrates that the same questions or requests are
addressed in great detail in botfi sets of Itexs. PlaintiffsyRequests f ~Admission
r
numbered 1

DEFEWAWS' FIRST 3fOTfON FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR EhTA.l_RGEhl_EliiT
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through 23 of Items 6 through 9 and corresponding Interrogatory No. I in Items 2 througb 5
(which Interrogatory No. 1 requests, as to each of 40 requests for admission, "all facts on which
you based any part of your responses.. . all documents memorializing each such fact.. . all
persons with knowledge of each such fact.. .." [generally the "Admission Interrogatory"]),
address the width andlor alignment of Camps Canyon Road, subject matter that was already
thoroughly addressed in Plaintiffs7Responses to Defendants' Requests for Admission and
numbered 2,3,4, 13,17,21, and 22 of Items 12, 14, 16 and 18 and numbered 40 through 48 of
Item 14 and corresponding Interrogatory Items 11, 13, 15 and 17, the Admission Interrogatory,
numbered 4,5,6,7,8,9, 10 and 11 of Items 19, numbered 1 through 28 of Item 21, numbered 1
through 8 and 12 of Item 22 and numbered 1 tluough 15 of Item 23. See paragraph 4 and Itenis
2 through 5,12,14,16,18, 19, a i d 21 through 23 of Defendants' First Record Supplement.
Plaintiffs' Requests for Admission numbered 24 through 40 of Items 6 through 9 address
exclusively "standard operating procedure, the "Wagner permit7'and/or NLCHD hearing and
meeting procedures that were already thoroughly addressed in Plaintiffs7Responses to
Defendants' Request for Admission and Interrogatories nuinbered 10 througli 12 and 14 through
17 of Items 11,15, 19,20,23 through 28, and 30 of Items 12,14, 16 and 18,8 througli 10 and
12 thou& 15 of Item 17,12 thou& 16 of Item 19,2 through 24 and 30 of Item 2 0 , l through

22,26,27 of Item 21,2 and 6 of Item 22 and 16 through 31 of Item 23. See paragraph 4 and
Items 11, 12 and 14 tlxougl~23 of Defendants7First Record Supple~ent.
Moreover, in addition to being cumulative of prior discovery, the great majority of
admission requests in Plaintiffs' Items 6 - 9 are improper, being either repetitious,
ar,ownentative, unreasonable, confirsing or a combination thereof. In addition, even though
Items 1 - !1 deal alxost entirely with XLCHD issues and ~ oi st s ~ e pertinent
s
to individual
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Defendants, Plaintiffs' have caused undue burden and expense and annoyance by serving the
identical set of forty (40) requests for admission on the four (4) individual Defendants and not on
Defendant NLCHD.
Despite Plaintiffs' prior discovery excesses, Defendants answered and responded to
Plaintiffs discovery. However, in light of the circumstances of this case and the increasingly
improper and burdensome nature of the discovery contained in Items 1 through 10, Defendants
can refrain no longer fi-om calling Plaintiffs' improper discovery tactics to the Court's attention.
Plaintiffs' discovery approach is repetitious, tedious, detailed and designed to suit Plaintiffs'
confusing legal theories without concern for annoyance, repetition, irrelevancy, andlor expense.
Plaintiffs are engaging in legal ar,ment not factual discovery. Unless restrained by Court
Order, Plaintiffs will continue to barrage Defendants with improper, needless, time consuming,
oppressive and costly discovery requests.
The Court should use its discretion under Rule 26(c) to protect Defendants &on1
LC

annoyance.. . oppression or undue burden or expense." Comstock v. City of New Yovk, 437

N.Y.S. 2d 106,107-108,82 A.D. 2d 805,806-807 (Sup.Ct., App. Div. 1981) (copy attached).
Plaintiffs' constant revisiting of the same subject matter in successive requests is improper. Id.
at 108, 807. As stated by the New York Supreme Court in Comstock, the "combination of overly
comprehensive questions and definitions together with questions and definitions in such refined
detail in the second set of interrogatories is unduly burdensome and oppressive.. .." Id.

The

Comstock Court also declared inappropriate the use of successive sets of discovery requests for
the purpose of "obtaining in exquisite detail a breakdown of the prior responses." Id. Plaintiffs
have been provided with sufficient responses &om Defendants covering all issues of this case to

DEFESDANTS' F E S T MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, FOR ENLARGEMENT OF
TLMIE -h\B FOR ATTOR;Z-JY FEES A2iD BRIEF -- 7

0421

"set the state for meaningfir1 depositions" and to warrant this Court's order that further written
discovery not be had absent Court order for good cause shown. Id.
It is not the duty of the Court or Defendants to ''prune" the discovery requests or to point
out the repetition or impropriety of Plaintiffs' additional requests. It is the duty of the
propounding party, in this case the Plaintiffs, to insure that subsequent interrogatories and
requests for admission do not duplicate or overlap with prior discovery requests or are not
unduly burdensolne and oppressive. Id. Because Plaintiffs have not done so and do not appear
inclined to do so in the future, the Court should vacate the pending discovery requests, Items 1
though 10, and, at a minimum, require Plaintiffs to show good cause why m y additional written
discovery is justified in this case before any hrther written discovery should be permitted of
Plaintiffs. Id.
ATTORNEY FEES
Rules 26(c) and (0and 37(a)(4) provide this Court with discretion to award Defendants
their attorney fees incurred in curbing Plaintiffs unreasonable and improper discovery efforts,
and Defendants respectfblly request that the Court make such an award.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfillly request that Defendants' Motion for Protective Orders and

Motion for Attorney Fees be granted as set forth above.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of October, 2008.
RONAtD J. LANDECK, P.C.

i

By:

\~

Q Z ~ (.L
[ L&L
J

Ron id J. Landeck
Atto eys for Defendants
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I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of October, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below:

DON JXALVORSON
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD
KINDRICK, IDAHO 83537
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[ ] FAX (208) 322-4486
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the circumstances.

C
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, New York.
L. K. COMSTOCK & CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The CITY OF NEW YORK (Bower Bay WPCP)
Defendant-Respondent.
March 24, 1981.
Electrical contractor, which filed action against city,
appealed from order entered by the Supreme Court,
New York County, Sherman, J., which denied
plaintiffs motion for protective order striking
defendant's second set of interrogatories and ordering
that pretrial examination of plaintiff should
commence 15 days after service of plaintiffs answers
to the second set of interrogatories. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, held that combination of
overly comprehensive questions and defmitions
together with questions and definitions in such
refined detail in second set of intenogatories served
upon plaintiff, which had previously answered initial
interrogatories and furnished city wit11 a myriad of
detail in its responses and bill of particulars, was
unduly burdensome and oppressive, particularly in
IigM of fact that simultaneously with the service of
the second set of interrogatories, the city served a
notice of pretrial examination of the plaintiff.
Reversed.
Sandier, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes

U Pretrial Procedure 307A -19

aPretrial Procedure
307.411 Depositions and Discovery
307AIl{A) Discovery in General
307Ak19 k. Discretion of Court. a t
Citzd Cases
Although the Civil Practice Law and Rules set no
limits on what disclosure devices may be used or how
many times they can be used, special tern1 should
esercise its discretion to prevent abuse in light of all

Pretrial Procedure 307A -248.1
Pretrial Procedure
307,411 Depositions and Discovery
307AII(D) Interrogatories to Parties
307AIXD)l In General
307Ak248 Number, Form, and
Inlportance
307Ak248.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 307Ak248)
Combination of overly co~nprehensivequestions and
definitions together with questions and definitions in
such refined detail in second set of interrogatories
served upon plaintiff, which had previously answered
initial interrogatories and fiirnished city with a
myriad of detail in its responses and bill of
particulars, was unduly burdensome and oppressive,
particularly in light of fact that simultaneously with
service of second set of interrogatories, the city
served a notice of pretrial examination of the
plaintiff.
A
=

J
3
J Pretrial Procedure 307A -248.1

307A Pretrial Procedure
307AII Depositions and Discovery
307AIIiD) Interrogatories to Parties
307.411(D) 1 In General
307Ak248 Number, Form, and
Importance
307Ak248.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formeriy 307AiQ.ii.8j
Second set of interrogatories served upon electrical
contractor in its suit against city was repetitious,
burdensome, unreasonable and oppressive, and thus it
was not the duty of court to prune them but, rather, to
vacate them in their entirety.
Pretrial Procedure 307A -95

j07A Pretrial Procedure
307A11 Depositions and Discovery
307AlliC) Discovery Depositions

6 2003 Thoxsort ReutersfiT7est.No Cisi;n to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 2

307AII(C) 1 In General
307Ak95 k.
Other
Remedy,
Availability or Prior Use Of; Successive
Examinations. Most Cited Cases
Although noticing an oral deposition simultaneously
with the service of interrogatories was not necessarily
improper in action brought by electrical contractor
against city, the deposition should proceed before
service of such additional interrogatories as may be
deemed necessary after completion of the deposition.

""106 F. E. Tretter, New York City, for plaintiffappellant.
A. Aiosa, New York City, for defendant-respondent.
""107 Before SANDLER, J. P., and SULLIVAN,
ROSS, CARRO and FEIN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered
October 20, 1980 which denied plaintiffs nlotion for
a protective order striking defendant's second set of
interrogatories and ordering that the pre-trial
examination of plaintiff should commence 15 days
after service of plaintiffs answers to the second set of
interrogatories, reversed on the law and on the facts
and in the exercise of discretion, without costs;
motion for a protective order granted and the
interrogatories vacated, without prejudice to service
of appropriate interrogatories, after completion of the
deposition of plaintiff which shall proceed at a time
and place to be fised by the parties within 15 days
afler service of a copy of this Court's order with
notice of entry.
Plaintiff, an electrical contractor, entered into a
contract with defendant City of New York (City) to
perform electrical work in the construction by the
City of Bower Bay Water Pollution Control Plant in
Queens. During construction, disputes arose between
plaintiff and the City. plaintiff served a summons and
con~plaintalleging in four causes of action a balance
due under the contract, amounts due for extra and
additional work and for damages from construction
delays. The City served an answer and counterclaims,
together with extensive interrogatories, in February
1978.
Two years later, on February 2 1, 1980, the parties
stipulated to the service of an amended complaint in
the fonn annexed to the stipulation and the plaintiff

"806 served its answers to the interrogatories. The
amended complaint alleged three causes of action
instead of four. The claims for the contract balance
and extra work were reduced. The damages sought in
the cause of action for delay were increased. The
exhibits attached to the answers to the interrogatories
included schedules of the amounts of contract monies
paid and due, and a detailed evaluation of pending
change orders, disputed change orders and delays.
Included was a 15-page bill of particulars detailing
the circumstances giving rise to the suit and various
letters respecting time extensions for completion of
plaintiffs work. Although the amended complaint
alleging these three causes of action was not served
until June 13, 1980, it was in the form annexed to the
February 2 1 stipulation. Plaintiffs responses to the
interrogatories were geared to the amended complaint
and in accordance with the relief reauested in the
amended complaint rather than the original
complaint. The City did not move to compel fhrther
disclosure with respect to the interrogatories (CPLR
2124). Instead the City served its answer to the
amended complaint and a second set of
intei~ogatories,32 pages long, containing 104 main
questions, further subdivided into sub-parts and
subdivisions of those sub-parts, in exquisite detail,
totalling over 250 questions. Each interrogatory
adopted by reference ten definitions, some very broad
and others precisely detailed. With its answer and
interrogatories, the City served a notice to take
deposition on plaintiff upon oral examination
including a substantial request for the production of
documents, many of which were also called for in the
interrogatories.
On plaintiffs motion to strike the second set of
interrogatories, Special Term modified some of the
interrogatories and directed that the remainder be
answered prior to the pre-trial examination of
i;!aintiff. P!aintiff appea!ed.
Although we are loathe to interfere with Special
Ternl's exercise of discretion in disclosure matters, it
is plain that here the second set of interrogatories
should be vacated and not be pruned, as Special Term
sought to do. Special Term directed that to the extent
that the second set of interrogatories was repetitious
of the earlier interrogatories, plaintiff might answer
by citing the first set of interrogatories. We disagree.
Altkough the CPLR sets no limits on what
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disclosure devices may be used or how many times
they can be used, Special Term should exercise its
discretion to prevent **I08 abuse in the light of all
the circumstar~ces ( Commissioners of the State
Tnsurance Fund v. News World Communica~ions.
Inc.. 74 A.D.2d 765. 425 N.Y.S.2d 595: *807Clifton
Steel Productions Corp. v. County of Monroe Public
VC'orks Dept., 74 A.D.2d 715.425 N.Y.S.2d 672).
J
2
J ,4n examination of plaintiff's responses to the

initial interrogatories and the exhibits annexed
thereto establishes that plaintiff answered the
interrogatories and furnished the City with a myriad
of detail in its responses and bill of particulars. It has
not been demonstrated that plaintiff's answers were
not responsive. The second set of interrogatories
repeats verbatim a large number of items from the
earlier set of interrogatories. It is not the
responsibility of plaintiff to point out where its prior
responses answered the second set of interrogatories.
It is the duty of the defendant to insure that its second
set of interrogatories does not duplicate the prior
interrogatories. Nor is it appropriate to use a second
set of interrogatories for the purpose of obtaining in
exquisite detail a breakdown of the prior responses.
The combination of overly comprehensive questions
and definitions together with questions and
definitions in such refined detail in the second set of
interrogatories is unduly burdensome and oppressive,
particularly in the light of the fact that simultaneously
with the service of the second set of interrogatories
the City served a ilotice of pre-trial examination of
the plaintiff.
As noted in Commissioners of the State Insurance
Fund v. News World Communications, Inc., supra,
and Clifton Steel Corporation v. County of Monroe
Public Works Dept., supra, interrogatories are
appropriate and useful in enabling the seeking party
to obtain lists and other detaiied information ro set
the stage for meaningful depositions. Here, the
responses to the original interrogatories furnished
more than sufficient information for a fuitful
deposition.

a

The second set of interrogatories is repetitious,
burdensome, unreasonable and oppressive. Under the
circumstances, it is not the duty of the court to prune
them, but rather to vacate them in their entirety (
Horn Coastr!~ction Co. Lcc. v. ICOS Corn. of
America. 63 A.D.2d 939, 406 N.Y.S.Zd 75; Churchill

Computer Corp. v. Haug, 70 A.D.2d 546,
N.Y.S.2d 604).

416

j4J Although we do not now rule that noticing an oral
deposition simultaneously with the service of
interrogatories is necessarily improper (see Barouh
Eaton Allen Corp. v. IBM Cor?.. 76 A.D.2d 873.429
N.Y.S.2d 33), we direct that under the circumstances
of this case the deposition should proceed before
service of such additional interrogatories as may be
deemed necessary after completion of the deposition.
All concur except SANDLER, J. who dissents in a
memorandum as follows:
I agree that the detail and structure of defendant's
second set of interrogatories, particularly in light of
the prior interrogatories and the bill of particulars,
present a substantial question as to whether the
interrogatories are unduly burdensome. On balance, I
have concluded that Special Term's exercise of
discretion was appropriate.
The detailed nature of the interrogatories must be
ineasured against the reality that this is an action
against the City of New York for over $5 million, and
that the resolution of the litigation is likely to turn
upon a complex interaction of developnlents that took
place over a period of time. In addition, I do not
agree with the court that the answers to the
defendant's first set of interrogatories were
satisfactoly. Many of those answers seem to me
obviously vague, general and incomplete.
The nature of the litigation inakes it peculiarly
appropriate for the use of interrogatories to be
followed by an oral deposition. Many of the
questions are particularly suited to the interrogato~-y
device since the answers will frequently require an
examination of records and documents and some
consultation ~ i t hothers. Although answering the
interrogatories ~villimpose some preliminary burden
upon the plaintiff, it seems likely that the ultimate
result will be to reduce significantly the time required
""109 in the contemplated deposition. Conceivably,
full responses to the questions propounded may
ultimately obviate the need for a deposition. In short,
this does not seem to me an appropriate case to
depart from the strong policy in favor of noninterference with Special Term's exercise of
discretion in disclosure mattsrs.
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Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New
York County, entered October 20, 1980, denying
plaintiff? motion for a protective order and ordering
pretrial examination to commence fifteen days after
service of plaintiff's answers to the second set of
interrogatories, should be affirmed.

N.Y .A.D., 1981.
L. K. Comstock & Co., Inc. v. City of New York
80 A.D.2d 805,437 N.Y.S.2d 106

END OF DOCUMENT
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